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Introduction: Imagined Italies—Cinema, Nation, Narration 
  
On a map, it seems so practical, so commonsensical. A seven-hundred mile long 
peninsula bound on its lone continental side by Europe’s tallest mountain range should yield the 
formation of a “natural” nation. Yet it has not. Italy today in many ways still remains how 
Klemens von Metternich imagined it in 1847: “only a geographical expression.”1  
 A common misconception is that Italy has been a cohesive political and cultural state 
since the Renaissance, or even since the Roman Empire. This is partly because the legacies of 
these periods have been co-opted by Western Civilization as a whole. Lost is the fact that the 
Italian North and South had drastically different experiences during both these periods, and that 
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the entire peninsula was controlled by multiple 
foreign powers. Unified Italy is less than one hundred and fifty years old and, possibly more 
astonishing, the modern democratic republic formed only in 1948—a year after India. 
Since unification, Italian nationalism has struggled with an inbetweenness of identity. 
Although economic conditions (the seventh largest GDP in the world) render it an international 
power, Italy is considered a “second-tier” state in the European Union (EU) because of an 
inefficient and corrupt political system and relatively high unemployment rate. According to the 
EU, the Italian South is also one of the most prominent “problem regions” in all of Europe. 
Along with its Latin and Mediterranean heritage, the country’s proximity to Africa underscores 
imaginations of it as a land caught between the two continents. Moreover, Italians are also 
locked in a temporal limbo between the resonance of their ancient history and the ephemerality 
of the present. 
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Perhaps it should be no surprise then, that Italians have internalized their inbetweenness 
into a longstanding dualism between a “progressive” North and a “backward” South. In fact, the 
country has been so caught between the cultural and political remnants from the past and the 
realignments fostered by contemporary processes of globalization that nationalism has loomed 
like a carrot on a stick: always in sight, but never in reach.     
  
A Tale of Two Italies 
Although cultural differences have existed for centuries between a cosmopolitan, 
European-oriented North and a familial, localistic South, Italy at the time of its unification in 
1861 was more economically homogeneous than it is today. The economy nearly everywhere 
was dominated by primary-sector activities at that time. Notably, fifty-two percent of the 
northern population was still involved in agriculture as recently as 1940, with only twenty-two 
percent in industry, and only twenty-six percent in tertiary activities.2 Although northern Italy on 
the eve of World War II was certainly more urbanized, industrialized, and connected to the rest 
of Europe than the entirety of the South (with the exceptions of Rome and Naples), the national 
economy still revolved around small-scale agriculture. The biggest contrast between regional 
economies at that time was small-to-medium-scale commercial agriculture in the North versus 
subsistence agriculture in the South. This functionality had great implications for growth 
potential, particularly in the ensuing postwar years.3  
   The contemporary landscape of a divided Italy became cemented after 1945 by rapid 
industrialization of the North. This region contained the majority of the country’s meager natural 
resources plus ninety-five percent of  the rail network, an established credit system dating back 
to the Medici family, and proximity to northern European markets.4 Financial capital from the 
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Marshall Plan then bolstered these advantages. Scholars have noted that the use of such aid could 
be interpreted as a regional misappropriation of funds considering that southern Italy “was more 
devastated and destroyed than northern Italy during World War II.”5 The country’s newly formed 
democratic government immediately set about nationalizing steel, electronics, transportation, and 
communications industries. Leaders concentrated industrial development in the North because of 
Southern stereotypes that dated back to unification: that region’s lack of an entrepreneurial class, 
widespread clientelistic politics, and a societal arrangement of what sociologist Edward Banfield 
has called “amoral familism,” which refers to a system of localized loyalties within towns with 
little desire to establish mutually beneficial social and trade networks between them.6  
The division between North and South intensified rapidly in the late 1940s as industrial 
growth in the North fueled Italian reconstruction and instigated the “economic miracle” of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. As the neglected “Mezzogiorno” fell behind economically, Northern 
cultural antagonism towards the “backward” South grew proportionately [Fig. I.1].7 In fact, 
Northerners perceived that growth within their industrial triangle (Milan, Genoa, and Turin) was 
held from reaching even higher levels by stagnation in the South.  
  Statements deriding the South as a hindrance to national growth were, in fact, wrong. 
Contrarily, two distinct qualities of that region allowed northern growth to occur initially. First, 
the Southern agrarian economy was the principal supplier of urban foodstuffs nationwide. 
Second, and perhaps more important, the South served as the primary source for industrial labor 
in the North, leading to massive waves of migration. The increasing “backwardness” of the 
Mezzogiorno eventually led the government to attempt more balanced economic growth and 











country’s history: the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Fund for the South). 
In August of 1950, the Italian government passed Law 646, which distributed over ten 
billion dollars to the South for industrial redistribution and development in tandem with 
sweeping land reforms and the development of public works infrastructure. Taking large land 
holdings out of the hands of a small number of owners and giving this acreage to landless 
peasants was viewed as the first step to countering stagnation and inefficiency of the southern 
economy.  
Land reform was viewed as a quick antidote to inefficiency in agricultural production, 
rising internal unemployment, and a rapidly occurring migration from the South to the North. 
Because efforts to fund industrialization in the South were not begun until 1957, however, 
southern cities lagged far behind their counterparts in the North.8 This vast discrepancy between 
a continuously emerging industrial economy in the North and a massive restructuring of 
agricultural lands in the South created unforeseen and undesirable consequences for both 
regions. The lack of employment in the South was in stark contrast to labor shortages developing 
in the North, and this disequilibrium set off the greatest internal migration in Italian history. 
The economic miracle of northern Italy effectively ended in 1965. As the economy 
became besieged by rising inflation, public debt, and unemployment, officials attributed many of 
the troubles to the massive internal migration. Competition over employment opportunities pitted 
northerners against southerners and social conflicts bubbled. Political movements in the North 
sought to sever all ties to the South and rhetoric developed that framed the South and its people 
as “backward,” “wild and primitive,” “corrupt,” and an overall hindrance to Italian national 
growth. Put in terms of culture theory, Northern Italians were asserting the Otherness of the 
Mezzogiorno. This characterization had many components, including language differences, 
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loyalty to the family, town (campanilismo), and the Catholic Church, the tradition of subsistence 
agriculture, and the influence of organized crime. The collective image apparently served (and 
continues to serve) to reduce the guilt associated with subjugation and injustice while 
simultaneously justifying the extraction of labor and resources from areas deemed incapable of 
developing on their own and in their own way.  
  The construction of identity through regional labeling is crucial to understanding 
contemporary Italian political schisms and the development of a northern separatist party, the 
Lega Nord, that has called for an end to southern “welfare” in its quest to sever the South (or, if 
necessary, its northeastern stronghold, called “Padania”) from the modern State. Geographer 
John Agnew’s research is important in this light, for he has traced the country’s current regional 
fracturing back to the uneven regional development during the economic miracle. It is also 
interesting how modern development strategies concerning the South are still often based around 
the construction of the Mezzogiorno as “exotic,” “romantic,” and “frozen in time.” Tourism is a 
good example. International tourists are certainly targeted in this way but so are northern Italians, 
consistent with a strategy of reverse migration from densely populated areas of the North to the 
South. 
The North-South dichotomy also endures via the recent emergence of a “Third” Italy 
comprising the regions of Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, and Lazio. These areas are united more by 
differences they have constructed between themselves and the traditional North and South than 
by any internal cohesion. Their new alliance has fueled smaller-scale allegiances that have 
resulted in a greater number of regional-level drives for special autonomous political status. Such 
standing has been granted to only five of the twenty Italian regions (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto 
Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicily, and Sardinia) but the push is ongoing. 
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The Role of Cinema in Postwar Italian Culture 
This dissertation explores the role of film in the creation of regional identities and 
disparities. I ask how particular Italian film genres represent and contest the realities of specific 
postwar social, political, and economic cycles. The traditional stereotypes of the North and the 
South are mythologized in Italian cinema and filmmakers subvert these descriptions in complex 
and revealing ways.  
  Marcia Landy has bluntly asserted that, “distinctions between the northern and southern 
landscapes of the nation are common in the iconography of the Italian cinema.”9 This division is 
not surprising, of course, because it is predicated on vast regional differences in ethnicity, 
tradition, and language, as well as the dualistic nature of urban versus rural, industrial versus 
agrarian, and country versus city. More particularly, a basic correlation in Italian film can be 
made between the development of thematically united genres and the reality of socioeconomic 
change that informed creation, representation, and imagination of postwar Italian regionalism. 
The advent of film neorealism in the immediate postwar years can be viewed as a 
definitive backlash to the propagandist nationalist productions that had characterized the earlier 
Fascist period. Neorealist films focus on naturalism in terms of lighting, subject matter, the use 
of nonactors, and a reduction in romanticism. As the term indicates, neorealism is bound by an 
ideology of realism in which narrative constructions are often downplayed in favor of 
presentations more akin to the documentation of social, cultural, and political truth. Critic Andre 
Bazin characterized neorealist cinema as united by “realistic treatment, popular setting, social 
content, historical actuality, and political commitment.”10 Films such as Roberto Rossellini’s 
Roma, città aperta (Rome: Open City, 1945), Paisà (Paisan, 1946), and Stromboli, terra di dio 
(Stromboli, Land of God, 1950); Vittorio De Sica’s Sciuscià (Shoeshine, 1946) and Ladri di 
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biciclette (The Bicycle Thief, a.k.a. Bicycle Thieves, 1948); and Luchino Visconti’s La terra 
trema (The Earth Trembles, 1948) are connected by their examination of pressing postwar 
problems within Italian society—the effects of the war, poverty, labor unrest, migration from the 
South, organized crime, and the complexities of nationalism following Fascism. As chapter two 
presents, neorealism embodies a rejection of an authoritarian approach to nationalism via 
cooptation and translation of numerous visual tropes of Fascist cinema. Neorealist directors 
frequently were aligned (and financed by) the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and the ideological 
message of many films reflects an attempt to posit a new sense of nationalism based on 
proletarian unity.    
 Whereas neorealism projected the socioeconomic realities of postwar plight and 
reconstruction, the commedia all’italiana (Italian-style comedy) genre explored the drastic 
economic and social alterations instigated by the economic miracle. The majority of the 
commedie all’italiana confront the shock of Italy’s rapid modernization through a comic 
juxtaposition of an emerging secularized, consumer-based, and urban culture in the North with a 
traditional and antiquated parochialism in the South. In chapter four, I examine the ways that, as 
depicted in commedia all’italiana films, the transformative aspects of industrialization, economic 
growth, and consumption are rendered the progressive bases of the modern nation, and how the 
South, as a consequence, is reinforced as static, backward, and antimodern.      
Concurrent with the commedia all’italiana of the late 1950s and early 1960s was the 
development of what has been variously referred to as the “cerebral decade,” the “existential 
period,” and “auteur cinema,”—the focus of chapter five. This period saw the emergence of 
directors Federico Fellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, Pier Paolo Pasolini, and Francesco Rosi, as 
well as the transitional efforts of Rossellini and Visconti. Although auteur films are characterized 
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by their innovations in formal techniques and narrative construction that imbue a degree of 
theoretical abstraction, the topics that they engage are rooted in the everyday realities of the 
modernizing nation. Many deal with dimensions of contemporary marriage, moral degradation, 
and personal despair. Fellini’s La Dolce Vita (The Sweet Life, 1960) and Antonioni’s 
L’avventura (The Adventure, 1960) and Il deserto rosso (The Red Desert, 1964) focus on the 
emotional milieu of the growing middle class and cultural elite in the prosperous times of the 
economic miracle. Issues of alienation, unfulfilling decadence, and urban anomie are central to 
these works; they lay bare the individualistic obsession of consumer society. 
Fellini and Antonioni predominantly focused on transformations in urban and northern 
life while Pasolini and Rosi entertained greater concerns for the southern peasantry and 
proletariat. Landy, for example, has viewed Pasolini’s films as offering “a perspective on 
modernity and capitalism from the vantage point of subaltern groups” as evidenced by the 
proletarian protagonists of Accattone (1961), Mamma Roma (1962), and Uccellacci e uccellini 
(Hawks and Sparrows, 1966).11 The treatment of peasant life, regional dualism, conflicts 
between urban and rural existence, familism, and the impact of modernization on nationalism all 
serve as means to question Italian history and to devise an expanded theory of cultural politics 
where social and political change are analyzed in terms of hegemony, common sense, and 
folklore. The works of Pasolini and Rosi are the most acute examples of “film inquests”—Cesare 
Zavattini’s term for politically charged films that utilize and transform the cinematic codes of 
neorealism as a means to challenge dominant representations of Italianness.  
Other auteur films and directors of the 1960s were also essential to emerging politicized 
portraits of the North and South. Visconti’s Rocco e i suoi fratelli (Rocco and His Brothers, 
1960) centers on the migration of southern Italians to northern industrial areas and the 
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subsequent clash between differing value systems. Vittorio De Seta’s Banditi a Orgosolo 
(Bandits of Orgosolo, 1960) examines the persistence of Sardinian banditry in the mid-twentieth 
century, positing the phenomenon as a rational response of the poor to economic 
marginalization.   
The 1960s also saw a growth in films that specifically targeted southern audiences. 
Chapter six explores this new “cinema for the South” that was centered on filoni—formula films 
with serial tendencies that were made quickly and cheaply owing to a repetition of sets, stars, 
directors, and costumes. One part of this, the peplum (historical-mythological epic) genre, 
produced some of the most profitable and popular films of all time, thanks in large part to their 
appeal to the terza visione (third screening) audiences throughout the rural South. The success of 
the peplum films fostered the “spaghetti” and Marxist westerns of the 1960s and early 1970s that 
corresponded with the decline of the economic miracle. Rather than simply being Italian 
imitations of American predecessors, spaghetti westerns deconstructed myths of modernization 
through the older lens of the frontier. The western setting served as an appropriate arena to 
entertain and dissect social issues that historically have plagued the South and to react to the 
unevenness of Italian economic development and its subsequent disenfranchisement. The role of 
violence in the making of the modern nation, industrial blight, corruption, familial disintegration 
as a result of “progress,” and a rise in individualism are all central themes in these films. The 
Marxist, or “Zapata” variants injected revolutionary ideology into the western via a focus on 
peasant resistance and armed struggle. Given that this subgenre coincided with a period of 
widespread social unrest and revolt throughout Europe and the developing world, the correlation 
of the Italian South as a “postcolonial” space in the Zapata films reflected broader critiques of 
capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism.   
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 As evident from the titles mentioned above, I am concerned primarily with films 
produced from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. There are three reasons for this. First, 
they mirror the most volatile social and economic phases of postwar Italy, a period that ended 
dramatically with the oil shocks and global economic crises of the early 1970s. Second, a 
dismemberment of the Italian film industry during the mid-1970s caused largely by the global 
economic crisis of that time led to a substantial decline in the number of Italian film productions. 
This was coupled with a deregulation of television in 1976 that greatly reduced attendance at 
movie houses throughout the peninsula and effectively ended cinema’s reign as the most popular 
visual medium. Third, the devolution of powers from the central government to the regions 
reduced the importance of framing the South as antithetical to northern progress. The subsequent 
rise of a “Third” Italy comprising areas in central and northeastern parts of the nation also 
brought into question the relevance of the nation’s historic dualism. Cinematic representations 
and contestations of the “Southern Question” were replaced by an emphasis on internationalism 
characteristic of Italian films of the 1980s and 1990s. These causes and effects of “the end of 
cinema” are contexualized in chapter seven. 
         
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Three primary intents underscore this research. First, I hope to illustrate, via the postwar 
Italian example, the necessity of incorporating analyses of the sociocultural and political 
functionality of cinema into historical geographies of twentieth-century place. As Richard 
Slotkin has suggested, the development of cinema in the 1900s, more so than any other visual 
medium, is tied to: 
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a pattern of reciprocal influence in which the preoccupations of politics shape the 
concerns and imagery of movies, and in which movies in turn transmit their 
shapely formulations of those concerns back to political discourse, where they 
function as devices for clarifying values and imagining policy scenarios.12 
For several decades prior to the midcentury expansion of television, cinema was the principle 
mode of visual communication open to all strata of the population, in both developed and 
underdeveloped countries. As a result, articulations of mass consumption, place iconography, 
and social change attributed to modernization, postcolonialism, and globalization can rely on 
film as a primary resource. Cinema—as an industry, art form, and communicative tool—marks 
the intersection of the economic, social, and political aspects of everyday life more concretely 
than any other medium.  
I also want to encourage other geographers investigating media, particularly those 
examining film, to see the explanatory power and contextual value of genres. This is not to 
downplay the merits of geographical analyses of individual films and directors. But studies of 
genre are more appropriate for elucidating the persistent ideological representations of place that 
are associated with specific stages of social and political transition. The postwar Italian 
experience indicates how genre development is determined as much by consumers as by 
producers. Shifts in genre popularity can be viewed as reflecting changes not only in cultural 
tastes, but also in the ideological tactics involved in the struggle between sustainment 
(hegemonic), metamorphosis (position), and rebirth (maneuver) of dominant forms of 
representation.  
Finally, I intend to suggest that, in the social construction of geographic scale, regions are 
the most complex conceptualization. Whereas the primary determinants of other scales are 
relatively fixed—the local by social relations (the “lived” experiences of the everyday); the 
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national by politics (the administrative borders of the nation-state); and the global by economics 
(the fluidity of capital and labor)—regional boundaries and affiliations are amorphous and in 
constant flux. The region is the most “imagined community” in that its invocation is equally 
responsive to social, political, and economic rhetoric that seeks to solidify or fragment the power 
of opposing scales. In terms of identity, it is difficult to pinpoint the advantages of allegiance to 
the regional, and it is rare that such identification prevails over the local or national. As the 
legacy of the modern Italian State indicates, regions occupy an ‘interpretive middle ground 
between exclusionary national histories and endless local narratives.”13 As such, regional 
divisions are conjured as a means to both synthesize and mediate representational differences 
between the national and local.     
   Three modes of intellectual thought are particularly useful to this analytical inquiry: film 
theory, sociocultural criticism, and cultural geography. Previous attempts to describe, explain, 
and evaluate the selective construction and subsequent implications of film on general culture 
have included a wide spectrum of perspectives. These range from the aesthetic (e.g. Rudolph 
Arnheim, Film as Art, 1957), anthropological (e.g. John Collier, Visual Anthropology, 1967), 
linguistic (e.g. Brenda Bollag, “Words on the Screen: The Problem of the Linguistic Sign in 
Cinema,” 1988), and psychological (e.g. Martha Wolfenstein and Nathan Leites, Movies: A 
Psychological Study, 1950), to Marxist (e.g. Mas’Ud Zavarzadeh, Seeing Films Politically,  
1991) and, more recently, postmodernist (e.g. Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic, 
1992).14 Within film studies, semiotics has become a particularly well-developed approach to 
understanding meaning. As Jeff Hopkins (a geographer) has noted: “the semiotic approach has 
contributed greatly to our understanding of the structure or ‘language’ of film, the constitution of 
the film image or sign, and the communicative processes of film.”15  
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 Although such geographical concepts as “space,” “place,” and “landscape” have been 
employed by film theorists, very little cinematic work has been done by geographers.16 This is 
strange in several ways, for landscape painting, literary landscapes, and landscape photographs 
are established areas of research in cultural geography.17 Yet, as Hopkins has stated: 
Exploring the realm of cinema, perhaps the most popular and accessible mode of 
visual representation in contemporary society with the exception of television, is 
not a radical departure from more conventional landscape studies; it is a 
reasonable augmentation of our principal interest in the “scaping” of our world.18 
The most notable geographical exploration to date of cinema and its ties to identity and 
the construction of place is a 1994 collection of essays Place, Power, Situation, and Spectacle: A 
Geography of Film, edited by Stuart Aitken and Leo Zonn. The underlying theme of these 
variegated investigations is “the way spaces are used and places are portrayed in film [to] reflect 
prevailing cultural norms, ethical mores, societal structures and ideologies.” The usefulness of 
such endeavors is rooted in the realization that “the impact of a film on an audience can mold 
social, cultural, and environmental experience,” to which I would add in light of my intended 
study, the historical experience as well. A primary concern of the authors is the intrinsic 
spatiality of representation and the hegemony of the visual image as part of our social 
subconscious.19  
  The fifteen years since the Aitken and Zonn publication have seen only modest new work 
on film done by geographers, leaving as still true their statement that “the study of the 
interrelations between film and the politics of social and cultural representation offers a 
provocative research setting for geographers, and yet the subject is virtually ignored by the 
discipline.”20 A fair amount of interest has surfaced very recently, however, as seen by a new 
specialty group on “communication geography” within the American Association of 
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Geographers, the creation of Aether: The Journal of Media Geography, thematic issues of 
GeoJournal and The Journal of Geography on the potential uses of film, and a number of essays 
that entertain geographical issues in films.21 The majority of work thus far is centered on singular 
films and directors, theoretical readings of formal tropes (techniques and iconography), and/or on 
the economic mechanisms of the cinema industry. Also, the scale on which place is being 
examined occupies both extremes of the spectrum, from the local examination of the city to the 
global, but with little inbetween. This dissertation helps to move the field beyond such 
limitations. 
In order to contextualize film and genre development, a backdrop of national and regional 
history is needed, especially in its postwar cultural and economic aspects. A detailed historical 
account of the various strategies of framing the South in the postunification period, presented in 
chapter one, provides this context. The underlying economic, social, and political characteristics 
of Italy’s economic miracle—outlined in chapter three—add vigor to an historicization of cinema 
intended to liberate film criticism from the binds of aesthetic abstraction. Analyses of Italian 
demographics, economic growth, cinema-industry infrastructure, and box-office revenues 
provide empirical evidence that supports assertions about regional differences in cinema 
attendance and taste, and the degree of popular dissemination and resonance of individual films 
and genres. Through a critical reading of the films themselves, framed by dissection of such 
components as form (the technical production elements of filmmaking); narrative (the 
construction and organization of subject matter); language (the various directorial motivations 
and characteristics ascribed to shot construction, setting, camera positioning and aspect, and 
editing); and sign (the semiotic deconstruction of image and icon) I elucidate the principal tactics 
used to communicate particular ideological viewpoints concerning postwar transformations. 
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Although I utilize a methodological reading of films and directors similar to approaches 
established by other geographers, I also attempt to view film through a sociospatial lens that 
complements and enhances traditional formalist and auteurist lines of critique. This is 
specifically true in my holistic examination of popular genres as indicators of predominant 
cultural and political trends that define specific phases of postwar development and changes in 
the conceptual framing of the North and South. 
A template for my approach lies in the exhaustive research previously done by 
nongeographers. The impact of the American “western” on regional identity, for instance, has 
been critically examined by film critics.22 However, the greatest contribution to this field is by 
Richard Slotkin, a historian. His Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-
Century America seeks to show how cinema (in this case the western) has cemented and 
transformed ideas about American nation-building in relation to specific socioeconomic periods 
of the last century.23 Tantamount to this exploration is a concern for the politics of myth. 
Slotkin’s suggestion that “within the structured marketplace of myths, the continuity and 
persistence of particular genres may be seen as keys to identifying the culture’s deepest and most 
persistent concerns,” can be translated to the critical analysis of postwar Italian films and their 
impact on the construction of regional identity.24  
Film theorist Angelo Restivo provides additional inspiration in his book, The Cinema of 
Economic Miracles: Visuality and Modernization in the Italian Art Film.25 Although he relies 
heavily on postmodern cultural and film theory, Restivo presents a lucid and powerful 
contextualization of postwar Italian cinema and its connection to “the processes of political and 
economic reorganization that (re)constructed the nation into the Italy we know today; and . . . to 
the larger and more ‘invisible’ processes that have marked the transformation of global 
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capitalism in the postwar period.”26 Whereas Restivo’s focus is on “canonical art films”—
specifically the works of Pasolini and Antonioni—I am concerned equally with popular, 
formulaic cinema. I also deviate from his emphasis on economic change at the national level by 
concentrating on the sociopolitical implications of visual representations of the South.    
The social theory of Antonio Gramsci is an additional anchorpoint for this research. 
Arrested in 1926 by Mussolini’s Fascist regime for his involvement with the Communist Party, 
Gramsci spent twelve incarcerated years producing a vast set of writings on Italian politics and 
culture. Most notable for me are his ideas concerning the Southern Question, in which he 
examines the disparate historical development between northern and southern Italy and the 
subsequent failure of the Risorgimento, Liberal-era nationalism, and Fascism to truly unite the 
country. Inherent in his work is a critical examination of power relations and hegemony in the 
spheres of politics and popular culture. A thorough treatment of Gramsci’s importance to 
postwar Italian thought, cultural production, and politics by Marcia Landy—Film, Politics, and 
Gramsci—serves as a crucial resource for placing Gramscian thinking in modern context.27 
Gramsci’s writings emphasize the importance of viewing mass culture as an arena for 
affirmation and opposition, as a central facet of modern life, and a primary vehicle for the 
transmission of concepts of inclusion and exclusion. His concerns with intellectuals, education, 
and “good” versus “common” sense suggest that the media is an increasingly important source 
for the production and dissemination of knowledge. Stuart Hall’s and Edward Said’s treatment of 
Gramsci in their works on the media and identity also offer excellent frameworks for placing this 
scholar’s ideas in a geographic and modern perspective.28 Linkages among the hegemonic nature 
of popular culture production, film genre, and socially accepted ideas concerning nationalism 
and regionalism are important relationships to establish.  
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Gramsci’s writings were not published until 1948 and were not disseminated nationally 
and internationally until the mid-1950s. As a result, the impact of his work coincides with the 
“new cinema” period. Landy has gone so far as to suggest that “no other figure’s ideas played 
such a large role in the development of post-World War II Italian cinema.”29 Indeed, Gramsci’s 
ghost haunts the ideological underpinnings of contestatory and southernist films of the entire 
postwar period, from neorealism and the “film inquests” of Pasolini and Francesco Rosi to the 
Zapata westerns of the late 1960s and early 1970s.   
 Along with the aforementioned work by geographers, the writings of John Agnew greatly 
inform this research. Agnew has examined contemporary Italian politics and their relation to 
regional constructions within a framework of social theory. His work is indebted to Gramsci, of 
course, and also the writings of several other geographers, including Peter Jackson, Don 
Mitchell, Denis Cosgrove, and James and Nancy Duncan.30 These scholars add credence to the 
examination of culture as a continuously contested process rife with political motivations and 
struggles over power both physically (in terms of spatial divisions and antagonisms) and 
psychologically (the social conscience). Such ideas have direct correlations to Gramsci’s 
writings about power, the implications inherent in the production of culture industries, and how 
hegemonic structures of mass media are mediated by the construction of oppositional identities.  
 Although it may seem odd, Joseph A. Conforti’s book, Imagining New England: 
Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid-Twentieth Century, has also been 
a valuable source of inspiration.31 In approaching “regional identity as the cultural terrain where 
the imagined and historic ‘interpenetrate’,” Conforti illustrates how impressions of New England 
as a natural and static culture region reflect the way “discourses of regional distinctiveness. . . 
established cultural and conceptual order on a dynamic place that did not define itself.”32 In 
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examining the role of popular print media in the construction of New England’s uniqueness, 
Conforti affirms how “visual images accumulated over time distill the perceived cultural essence 
that defines regional identity.”33 Imagining New England also attests to the tenuous nature of 
regional divisions, given that defining characteristics are determined as much by exogenous 
comparisons as by endogenous practices. Thus, regional identities are prone to episodic 
reassessment and reinvention in relation to alterations of opposing regions and scales.  
For postwar Italy, no portrait is complete without including the role of film in 
constructions of national unity, since the history of Italian cinema is the history of the making of 
















The Southern Question and the Roots of Modern Italian Regionalism 
 
With Italy made, we must now make the Italians. 
         Massimo D’Azeglio 
Italy will be whatever the Mezzogiorno will be.1 
                                                    Giuseppe Mazzini 
  
Spoken shortly after the general election for the first Italian Parliament in 1861, 
D’Azeglio’s comment on the monumental task of creating a united state is arguably the most 
quoted line in histories of modern Italy. Certainly the experience of the Italian state since then 
often is viewed as a series of failures—as “incomplete” or “passive” revolutions that fell short of 
constructing a truly populist form of nationalism based on civic consciousness and a collective 
sociocultural identification with italianità (Italianness). The suggested need to “make” Italians 
alludes to two goals of the first unified Italian government that continued to resurface throughout 
the twentieth century: the creation of a top-down version of unification devised by a narrow 
group of political elites, and the reduction of daunting social, political, and economic difference 
at the micro- and macroregional scales.  
 A central hindrance to the newly unified state related strongly to the divergent ways in 
which northern and southern Italy were incorporated. Consolidation of northern territories was 
largely driven by the independence movement generated within the Kingdom of Sardinia 
(centered in Piedmont) under the direction of King Victor Emmanuel II and his Prime Minister 
Count Camillo Benso di Cavour. Following the failure to oust the Austrian Empire from 
Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, and Tuscany in the First Italian War of Independence in 1848, 
Cavour orchestrated a partnership with Napoleon III in 1858 to renew the same quest. With the 
aid of Napoleon’s troops, the Sardinian army forced Austria to hand over Lombardy to the 
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French, who then traded it to the Kingdom of Sardinia in exchange for Nice and Savoy. With the 
campaign deposing Austrian rulers from the central regions as well, the Duchies of Parma, 
Tuscany, Modena, and Romagna voted in 1860 to join the Kingdom of Sardinia, thus completing 
the Second War of Italian Independence. The last piece of the northern puzzle, Venetia, was 
ceded to the Kingdom of Italy by France following the Third War of Independence, which 
coincided with Italian involvement in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.  
 Whereas the northern regions were consolidated via internally generated revolutionary 
wars (albeit achieved only with external support), the southern territories comprising the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies were liberated from Bourbon rule and subsequently integrated into 
the new nation by the military forces of the North. Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had played an 
important role in the Second Italian War of Independence, embarked on his campaign of i mille 
(the thousand) at Sicily in April 1860.2 After taking the island, Garibaldi crossed the Straits of 
Messina and gathered thousands more volunteer soldiers before marching on Naples, the capital 
of Bourbon territory. He gained control of the city easily, but the defeat of the Neapolitan army 
was accomplished only after Piedmontese troops arrived from the north to assist. Along the way, 
this Piedmontese army had captured the Papal States of Marche and Umbria but not Rome and 
surrounding Lazio.3 Despite being forbidden to take Rome by Count Cavour and Victor 
Emmanuel II (who feared an altercation with France), Garibaldi then relinquished control of the 
Two Sicilies to the king, and Victor Emmanuel II formed the Kingdom of Italy on March 17, 






Figure 1.1. The Unification of Italy, 1815-1870. William Shepherd. Historical Atlas. New York: 




For a considerable number of southerners, political incorporation into the Kingdom of 
Italy amounted to little more than a transfer of their subordination from one foreign monarch to 
another. Instead of a democratic system of representation based on universal suffrage and 
federalist principles, the new state simply expanded the Piedmontese constitutional monarchy 
throughout the peninsula. Perceived as a continuation of external occupation, attempts to 
establish Piedmont law in the South were met with widespread rebellion. Between 1861 and 
1866, hundreds of incidents occurred, primarily in Puglia, Molise, Basilicata, Campania, and 
Sicily. The North, in response, sent in over a hundred and twenty thousand troops to squash 
brigandage in the South, an endeavor known as the War of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. As 
John Dickie has noted, this conflict served as a precursor to North-South relations in the 
postunification period for, “without having a declared beginning or end, the war continued for 
almost a decade, cost more lives than all other battles of unification put together, and at its peak 
in 1863 necessitated the deployment of about two-fifths of the effective strength of the Italian 
army.”4 An actual political-geographical unification of Italy was only realized in 1870, after the 
successful capture of Rome and the containment, at least for a brief period, of southern 
insurrection.      
That the incorporation of the southern half of the peninsula and Sicily into the nation was 
accomplished by force instead of consent speaks to only part of the “Italian problem.” When the 
Kingdom of Italy was created, the peninsula and the islands of Sardinia and Sicily contained 
twenty-two million people. However, the electorate totaled only five hundred thousand, less than 
three percent of the populace, and all of these voters resided in the North.5 Cavour’s Italian 
Liberal Party (PLI) maintained a dominant position within parliament from 1861 to World War I 
despite fracturing into rightest (Liberal-Conservatori) and leftest (Sinistra Liberale) branches in 
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the 1870s.6 The only tangible threat to the party’s hegemony during what is now known as the 
Liberal Period (1870-1915) was mounted by the Italian Republican Party (PRI) near the turn of 
the century.7 Founded to honor the principles of Giuseppe Mazzini, the PRI sought to convert the 
centralized state from constitutional monarchy to democratic republic. What is essential to note, 
however, is that, regardless of ideological differences, all officials in the national government 
during the Liberal Period came from the same sociopolitical class. Even though suffrage was 
expanded in 1882 to include twenty-eight percent of the male population, educational 
qualifications barred the vast majority of southerners from the process. In fact, only seven 
percent of the entire population of the Mezzogiorno was eligible to vote in 1910.8  
Incorporation of the South into the national economy and social network was at least as 
perplexing as equitable electoral representation. Bourbon rule firmly entrenched latifondismo in 
the South—a system of economic production and social relations that combined elements of 
feudalism and small-market capitalism. At the center were latifondi, immense landed estates that 
each controlled thousands of people, overseeing employment and wages, extension of credit, 
access to legal and medical services and state institutions, enforcement of taxation, and the 
dispersal of force. At the time of Garibaldi’s conquest, an estimated seventy-five percent of the 
employed population of the Two Sicilies was classifiable as peasant (subsistence), sharecropper, 
or day-laborer (braccianti).9 It was an inefficient agrarian economy predominantly based on 
extensive agriculture with little industrial development outside of localized metallurgical, 
mining, and handcraft endeavors centered in Naples and Palermo. Some citrus crops and grains 
were exported to France, Spain, and North America, but ties to northern Italian markets were 
virtually nonexistent.10 Any attempt to overcome this void was hindered by competition with the 
established intensive-commercial agriculture of the North.  
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The majority of southerners at the time of unification were rural, poverty-stricken, and 
illiterate. The first two of these conditions suited Bourbon rulers, for their ability to control the 
region hinged greatly upon the subordination of the masses via collusion with a small class of 
landowners. The substantial illiteracy rate (estimated at eighty percent in 1870), in contrast, had 
more to do with the absence of Bourbon action—in other words, their lack of institutional 
promotion. The rulers left educational provision entirely to the Catholic Church, and this 
responsibility was retained throughout the Liberal Period since the State lacked the resources to 
start its own secular system.11 Together, these conditions contributed to a pervasive and 
disintegrative social system of “parochial familism,” whereby preservation of the traditional 
family was paramount and any sense of civic allegiance was limited to the local level.   
Mazzini’s prognosis that began this chapter stands as one of the first identifications of the 
Southern Question. Taken at face value, his suggestion that the nation will be no stronger than its 
weakest part is lucidly pragmatic. The incorporation/assimilation of the South into an Italy 
constructed in the image of the North exists as the central determining factor for the achievement 
of national unity. As a consequence, the Southern Question acts as both a regional and national 
issue. A deeper understanding of Mazzini’s politics, however, reveals his comment as more of an 
apocryphal warning to the liberal-controlled government. An ardent proponent of democratic 
republicanism, Mazzini was dismayed by extension of the constitutional monarchy to the new 
nation. He argued that unification without the participation of the masses was doomed to fail. 
Perhaps more apropos was his disdain for the Liberal Party’s treatment of the South. He saw this 
as “nothing short of wanton imperialism,” in which “the desire to enrich themselves at the 
expense of millions is justified by brutally imagining the peoples of the Mezzogiorno as savage 
and foreign children incapable of directing their own salvation.”12 
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Constructing an image of the Mezzogiorno as a colonial space outside the “real” Italy 
was a central facet of the nationalist strategy enacted by the Liberal Party. Such a framing 
strengthened northern claims of superiority and rationalized southern dependency and 
subordination. However, representing the Mezzogiorno as a socioeconomic Other in this way 
highlights a great paradox of Italian nationalism, for “the way that the representatives of the new 
national order conceived of the South as alien to an imagined Italian nation was part of the 
process in which it was incorporated into the Italian state.”13 Although initiated during the 
Liberal Period, this core/periphery relationship between the regions has persisted throughout all 
major political eras since unification, and is still evident today. At the very least, the North-South 
dynamic reinforces the notion of geographic scale as social constructed, and the nation-state 
itself as an “imagined community” instead of a simple physical-geographical reality.14 
 
The South of the South: The Mezzogiorno in Italy and Europe 
 Even though the Southern Question “has been taken to emblematize the problem of state 
formation since 1859,” recent scholarship has challenged whether it is any longer relevant to the 
modern Italian state.15 One economist has gone so far as to call for “abolishing the Mezzogiorno” 
altogether, viewing the delineation as no longer viable given the considerable economic 
development of the South since 1950.16 Certainly globalization, via the expansion of neoliberal 
capitalism and transportation, communication, and technology networks, has diminished the 
primacy of the nation-state. The growth of European supranationalism, epitomized by the 
European Union (EU), has similarly encouraged the transfer of allegiance and economic 
competitiveness away from the national level to the continental, regional, and local. These 
factors, coupled with cultural and economic assimilation over the last fifty years, seemingly 
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depreciate the importance of national unity and therefore the need to perpetuate the negative 
framing of the South. 
  However, for Italy, membership in the EU has reawakened internal regional 
antagonisms. The paradox of European supranationalism is that, while nations have become 
politically integrated, economic disparities between regions have intensified. As Benito Giordano 
has acknowledged, EU membership has recreated the post-World War II divide between North 
and South as “the implementation of policies designed to reduce barriers to free-trade in pursuit 
of a level European ‘playing field’ have actually contributed to a divergence in regional 
economic imbalances . . . .”17 In accordance with the goal of creating a Europe “of the regions” 
as opposed to a Europe “of the nations,” the EU formed the Committee of European Regions 
(COR) in 1994. In theory, COR involved a devolution of power, as regions were granted direct 
access to decision making and policy formation. The agency devised Regional Development 
Plans (RDP) for the poorest regions, a classification that befell the Mezzogiorno. Not 
surprisingly, the language of the RDP for the Italian South resembled that of the postwar Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno. Both called for reform of the agricultural sector, subsidies for industrial 
development, and promotion of the South’s supposed competitive advantage in tourism.  
 To many northerners, the RDP amounted to little more than a continuation of welfaristic 
handouts to the South, a view epitomized by the Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) political 
party.18 Formed in 1991, the general platform of the LN centers on the transformation of Italy 
into a federalist republic. At times, the party has advocated succession of the northern regions to 
form an autonomous nation called “Padania.” In other moments it has been less extreme, calling 
for the division of Italy into three semiautonomous macroregions called Padania, Etruria, and 
Sud. Since the formation of the EU, LN officials have frequently used the Union’s phrase the 
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“Europe of the regions” and the policies of COR to justify their political goals. The rhetoric is 
markedly antisouthern in tone, as summarized by a statement from the longtime leader of the 
LN, Umberto Bossi: “There is a cultural battle going on in this country: between the efficient, 
European culture of Milan and the culture of institutional inefficiency and collaboration between 
mafia and politics in Palermo.”19 Other representatives of the LN have been even less restrained, 
and their entire campaign has always been acutely aware of the importance of the media in 
constructing a derogatory image of the South.20 
The coincidence of European supranationalism and the regional autonomist movement of 
the LN is indicative of today’s amorphous image of the Italian state. On the global scale, Italy is 
considered one of the most advanced countries in the world. At the continental level, however, it 
is seen as backward compared to its northern counterparts, stigmatized as “Mediterranean” and 
thereby tied to Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and even northern Africa. This negative 
perception of Italy as Europe’s “South” is framed as the fault of the country’s internal South.  
The approach of the LN to this problem is essentially to sever the Mezzogiorno from the true 
“European Italy” by giving the region “back to Africa where it firmly belongs.”21 Such rhetoric 
is extreme but powerful and has led John Agnew to assert that: “The Northern League may be 
the first authentic European postmodern territorial political movement in its self-conscious 
manipulation of territorial image to create a sense of cultural-economic difference within an 
existing state.”22  
The reason I mention this contemporary example of the resurgence of regionalism is to 
highlight the enduring nature and political relevance of derogatory images of the South generated 
from the North (of Italy and Europe). Still viewed as the “ball and chain” that prevents the nation 
from claiming its position as international superpower, the South is rendered incapable of 
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devising its own identity and unable to transform its feudal economy and antiquated social 
customs. My point for this chapter and those that follow is to illuminate the representational 
patterns used to depict the South that have persisted through all major episodes of political 
reorganization since the Risorgimento. Although my focus is the first half of the Republican era 
(1945-1975), my intention is to illustrate the “vicious cycle” of southern stereotyping that has 
developed from Unification, the Liberal Period, and Fascism to the emergence of regional 
autonomy and the “Third Italy” in the 1970s and the macroregional secessionist movements of 
the 1990s. In the one hundred and fifty years since formation of the modern state, the South has 
consistently been reproduced as the cause of Italy’s weak sense of nationalism.  
Although the ways in which the South has been made the scapegoat for the nation’s ills 
has been undertaken differently in specific historical periods, every representation falls within 
one of three basic categories. As Agnew has delineated: 
Projecting qualities drawn from a rendering of a specific historical experience of 
one place (England, the West, or the United States for Italy; northern Italy for the 
Italian South) onto terrestrial space in general promotes three dominant tendencies 
in social science. One is the tendency to essentialize, or identify one trait as 
characterizing a particular spatial unit (e.g. caste in India; Mafia in Sicily; 
political instability in Italy as a whole). A second is a temptation to exoticize, or 
focus on differences as a single criterion for comparison between areas. 
Similarities or universal conundrums (e.g. barriers to political participation, 
difficulties of social mobility) are thereby ignored. The third is a tendency to 
totalize comparisons, or turn relative differences into absolute ones. The whole of 
society is thereby made recognizable by any one of its parts.23 
 
Of these three, the tendencies to exoticize and essentialize have dominated characterizations of 
the South. They enframe the representational process as a complex dualism. The South 
recurrently has been imagined as both exotic/picturesque and antiquated, immoral, and 
backward. The former envisionment can be either positive or negative. Some have painted 
romantic views of the region as unspoiled physical spectacle and repository of a simpler way of 
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life attuned to the natural world, while others have imagined a bountiful land inhabited by 
savages and a place more African than European. In contrast, the latter stereotype is wholly 
negative. It positions the South as needing authoritarian guidance from the central State because 
of socioeconomic backwardness and/or a culture of criminality and religious superstition. Both 
tactics situate the South as the Other of northern Italy and Europe. And in so doing, each infuses 
a fear of radicalism (e.g. brigandage, peasant uprisings, communism) and difference (e.g. skin 
color, dialect, customs).  
 Internal tendencies to exoticize and essentialize the South must be understood as 
reactions to the region coming to represent the entire nation for outside observers since 
Unification. In his inquiry on the Italian national character, Alessandro Cavalli has shown how 
descriptions of Italians made by foreigners overwhelmingly focus on categories internally 
associated with southerners. These include familism, localism, clientelism, fatalism, overt 
sexuality, cunning, deceitfulness, and violence. Cavalli adds how these impressions of 
Italianness are predominantly vices rather than virtues. Just as the classically Neapolitan 
strategies of arte di arrangiarsi (art of getting by), cavarsela (finding a way out), and tirarsi 
fuori dalle difficoltà (getting out of trouble) are perceived by northern Italians as immoral actions 
instead of rational techniques, localism and familism in reference to all Italians are traits 
symptomatic of antimodernism and parochialism.24  
 Cavalli’s findings hint at the inbetweenness of Italian nationalism—a collective civic 
spirit and culture that is neither quite North nor South, European nor Mediterranean, core nor 
periphery. As Antonio Gramsci opined in the 1920s, the enduring feature of the Italian nation-
state since its inception has been the divide between North and South, which continually requires 
reification. It is obvious that, ninety years later, this is still the case. Identifying the ways that this 
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division has been reaffirmed since Unification is therefore essential to understanding the 
longstanding difficulty of creating a sense of national unity.  
 
Imagining the Mezzogiorno  
 Any attempt to summarize the literature on the South is a foolhardy endeavor. As the 
Italian scholar Piero Bevilacqua has remarked, “Since 1860, no place, ideal, person, or event has 
been analyzed, dissected, constructed, and distorted to the extent the Mezzogiorno has in the 
historiography of modern Italy.”25 He relates this breadth of scholarship to the fact that the 
region continually has been identified as a “problem.” As such, the South has represented a 
“perpetual hypothesis” for researchers who have sought to identify both the causes of and 
solutions to the broader issue of Italian nationalism. In the last twenty years, engagement with 
the Southern Question has developed a more revisionist slant, with focus moving from analysis 
of cause and effect to the demythification of southern stereotypes. In his review of this “new 
southernist agenda,” John Davis has identified the unifying factor as a methodological shift away 
from “political history toward social history and the historical sociology of politics and power, 
from macro- to microeconomic analysis, from the center to the periphery, from the history of 
political movements and organized labor to the history of social formation and social 
relations.”26 
 This postmodern approach is epitomized by the research endeavors of the Istituto 
Meridionale di Storia e Scienze Sociali (IMES). Founded in 1986 by Bevilacqua and Augusto 
Placanica, IMES fosters collaborative, interdisciplinary studies of the South and its quarterly 
journal, Meridiana, has become the “standard-bearer for new approaches to the Mezzogiorno.”27 
The majority of literature produced by IMES is supportive of one or more of its three principal 
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goals: to dispel concepts of southern uniformity (e.g. economic and social backwardness); to 
divorce the history of the South from its reduction to the Other of the North; and to encourage 
pensiero meridiano or “southern thinking”—internally generated solutions to regional 
development. 
 To these ends, the revisionist historiography has had a remarkable impact. Reappraisals 
of southern agriculture during the Liberal Period have refuted longstanding associations of 
economic stagnation and social injustice ascribed to the latifondi with case-study evidence that 
suggests high levels of flexibility, specialization, efficiency, and wage protection throughout the 
system.28 Additional studies have challenged conceptions of homogeneity and immobility within 
the southern economy. These findings highlight historical examples of spatial differentiation and 
innovative adaptation to competition and global market fluctuations.29 Scholars have also made 
great strides in undoing the ideological framework that poses the South as the antithesis of the 
North. Some have reversed the dialectic, seeing the history of northern Italy through the 
comparative lens of the South and reframing the problems of southern underdevelopment as a 
consequence of a “Northern Question.”30 Others have attempted to wrest the South from 
comparisons with the North altogether by emphasizing southern familism, economic 
improvisation, and artistry as positive traits worthy of regional pride and unity.31       
 Although this new historiography has done much to discredit the negative stereotypes of 
the South, it largely ignores the historical contexts in which these images have been created and 
reaffirmed. This is partly the result of the methodology employed. Jonathan Morris has defined 
the standard approach as microstoria—microscale analyses that “attempt to capture a ‘holistic’ 
picture of human interrelationships, which, of necessity, favoured the intensive study of a single 
episode, enterprise, family or, above all, community.”32 This has produced a patchwork of 
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localistic and particularistic evidence that, while enlightening, ultimately neglects questions of 
how macroregional antagonisms have been reified and why they persist as the most prominent 
and politically relevant. Dickie has summarized this void: 
The new southern historiography has done much to puncture stereotypes of the 
South. But it has yet to address systematically the historical task of analyzing the 
various ideas of the South produced at various times. To put it in philosophical 
terms, historians of the South have shown us the gap between stereotypical 
utterances about the Mezzogiorno and their referent, but they have not shown us 
the relationship between those utterances and their context.33 
 
Beyond simple identification, Dickie has contributed greatly to rectifying this absence. 
His book, Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes of the Mezzogiorno, 1860-1900, along with 
Nelson Moe’s The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Question, and 
Christopher Duggan’s The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796 stand as the best 
attempts to contextualize the use of southern stereotypes in the nation-building process. 
Together, these books constitute an exhaustive account of the sociopolitical motivations and 
power relations underlying the various depictions of the South since the Napoleonic Era.   
With concern for my dissertation objectives, it is important to note that Dickie’s and 
Moe’s analyses end around 1900, and while Duggan does continue to the present, he does not 
extend his political situation of regional stereotypes into the twentieth century. Focus in all three 
works is squarely on the first thirty years following Unification. This acknowledgment 
underscores my concentration on the contextualization of regional stereotypes in the first thirty 
years of the Republican Period starting in 1948. My intent is to show how representational 
images of the South following Unification have been reiterated, reified, and contested in the 
postwar era. In order to explain this relationship, it is important to briefly outline some of the 
dominant visions of the South constructed during the principal political phases leading up to the 




 Popular impressions of the peninsula during the first half of the nineteenth century related 
strongly to an external perception of cultural and economic regression following the 
Renaissance. Italy’s transition from Europe’s “museum to its mausoleum” was partly a function 
of a radical inversion of continental supremacy from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as primary divisions were solidified between 
former and current imperial powers and Protestant and Catholic blocks.34 Italians as a whole 
were measured against the glorious pasts of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance, which 
easily overwhelmed all cultural, political, or economic achievements of the modern territory. 
Delineations of regional subdivisions within the peninsula were derived primarily from 
distinctions in physical geography.  
 The majority of images during this time were constructed and disseminated by Northern 
European novelists and travelers. Montesquieu’s book, The Spirit of the Laws, influenced many 
writers of the early nineteenth century who utilized his theory of climatic influence as scientific 
justification for their portrayals of Italians as dilatory, uncivilized, and violent. He posited that 
the effect of temperature on the body substantially influenced temperament and character. Cold 
climates rendered inhabitants vigorous and bold yet dispassionate, whereas hot climates 
produced sensual pleasure-seekers whose productivity was hindered by their heat-induced 
lethargy and irritability. Not surprisingly, Montesquieu’s France occupied the center of the 
temperate zone that imbued its residents with only the positive qualities of the other two areas. 
The Alps provided a natural southern border for his division of the continent. Relegation of the 
Italian peninsula to the hot zone provided a convenient explanation for that territory’s lack of a 
unified government, economic dynamism, and social progressivism. Moe has shown that such 
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emphasis on environmental determinism in representations of Italy was tied to a northern 
obsession with mapping the boundaries of Europe during this period.35 Claims of international 
superiority based on the cultural, political, and economic commonalities of the northwestern 
nations necessitated the exclusion of Italy from any definition of Europeanness. 
Following Montesquieu’s guide, writers and politicians such as Charles-Victor de 
Bonstetten, the Marquis de Sade, William Gladstone, and Ernest Renan attempted to identify 
Europe’s cultural boundaries. In relation to Italy, the southern continental border moved farther 
and farther south as more travelers published their experiences of the peninsula. The dividing 
line was at first the Alps, then the Garigliano River (the border between Lazio and Campania), 
and then Naples itself. A particularly influential account was that of Augustin Creuzé de Lesser, 
a French traveler and Napoleonic administrator. In his book, Voyage en Italie et en Sicilie, he 
proffered the notion of a distinct North-South divide, claiming that “Europe ends at Naples and 
ends there quite badly. Calabria, Sicily, all the rest is part of Africa.” Echoing the ideas of 
Montesquieu, Creuzé de Lesser based his categorization of the southern populace as “permeated 
by slothfulness, immorality, and savagery” on the harshness of the southern sun that “renders the 
land desolate and inhospitable and the men idle.”36 
In some instances, images of the Mezzogiorno morphed into exotic and alluring 
metaphors of the South as a preserve of the picturesque—a land that lent itself to northern 
European travelers who wished to experience “Africa without leaving the continent” or the 
juxtaposition of past and present where “an uncivilized state [exists] side by side with 
civilization.”37 Although generally denunciatory towards the South (especially Naples), de Sade 
identified a redemptive function in the region’s primitiveness when he asked: “Is it not a blessing 
for Europe that there are belated provinces like these whose backwardness enables us to measure 
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the progress of the others?”38 In this way, the South also represented Rousseau’s mythical state 
of nature—a place “untouched by and opposed to Europe’s stale and artificial civilization” in 
which the sultry climate, subtropical flora, and unspoiled coastlines rendered it a “paradise 
inhabited by devils.”39 
 
Unification 
 In the fall of 1860, just months prior to the formation of the Kingdom of Italy, the 
northern general Luigi Carlo Farini reported to Count Cavour about the conditions he 
encountered in the South. His bleak assessment read: “What lands are these. . . ! What 
barbarism! This is not Italy! This is Africa. Compared to these peasants the Bedouins are the 
pinnacle of civilization.”40 The appalling situation of the region was initially blamed on the 
former Bourbon rulers. Piedmontese administrators believed that, with this tumor excised, the 
Mezzogiorno would regenerate into a “gentle and happy state promised by the natural 
environment.” However, as southerners rebelled against northern intrusion, the prognosis for the 
region changed and the dominant image reverted to framing the South as “a happy land rendered 
unhappy by men.” 41 
 In their “irrational and violent resistance” to the benevolent attempts by Piedmont 
officials to instill “proper institutions and civility,” southerners were cast as “a cancer that if left 
uncontrolled, [would] spread and infect the rest of Italy.”42 Action was therefore necessary, even 
military force. But to justify such measures, it was essential to disseminate even more extreme 
images of southern barbarism and immorality. During the first two decades of Unification, “no 
phenomenon evoked the South more powerfully in the imaginary of the middle and upper classes 
than brigandage.”43  
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 Photographs and artist renderings of brigands torching buildings and fields, rotting in 
prison, and hanging from scaffoldings circulated widely in northern periodicals and firmly 
settled public opinion on the matter. The Pica law of 1863 legalized both the suspension of civil 
liberties in the region and the use of military force to curtail further rebellion. It cast a wide net 
by criminalizing not only overt acts such as food and tax riots, land occupation, castle rustling, 
and destruction of property, but also the more elastic offense of manutengolismo—aiding and 
abetting brigands. Using this power, authorities waged a campaign of intimidation via 
widespread arrests for relatively minor offenses.44 
 The image of the South as a lawless frontier legitimated a program of forced assimilation, 
and thus of continued outsider occupation and rule. Gone were idealist visions of integration and 
complementation. According to this authoritarian spatial logic, “the South [existed] outside the 
law as its spectator, the brigands outside as its object,” which placed the task of “making the 
southern peoples understand the National Idea” in the hands of the army.45  
 Noteworthy is the way that the image of brigandage was symbolically inverted by 
southerners themselves. Banditry in particular was ascribed an air of patriotism by which any 
attempts to subvert foreign domination, regardless of the atrociousness of methods, were 
heralded as noble. Tales of bandit-heroes fighting against the advancements of a monolithic and 
inhumane imperialist State developed in southern folklore. Existing in the tenuous space between 
individuality and community, morality and immorality, the image of the bandit, in its 
“combination of romanticism and brutality, of exoticism and squalor,” encapsulated the 





The Ascendancy of the Left and Meridionalismo 
 The imagery of southerners as primitive savages remained a dominant stereotype 
throughout the Liberal Period. Under the influence of criminal anthropologists such as Cesare 
Lombroso, Alfredo Niceforo, Enrico Ferri, Raffaele Garofalo, Giuseppe Sergi, and Paolo Orano, 
a literature of racist positivism developed as a means to scientifically explain southern deviance 
and backwardness. This rhetoric presenting physiognomic and sociobiological characteristics as 
indisputable evidence of the differences between “Aryans” of the North and “Mediterraneans” of 
the South again served to justify military excursions in the South. It framed the region as an 
experimental proving ground for subsequent imperialist endeavors in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 
Libya. 47  
 The coming to power of the Left in 1876 marked the entry of the southern ruling classes 
into national political life and thus a change in regional portrayals. A group of southern 
intellectuals referred to as meridionalisti (southernists) set the new tone, notably Pasquale 
Villari, Giustino Fortunato, Leopoldo Franchetti and Sidney Sonnino. These men conducted their 
own field-based studies of the Mezzogiorno that illuminated government failures to understand 
and address the spatially unique socioeconomic problems of the region and identified 
characteristics of southern society itself that deterred the pursuit of modern objectives.48 As 
ardent supporters of a unified state, the meridionalisti intended, via empirical analysis, to 
“combat ignorance about the South and offer a true image in its place”—an image that, devoid of 
ideological underpinnings and myth, would isolate the sectors of southern society most in need 
of State intervention.49   
 Although  meridionalisti contributions to a more objective and empathetic understanding 
of the conditions of the South during this period cannot be denied, they witnessed firsthand the 
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cooptation of their findings to support the continuation of southern subordination and exclusion. 
Reports of the widespread influence of the Sicilian mafia and Neapolitan camorra, intended to 
highlight the need for State encouragement of more dynamic forms of agriculture and the 
creation of a class of peasant landowners, were repositioned by the political right as evidence of 
an inherent southern criminality. Assessments of the southern economy as undifferentiated and 
too heavily agrarian, meant to encourage greater industrial subsidies and incentives, were instead 
accepted as confirmation of the region’s lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Similarly, the South’s 
extraordinary unemployment level was framed as a consequence of overpopulation rather than a 
function of feudal land ownership divisions left over from Bourbon rule.   
 The ways in which the works of the early southernists were transfigured into nation-
building dialogue highlights a primary weakness of their approach. Attempts to scientifically 
define the specificity of the South and its differentiation from the North reinforced the idea that 
this region lay outside the Italian nation. Constructions of the Mezzogiorno produced by the 
meridionalisti were therefore stereotypical in that “they were integral to the way a set of values 
and a cultural identity were articulated: they emerged within specific discourses of moralism, 
patriotism, liberalism, and positivist social analysis.”50 Villari’s claim that the South was both the 
nation’s “greatest moral danger and its ultimate salvation” symbolized the emerging perception 
of the Mezzogiorno in the last decades of the nineteenth century as the testing ground of Italy’s 
modernity, the measure of its claims to civility, and the focus of its national solidarity.51  
  
Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Hemorrhaging of the South  
The years between 1900 and 1918 produced a multitude of political, economic, and social 
changes for Italy that, in many instances, laid the foundation for the nation’s extraordinary 
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development in the middle decades of the twentieth century. For the South, however, this period 
was defined almost exclusively by massive emigration. Although the number of Italians who 
moved abroad between 1861 and 1900 was a substantial seven million, two-thirds of these were 
from the North and over half migrated to other European countries. This was seen as a sign of 
progress in some ways, part of the priority of the first Italian government to connect the North to 
the rest of Europe (both physically and ideologically). The modernization of transportation 
routes through the Alps, such as railways over the Brenner Pass (completed in 1867) and Fréjus 
Tunnel (completed in 1871), facilitated the movement of these migrants. From 1900 to the end of 
World War I, however, emigration flows shifted dramatically. Of the eleven million people who 
left the peninsula during this time, an estimated eighty percent came from the South and their 
primary destinations were North and South America. This staggering total amounted to a loss of 
over thirty-five percent of the total population of the Mezzogiorno in less than twenty years.52  
The “hemorrhaging of the South” had numerous causes and consequences. What is 
important to stress here is the way that southern emigration was framed politically as a solution 
to the “southern problem” and how this view was subsequently incorporated as a core component 
of a nationalist campaign centered on colonial expansion. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the 
primary tactic for instilling a sense of national pride amongst the southern masses was their 
inclusion in civil service positions and the armed forces. The financial and political costs of this 
strategy were exponentially less than those required by the sweeping structural changes 
suggested by the meridionalisti. Many southernists did support the expansion of the central state. 
However, their visions of industrial subsidies, land reform, and infrastructural improvements that 
would foster growth of a southern middle class were eschewed by both the political left and right 
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who preferred that government intervention in the South be limited to the bureaucratic sphere, in 
which clientelism functioned as the rule of law.   
Federal positions of localized power were awarded to those who vowed to provide voter 
support for the ruling national parties. The creation of thousands of State jobs in the South by 
leaders of the left (Francesco Crispi) and right (Giovanni Giolitti) was meant to symbolize the 
government’s incorporation of southerners into the national realm. In actuality, this process 
reinforced the power of southern landowners (who were appointed to the majority of posts) and 
the Liberal Party while doing little to alleviate chronic unemployment and poverty among the 
southern working classes. Duggan has suggested that the subsequent associations of southern 
bureaucracy with corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency after the turn of the century were 
exactly what the Liberal Party leaders had hoped for.53 If the efforts of the State to include the 
South in the nation-building process were perceived to fail because of southern crookedness and 
campanilismo, then other forms of government intervention could be preemptively scuttled, 
based on the rationale that southerners would corrupt any and all programs of assistance.54 
As economic conditions worsened, emigration rapidly increased. To better control the 
mass exodus from the South, the State formed the Commissariat of Emigration in 1901. 
Politically, the agency was portrayed as benevolently concerned for the well-being of departing 
citizens. It fixed ticket costs for overseas voyages, provided health care and inspections for 
emigres, and brokered agreements with receiving countries to help care for the people upon 
arrival. Its underlying intent, however, was to facilitate and expedite the process. In 1903, the 
Commissariat established Palermo and Naples as the primary ports of embarkation for the entire 
country. Through a program administered by the federal Banco Italiano di Sconto, the agency 
also encouraged emigrants to exchange remittance dollars sent from the Americas for treasury 
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bonds with guaranteed, short-term interest rates. The volume of remittances in the first decade of 
the twentieth century alone has been estimated to exceed five percent of the Italian gross 
domestic product during that time.55 With the majority of this money deposited in the State-run 
bank, it became clear to many critics that the program was turning “emigrants and their families . 
. . into agents that would give the State the financial means by which to subsidize the parasitic 
industries of the North,” while allowing the government to rely on remittances in general as the 
exclusive economic catalyst for the South.56 
Although nationalist mythology would occasionally frame southern emigration as “the 
ebbing away of the nation’s life blood” and “a preventable harm to the advancement of the 
country,” the dispersal of millions of Italians abroad was a key component in a campaign to 
generate national unity through colonial conquest.57 The establishment of emigrant communities 
throughout North and South America, Australia, and Europe was recast as a desirable aspect of 
cultural colonialism rather than the consequence of domestic push factors. This complemented 
the less benign tactics of expansion that centered on the use of military force and rule of foreign 
lands.  
 Crispi’s assertion that “there is no better way to invigorate the masses with a sense of 
nationalism than war” underscored his attempt to instill pride in the nation by colonizing 
Ethiopia in 1896.58 Even though the Italian army failed in this quest, suffering a humiliating 
defeat at the Battle of Adwa that resulted in his resignation, Crispi’s political successors 
maintained the belief that territorial enlargement would rally Italians around a united cause. In 
1911, nationalist advocacy for Italian control of the Mediterranean led Giolitti to declare war on 
the Ottoman Empire and to invade the provinces of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica 
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(modern-day Libya). Following the successful annexation of Libya, Giolitti used the promise of 
free land to entice over forty thousand southerners to move to that territory in 1912 alone. 
 Italian entry in World War I represented the ultimate chance to manufacture allegiance to 
the nation. The importance of the opportunity was summed up by the nationalist and future 
Fascist politician Luigi Federzoni: “Italy has awaited this since 1866, her truly national war, in 
order to feel united at last, renewed by the unanimous action and identical sacrifice of all her 
sons.”59 The sad reality for southerners during this period was that their most admirable 
contributions to the growth of the nation involved absence, in both their physical departure from 
the peninsula and their deaths on the battlefield.    
 
 Antonio Gramsci and the Defense of the South 
 Despite being on the victorious side, the end of World War I ushered in a period of 
political turmoil. Under the Treaty of London (1915) and, in exchange for its support of the 
Triple Entente, Italy had been promised numerous territories along its northern border, across the 
Adriatic, and in Africa. Allied forces reneged on these agreements at the Paris Peace Conference 
(1919) however, and granted Italy only the Dalmatian port of Zara, the island of Lagosta, and 
portions of Trentino. Although furious over the betrayal, Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando 
eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles. This capitulation led to a wave of public outcry from 
leaders of the far left and right who were quick to criticize the failures of his Liberal Party. 
 Prowar nationalists such as Benito Mussolini and Gabriele D’Annunzio led the attack on 
the prime minister and portrayed his acquiescence as a belittlement of the financial and corporeal 
sacrifices made by the Italian populace. Orlando’s unwillingness to stand firm against the 
dictates of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia was perceived as 
44 
 
humiliating and defeatist, in that this act thwarted Italy’s imperial intentions and desired 
recognition as an equal international superpower. To rectify this, the nationalists called for the 
end of Liberal rule and a strengthening of the central State through reactionary isolationism. 
Ultimately, their platform would be affirmed by the rise to power of the Fascist Party in 1924 
and its stranglehold on Italian politics for nearly twenty years.   
 Galvanized by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the left offered its own condemnation 
of the war effort and proposed a different path forward. Leaders of the Radical (PR) and Socialist 
(PSI) parties, including Francesco Saverio Nitti, Gaetano Salvemini, and Guido Dorso, 
admonished Italy’s involvement in the war as a tactic of northern bourgeois enrichment. They 
emphasized that over two-thirds of the seven hundred thousand soldiers killed were southerners. 
Salvemini and Dorso believed that the best way for the South to escape its position of northern 
servitude was by asserting independence from central government. In Dorso’s words: 
The people of the South need to win self-government, and develop practical 
solutions which openly reject the requirements of paternalism. . . . it is precisely 
these common services and sacrifices [of the war] that have given the people of 
the South the right to demand the destruction of the old economic and political 
order, which the northern Oligarchies have used to create a veritable dictatorship 
at the South’s expense, bleeding it dry economically and failing to educate it 
politically.60   
 
 In contrast to the autonomist argument, Antonio Gramsci outlined a third course of 
action, one that would lead to Italian unity via a working-class political hegemony based on an 
alliance between southern peasants and northern industrial workers. Together with Amadeo 
Bordiga, he split from the Socialist Party to form the Communist Party (PCI) in 1921. Through 
both the weekly L’Ordine Nuovo (which he founded) and the PCI’s official newspaper, L’Unita, 
Gramsci championed an image of the South as the lynchpin of a truly populist revolution. In the 
essay, “Workers and Peasants,” he wrote: 
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The Northern bourgeoisie has subjugated the South of Italy and the islands, and  
reduced them to exploitable colonies; by emancipating itself from capitalist 
slavery, the Northern proletariat will emancipate the Southern peasant masses 
enslaved to the banks and the parasitic industrialism of the North. The economic 
and political regeneration of the peasants should not be sought in the division of 
uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands, but in the solidarity of the industrial 
proletariat who need, in turn, the solidarity of the peasantry.61 
 
Gramsci’s call for an interregional coalition of the proletarian masses harkened back to 
Mazzini’s bottom-up plan for Italian unification, in both a class-based and geographical sense. 
Gramsci clearly believed that State-instituted agrarian reform, industrial development (as 
recommended by Nitti), and regional independence (as heralded by Dorso) would only 
exacerbate the subordinate position of the South. For the majority of the populace to be included 
in the national process, it was first necessary to break down bipolar representations of the North 
and South and create a more complex view of social stratification and intraregional 
differentiation.   
 In Notes on the Southern Problem and the Attitudes Toward it of Communists, Socialists 
and Democrats, Gramsci summarized the South as “una grande disgregazione sociale” (“a great 
social disintegration”) in which: 
Southern society is a large agrarian bloc made up of three social strata: the large  
peasant mass, amorphous and disintegrated; the intellectuals of the petty and 
medium rural bourgeoisie; and the large landowners and the great intellectuals. 
Southern peasants are in perpetual ferment, but as a mass they are unable to give a 
centralized expression to their aspirations and needs. The middle strata of 
intellectuals receives the impulses for its political and ideological activity from 
the peasant base. In the last stage of analysis, the large landlords in the political 
field and the great intellectuals in the ideological field centralize and dominate the 
whole complex of manifestations.62  
 
On the surface, this description could be taken as reinforcement of the backward stereotype he 
fought so strongly against. His intent, however, was to identify ways that southern intellectuals 
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and land owners betrayed the interests of the peasant masses in order to highlight the need for the 
development of a new class of “organic” intellectuals.  
 Gramsci emphasized how traditional southern intellectuals came mainly from the rural 
bourgeoisie, a class of petty and medium landowners “who [do] not work the land, who would be 
ashamed to be farmers.” As a result, these people harbor “a fierce antipathy for the working 
peasants, whom they consider a machine for work that must be bled dry to the bone and that can 
be easily substituted.”63 Consumed by the relative power of their positions in State bureaucracy 
(largely granted to them by local landowners), this group of southern intellectuals, although 
“democratic in its peasant face,” in reality served to “prevent the cracks in the agrarian bloc from 
becoming too dangerous” by distorting and fragmenting the revolutionary agenda of the 
peasants’ movements.64 
 The “centralized expression” of the masses needed to be vocalized by the peasantry’s 
own organic intellectuals. Gramsci envisioned the members of this class as both organizers and 
ideologues who could merge theory and praxis and be capable of operating within the dominant 
modes of the State apparatus while always preserving their working-class allegiance. Cultivating 
this class of intellectuals was particularly promising in the South. Framed so often as a 
disintegrative trait, campanilismo could be reimagined to extend from place- to class-based 
loyalty. To make southern workers aware of their collective plight and aspirations, Gramsci 
emphasized the development of a secular education network separate from the Catholic Church 
and the State. The unwillingness of the ruling parties during the Liberal Period to develop State 
educational institutions in the South, while debilitating in one sense, had a positive effect in 
Gramsci’s view. It left the southern peasantry uncorrupted by bourgeois indoctrination. As a 
result, the majority of southerners maintained a “purity of thought, feeling, principle and intent, 
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devoid of capitalist ideology (if not its affect)” that, once consolidated and articulated, would 
make known that “only two social forces are essentially national and bearers of the future: the 
proletariat and the peasants.”65 For unity to be truly achieved, the fifty-year “passive” revolution 
conducted by the aristocratic classes had to be replaced by an active revolution initiated from the 
ground up. Collaboration between the marginalized working classes of the North and South was 
paramount to this process. Gramsci envisioned this as a series of “little molecular 
transformations” that hinged upon the ability of the new southern intellectuals to convince the 
proletarian and peasant masses of the possibility of achieving national unity through consent 
instead of force.       
 
Fascism 
 To the dismay of Gramsci and the political left, the Fascist tactic of constructing 
nationalism through force prevailed in the interwar years. Ironically, this strategy to transform 
Italy into a late colonial and corporatist power involved an ideological and practical 
deconstruction of regional dualism. As Mariella Pandolfi has claimed, in the period following 
Unification, only under Fascism “did the many complex elements that composed the Italian 
nation come together to affirm that identity, overriding and obliterating the rhetorical strategy of 
an Italy divided between North and South.”66 The image of Italy as a utopian project coalesced 
by the collective dream of achieving superpower status grew to cover the entire national 
territory. North and South as enemies did not figure in the everyday discourse of Fascist 
intellectuals. As a result, the Southern Question was supplanted by a consuming vision that 
posited the nation as a whole as the direct descendant of Imperial Rome.   
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 Although Fascist rhetoric projected an air of equitable concern for all Italians, the 
regime’s autarkic economic policies and its actions undertaken to maintain absolute power 
reinforced the subordination of southern development to the industrial and agricultural 
modernization of the North. Economically, Fascist policy embodied a “strengthening of the 
strong,” in which the government placed emphasis squarely on large-scale intensive agriculture 
in the Po Valley as a means to finance industry. Then, to protect emerging capital-intensive 
(rather than traditional labor-intensive) heavy industries in the North, Mussolini championed the 
ruralization of the South as a patriotic necessity. “Return to the land” was promoted as a means 
to avoid the evils of supercapitalism (sterility of industrial society, amoralism) and to preserve 
traditional ways of life. In actuality it served two other important functions. One was to reduce 
urban underemployment. From the viewpoint of both national self-sufficiency and public order, 
rural under/unemployment in the South was far preferable to its urban counterpart. The other 
function was to hinder the alliance between northern industrial workers and southern peasants by 
heavily regulating internal migration. This complemented severe limitations now placed on 
emigration abroad designed to end the “silent revolution” of the South, i.e. the monetary wealth 
generated from remittances that allowed entire communities (particularly in Sicily) to circumvent 
domestic markets and taxation.  
 Politically, Mussolini set about “northernizing” State bureaucracy. Given Fascism’s 
origins and support base in the North, this was not unexpected. The secondary motive in this, 
however, was to “desouthernize” the civil sector. Under the Crispi and Giolitti governments, 
southerners had come to occupy over three-fifths of federal positions. Following the war, 
weakness of the State was consistently blamed on this “infestation,” in which the endemic 
southern traits of “corruption, clientelism, and radicalism had been allowed to spread from the 
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localized frontierlands of Sicily, Naples, and Basilicata to the very center of State institutions.”67 
Purging southerners from the federal work force was framed as a necessary consequence of the 
Fascist campaign to eradicate organized crime. The underlying motivation was nonetheless made 
clear by Mussolini, who stated: “If we cannot trust southerners to govern themselves by rational 
and resolute means, we certainly cannot leave the decisions of the State and the future of Italy in 
the hands of the uncivilized and uneducated.”68  
 Despite its populist and ruralist message in the South, Fascism tended to reiterate 
stereotypes of the region as agrarian, barbaric, and socially antiquated. As much as cultivation of 
the land by the southern peasantry was heralded as the patriotic recognition of the needs of the 
State over those of the individual and the most salient way that they could contribute to the 
growth of the nation, its real intent was to entrench the South as a vehicle for northern 
modernization. The massive promotion of wheat, for example, had more to do with producing a 
commodity that could be traded for the raw materials needed to fuel northern industry than with 
nationalist claims of food self-sufficiency. The South was once again rendered an exploitable 
resource for the advancement of the “real” Italy, its participation in the nation-building process 
reduced to an acceptance of the jingoistic symbols of Fascism.  
 
Conclusion 
 Prior to the formation of the first Italian Republic in 1948, the diverse engagements with 
the Southern Question had one common characteristic. They all situated the South in a 
dependency relationship with the North. Whether the message was the Mezzogiorno as the exotic 
and primitive measuring stick for modern Europe, the calls for State interventionist policies 
needed to implant an entrepreneurial ethic and capitalist efficiency, the Left’s insistence that 
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salvation lay in the liberation of the southern peasantry by the northern proletariat, or the Fascist 
rhetoric that spoke of the modernization of the North and the ruralization of the South, the region 
was consistently rendered incapable of generating its own renewal, devoid of any qualities that 
could be incorporated into a vision and definition of the Italian nation other than labor and 
agricultural production.  
 Writing from prison, Gramsci lucidly summarized the “complex feelings created in the 
North about the South” since the earliest stages of the Risorgimento: 
The “poverty” of the South was “historically” inexplicable to the Northern 
popular masses: they did not understand that unity had not been created on a basis 
of equality, but as a hegemony of the North over the South in a city-country 
territorial relation; in other words, that the North was a “parasite” which enriched 
itself at the expense of the South, that industrial development was dependent on 
the impoverishment of Southern agriculture. Instead they thought that if the South 
made no progress after being freed from the obstacles that Bourbon rule had 
placed in the way of modern development, this meant that the causes of the 
poverty were not external but internal; moreover, given the deep-seated belief in 
the great natural wealth of the land, there remained but one explanation: the 
organic incapacity of the people, their barbarity, their biological inferiority. These 
already widespread opinions (Neapolitan lazzaroni had long been legendary) were 
firmly established and even theorized by positivist sociologists. . . thus acquiring 
the validity of “scientific truths” at a time of scientific superstition. Hence there 
was a North-South polemic about race and about the superiority and inferiority of 
North and South. . . . Meanwhile, the North persisted in the belief that the South 
represented Italy’s “dead weight,” the conviction that the modern industrial 
civilization of the North would have made greater progress without this “dead 
weight,” etc., etc.69 
Gramsci hoped that his identification of the dominant stereotypes and the principle modes 
utilized to transmit and reinforce these beliefs would focus the production of counterhegemonic 
responses on the most effective and popular communicative outlets. Until World War I, images 
and impressions of the South were disseminated primarily through newspapers, political 
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journals, public speeches, novels, and illustrated magazines. After the war, radio began to play a 
role as well, but it was film that would develop as the most popular and profusive medium. 
 The role that cinema could play in the culture wars of the twentieth century was 
understood almost universally. Trotsky saw film as “the most important weapon, which cries out 
to be used, [and] is the best instrument for . . . a propaganda which is accessible to everyone, cuts 
into the memory and may be made a possible source of revenue” for the political left.70 At the 
1937 inauguration of Italy’s first State-run film studio, Cinecittà, Mussolini unveiled a portrait of 
himself behind a camera lens with the reworked phrase emblazoned across the top: “film is the 
most powerful weapon.” Although the Fascist commitment to creating unity through faith in its 
own martyrs, rituals, festivals, and symbols “ultimately marked the bankruptcy of the conscious 
attempts at building national identity by indoctrination and State action,” its emphasis on film for 
message propagation had a remarkable impact on the development of the cinema industry.   
 In the first thirty years of the Republican Period, film would contribute greatly to 
reimagining and repositioning the South in the national process. Reiterations of the region as a 
site of displacement, an underdeveloped and archaic land, and a violent and lawless frontier, 
would be challenged by contestatory portrayals of the South as a site of regeneration, an 
untainted periphery to a sterile modernity, and an incubator of proletarian revolution and 
radicalism. The influential effect of film on public opinion was realized in the unprecedented 
popularity, financial success, and longevity of the postwar genres that together comprised the 






Film Neorealism and the Postwar Italian Condition 
 
In his examination of the relationship between cinema and sociocultural transformation in 
Italy, P. Adams Sitney identifies two specific periods in which film has participated most 
actively in the (re)construction and communication of the changing nation: the immediate 
postwar period of the late 1940s, and the early 1960s, years marked by the apex of Italy’s 
“economic miracle.”1 These times of political, social, and economic reorganization correspond 
with the two cinematic genres that have become most emblematic of Italian national cinema: 
neorealism, and the “auteur” or “art” films of the late 1950s and 1960s. Although considerable 
critical analysis exists on the politicized films of Sitney’s “vital crisis” and their relationship to 
transformative cultural issues, the impact of neorealism is still largely encased within a formal or 
aesthetic analytical shell.2 The innovativeness of neorealist films almost exclusively has been 
tied to their newness in cinematic style and narrative form, viewed as symbolic of the great break 
or divide between classical and modernist, action-image and time-image cinema.3  
Emphasis on the techniques of neorealist filmmaking, specifically the stylistic 
commonalities found in the propensity for location shooting, natural lighting, the use of non-
actors, and voyeuristic long shots, has largely obfuscated equally important and socially driven 
content and commentary. Similarly, the identification of neorealism as a decisive counter to the 
cinema under Fascism is too simplistic in its reduction of neorealism to a reactionary movement. 
It occludes, for example, the fact that many neorealist directors, including Luchino Visconti, 
Roberto Rossellini, Vittorio De Sica, Giuseppe De Santis, Luigi Zampa, and Cesare Zavattini, 
began their careers during the Fascist era.  
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Contrary to common considerations about neorealism as a stylistically bounded 
movement, director and film theorist Carlo Lizzani has insisted that the most acute unifying 
factor in these films is their “hybridization of culture.”4 To Lizzani, this includes tendencies both 
to represent multiple social classes across diverse regions (specifically a novel emphasis on the 
working class and the South) and to illuminate the exchange of traditional social roles brought on 
by the war. Equally important is Lizzani’s suggestion that neorealism itself is best characterized 
by a hybridization of genre. Counter to prevailing assessments, no singular narrative form unites 
the films. Neorealist works instead tend to be composites. They are amalgams of tried-and-true 
genre formulas central to prewar Italian cinema, ranging from melodrama, comedy, and 
historical epic to documentary and suspense. More than technique or narrative, an obsessive 
emphasis with re-imagining the nation through the portrayal of social reality serves as the 
primary unifying element. Tied by what Millicent Marcus refers to as “una nuova poesia 
morale,” neorealist films, via their dramatization of endemic and problematic cultural, regional, 
and class differences between North and South, city and country, presented a powerful populist 
counterargument to the coercive and homogenizing vision of nationalism under Fascism. 
Through the injection of local and regional social realities into cinema, neorealism exposed the 
fallacies of Italian unity ascribed to the Risorgimento while simultaneously offering a radically 
new concept of nationalism based on class consciousness, cultural heterogeneity, and regional 
complementation in a postwar environment characterized by the widespread reconstruction of 
the nation’s politics, economy, and culture. 
In this chapter I present a counterargument to the view of neorealist film developing “out 
of nowhere,” springing organically from the cultural void and political and economic uncertainty 
of the immediate postwar period. My intention is to identify neorealism, in a very Gramscian 
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sense, as representative of a “molecular transformation” of the existing Italian state, standing in 
contrast to Fascism’s projection of a wholesale new form for the nation. Incorporated in such a 
reading is a necessity to position the divergent political strategies of constructing nationalism 
based upon either force or consent.5 First, I locate Fascist filmmaking influences on neorealist 
directors as a means of highlighting the transformative (as opposed to revolutionary) nature of 
the artistic movement. Second, I examine the primary methods ascribed to Fascist interpretations 
and representations of the nation and nationalism. I then compare these to neorealist endeavors in 
order to outline the central filmic modes of resistance used to counter Fascist models. Third, I 
illustrate via a dissection of the primary visual tropes of Fascist cinema how neorealist directors 
sought to co-opt and transform the predominant semiotic codes of the regime through a 
contradistinctive sociopolitical lens. Last, I relate the points above in specific detail to Luchino 
Visconti’s film La terra trema: Episodio del mare (The Earth Trembles: Episode of the Sea, 
1948), which, I argue, exists as the most acute and politically driven neorealist example of re-
envisioning nationalism.  
In the case of Italy, in which the correlation of place and national cinema is perhaps more 
concretely defined than any other, the impact of film in social identification and pedagogy must 
be included in any attempt to describe the pervasive postwar tensions surrounding the ideological 
construction of the new republic. The power of cinema in this regard relates to several 
characteristics of Italian society in the immediate postwar years: the lack of a national-popular 
literature; low literacy rates (especially in the South); weak circulation of nation-scale 
periodicals; the absence of television; high levels of film production, importation, and cinema 
attendance; and high rates of theatre creation, particularly in the South.6 Together, these facts 
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suggest the necessity to utilize film and film analysis in any serious inquiry into the 
contextualization and nature of representations vital to this period of Italian history.  
 
The Resurgence of Realism: Fascist Era Influences on Neorealism 
It is impossible to divorce neorealism from the cinema under Fascism. Its response to 
Fascist ideology and iconography, specifically to representations of the nation, led to an 
awakening of artistic and social imaginations. A common assumption is that the “neo” element 
attached to realism describes the discernable break whereby postwar artists attempted “to create 
an imagined community to replace the (equally media-constructed) imagined community of the 
Fascist period.”7 In reality, the term refers more to the general movement within the Italian arts 
beginning in the 1930s (primarily with literature) that drew widespread inspiration from the 
verismo tradition in Italian fiction, painting, theatre, opera, and even cinema of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Verismo itself is derived from and indebted to the 
writings of Giovanni Verga, one of the most heralded modern Italian writers, whose works on 
the Mezzogiorno focused on unmelodramatic portrayals of southern Italian social organization 
and customs, regional identity, and naturalism. 
 The renewed interest in Verga’s verismo in the 1930s reflected a desired aesthetic shift 
away from the diffuse influence, particularly in film, of the writer Gabriele D’Annunzio. In 
general, D’Annunzio’s writings were marked by themes of “racism, nationalism, colonialism . . . 
antidemocracy, and imperialism” and, as Jared Becker has commented, it is he “above all others 
who orchestrates the shift from a nineteenth-century culture of nation-building to a culture of 
radical nationalism and imperialist aggression.”8 Dannunzianesimo is equated most strongly with 
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illusionism, melodrama, and the nationalist rhetoric housed within the plethora of historical epics 
central to Fascist filmmaking in the 1920s and 1930s.  
 Although dannunzianesimo may have been the largest inspirational pool for Fascist 
cinema of the 1930s, the resurgence of realism via the verismo tradition also affected directors 
and films supportive of the State. Two particular directors have come to be synonymous with 
such realism: Mario Camerini and Alessandro Blasetti.9 Both men were extremely influential to 
neorealists of the subsequent decade through their novel address of contemporary urban and rural 
life and their often ambiguous treatment of the historical events from which Fascism derived its 
representational connections to Italian unity and greatness. Predominantly comedic in form, 
Camerini’s films often centered on working-class protagonists of northern cities and their 
estranged relationship to the new urban social and physical landscape brought on by Fascist 
modernization policies. Consequently, his films are frequently associated (through their 
assessment and dissection) with the ideology of stracittà (urbanism or supercity), a movement 
popularized in literature of the early 1920s that heralded Fascist tenets of cosmopolitanism, 
urban renewal, and industrial development.10 The impact of Camerini on neorealism is 
emphasized by Lizzani’s view of the director as “the great confessor of the Italian lower middle 
classes” at a time when the upper- and middle-class bourgeoisie (owing largely to their support 
of and importance to Fascist nationalism) were the most widely represented social class, typified 
by their preponderance as subjects in the telefono bianco genre.11  
 In contrast, Blasetti’s films are identified with the rural and localist convictions of 
strapaese (ruralism or supercountry), a literary movement originally formulated as a counter to 
stracittà that nonetheless was co-opted by the state as a means of representing (and conveying) 
the vital nature of agrarian workers to the desired achievement of domestic self-sufficiency. 
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Compared to Camerini, the impact of Blasetti on neorealism has little to do with sociopolitical 
critique. Rather, it is his “convincing sense of realism” and his ability to blend historical drama 
and documentary in ways that remain sensitive to diverse connections to the past based on class 
and region that neorealism borrows from so heavily.12  
 Although films bearing the imprint of stracittà and strapaese presented idealized and 
ultimately unrealistic versions of the complexities of the Italian working classes, their existence 
expanded the formal cinematic boundaries for addressing contemporary social issues. Through 
their incorporation of technical modes of filmmaking that would come to be defining 
conventions of neorealism, the films of Camerini and Blasetti set the stage for a cinema reactive 
to the state’s representations of the nation, a cinema that “unleashed the powers of the false, 
where conventional notions of truth, virtue, heroism, good and evil, and, above all, the real and 
the artificial are put into crisis, and where the possibility of a more complex relation to the world 
is possible.”13  
 
Framing the Nation: Fascism, History, and Metaphor 
 Although the works of Camerini and Blasetti were highly influential, they were far 
outweighed in sheer numbers by a specific genre that more readily defined the ideological 
imaginations of Italian unity under Fascism. The historical epic served as this primary cinematic 
platform. Aside from the overtly propagandist “black” films, newsreels, and “documentaries” 
central to the mass communication of Fascist socialization policies, the historical epic developed 
as the principal cinematic genre in which notions of state virility and hegemony were codified 
through the equation of Fascism with historic episodes defined by Italian dominance, 
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international influence, and national unity. As Marcia Landy has stated, “the cinema under 
Fascism ransacked earlier historical moments--the Roman Empire, the Renaissance, the 
Risorgimento, and World War I--to create a pastiche of elements drawn from popular folklore, 
literature, opera, and current events.”14 Analogies drawn between Italy’s “glorious past” and the 
Fascist State underlined the ideological need to portray the latter as a truly nationalizing 
movement, as the realization of modern Italian unity begun, but never completed, during the 
Risorgimento (e.g. 1860 1934; Il dottor Antonio 1937; Piccolo mondo antico 1941). Treatments 
of the more distant past often sought to justify Fascist colonialist and imperialist endeavors by 
their conflation with the military triumphs of the Roman Empire (e.g. Aurora sul mare 1934; Lo 
squadrone bianco 1936; Scipione l’africano 1937; Luciano Serra pilota 1938) and the cultural 
hegemony and innovation ascribed to the Renaissance (e.g. Lorenzino de’ Medici 1935; 
Condottieri 1937).15 
 A substantial body of work exists on the utilization of historical allegory to construct and 
convey nationalism in Fascist cinema.16 Little of this scholarship focuses on the relationships 
between this allegory and the reactive emphasis of neorealist works. Two elements are of 
particular interest in this regard as a result of their subsequent renouncement and/or alteration by 
neorealism: the penchant for spectacle and the iconographic representations of physical and 
cultural landscapes that constitute the nation. Illumination of the ways in which Fascist films 
constructed signs and symbols of the nation and framed the narrative space in which such 
representations were housed is essential to understand the avenues of resistance inherent in 
neorealist films. As Landy has stated: 
Since neorealism eschewed the monumental and epic dimensions of the historical 
film that often functioned in the interests of nationalist rhetoric, and since it 
seemed to offer new versions of the nation, it presented new forms of address and 
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interrogation to filmmakers involved in postwar reconstruction, decolonization, 
and reconsiderations of the subaltern . . . . [It] was a movement that aimed to 
make connections with the Risorgimento, the unification of Italy as a nation, and 
the unfinished revolution. It was a cinema of anti-Fascism, expressing the 
aspirations of the Left, focusing on social injustice and the arrogance of power, 
critical of the clichés and formulas of genre and with the spectacle and rhetoric of 
the cinema under Fascism.17  
 
Counter to the embodiment of the nation under Fascism, the Italian experience of the immediate 
postwar years was that of history remaining to be written, of meanings remaining to be fixed. For 
Italians, this period was one of “social antagonisms that existed at the level of the Real of 
history.”18 
 
Realism and Resistance 
In summarizing the thoughts of Tim Cresswell, Peter Jackson, and Don Mitchell on the 
tactics of cultural subversion, Pamela Shurmer-Smith has stated that “often the politics of 
resistance takes the form of spectacle, shock, or irreverent play as an effective means of 
subverting power.”19 Each of the above geographers has, in his or her own way, illustrated how 
spectacle and the carnivalesque have regularly been utilized by marginalized groups to debase 
hegemonic constructions of culture, politics, and even public space. Although geographers have 
deftly illustrated, using examples ranging from the Middle Ages to Punk music, how spectacle, 
carnival, and détournement have served as means for subverting dominance, what avenues for 
contestation exist when spectacle itself is the primary mechanism of cultural hegemony? In such 
an instance, Mitchell, citing Guy Debord and Michel de Certeau, suggests that the most effective 
tactic “is quite literally to remake the situation, transform the images, [and] counter the spectacle 
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with even more spectacular spectacles.”20 As useful and prevalent as this strategy may be, it is in 
contradistinction to the principles of neorealism. 
The transformative nature of neorealist films resides in the absence of spectacle, artifice, 
and escapism. Instead, it relies on a more objective portrayal of contemporary reality that cleaves 
history from the conceptualization of Italian unity, favoring instead the poetic aspects of 
everyday life over allusion and metaphor. Through an emphasis and celebration of local and 
regional specificity, neorealist films expose the failures of Fascism’s equation of nationalism 
with grandiose moments from the Roman Empire, the Renaissance, and the Risorgimento. 
Aggrandizements of historical episodes meant vastly different things to peoples in different 
regions of the nation. The Renaissance, and in particular, the Risorgimento, were not inherently 
national. Different regions experienced these movements dissimilarly. In particular, southern 
Italians viewed these “glorious pasts” with times of exclusion, alienation, and subjugation. Such 
sentiments were reinforced by the fact that Fascism’s support base was strongest in the urban 
North. As a distinctly regional movement, then, Fascism “set on establishing stability to northern 
industry and commercial agriculture of the Po Valley.”21 This endeavor ultimately compounded 
the view of Fascism’s self-anointed task of completing the unfinished business of the 
Risorgimento as “a failure, in that revolutionary goals were betrayed by the subsequent 
hegemony of the North over the South.”22   
Thematically, the uniting factor of the master works of neorealism, including Luchino 
Visconti’s Ossessione (Obsession, 1943) and La terra trema, Vittorio De Sica’s I bambini ci 
guardano (The Children Are Watching Us, 1944), Sciuscià (Shoeshine, 1946), and Ladri di 
biciclette (The Bicycle Thief, 1948), Alberto Lattuada’s Il Mulino del Po (The Mill on the Po, 
1948) and Senza pietà (Without Pity, 1948), Roberto Rosellini’s Roma, città aperta (Rome: 
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Open City, 1945), Paisà (Paisan, 1946), and Stromboli, terra di dio (Stromboli, Land of God, 
1949), Giuseppe De Santis’ Caccia tragica (The Tragic Hunt, 1947), Riso Amaro (Bitter Rice, 
1949) and Non c’è pace tra gli ulivi (No Peace Under the Olive Tree, 1950), and Luigi Zampa’s 
Vivere in pace (To Live in Peace, 1947) is a concern for representing the ordinary and everyday 
struggles of the working class in the uncertain climate of postwar reconstruction. By 
“minimizing the effects of spectacle,” neorealist films provided “direct access to the images by 
means of long take photography and minimal editing, and through middle distance shots that 
could enable the viewer to assimilate the character’s specific relationship to the environment.”23 
Through transformation of the iconographic tropes central to Fascist cinema, neorealism posited 
a new path toward Italian national unity. Key was the encouragement of a collectivity via the 
elemental struggle to survive, a condition afflicting all Italians, across regions and classes, in the 
environment of postwar recovery.  
 
Iconographies of Reinvention    
 Of the plenitude of semiotic devices utilized by Fascist propagandists throughout all 
media, four themes are most relevant to the scope of this project: crowds, landscape, youth, and 
poverty. Given the focus on Italian nationalism in film, these subjects of representation are all, 
albeit in differing ways, related to concepts of belonging, identity, inclusion/exclusion, and 
citizenship (in terms of rightful contribution to and defining qualities thereof). They are also 
among the most prevalent topics entertained by both Fascist and neorealist cinema. This allows 
for contrast and comparison at the level of film genre of the most problematic sociocultural 
issues of the postwar environment. With the exception of youth, these themes also contain a 
geographical dimension in that the desire to control the representation of space is embroiled in 
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the broader project of defining acceptable uses of both public and private and urban and rural 
spaces on the ground.  
In neorealist films, crowds become sites of resistance and localized allegiance as opposed 
to symbols of occupation and submission. The conquest of nature and both national and 
international space is eschewed, replaced by emphasis on the symbiotic relationship between 
cultural practice and the environment. The idealized portrayal of Fascist urban luxury and 
modernization of city space is deconstructed through a presentation of pervasive urban poverty. 
Youth, in its most elementary form, is symbolic of the fledging postwar republic. However, it is 
also a theme ripe with connotations concerning state education and welfare and, in the case of 
neorealism, innocence lost to the reworking of traditional familial roles demanded by postwar 
plight. For all involved in the exposition of the neorealist viewpoint, it was essential to counter 
the iconographic tropes central to the Fascist representation of the nation. Equally vital was a 
necessity to posit a determined and cohesive semiotic explication of nationalism that would stand 
as an alternative ideological construction of the postwar nation.  
 
Crowds 
As the symbolic embodiment of the masses, the divergent portrayal of the crowd in 
neorealist films is indicative of the desire to empower those marginalized under Fascism through 
the representation of a collective will. As Lizzani has indicated, crowds in Fascist films exist 
largely “as a passive amalgam—an indistinct, orderly, militarized mass . . . a colorful, 
vociferous, applauding chorus that forms a backdrop for one character or another. In other 
words, the crowd is folklore—the populist, rural collectivity that corresponds to Fascist 
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populism.”24 Epitomized by scenes in Scipione l’africano, the crowd is devoid of any 
individuality or affect, imagined instead as subservient to and blindly supportive of the patriotic 
rhetoric spewed forth by a charismatic leader [Fig. 2.1].  
In contrast, neorealist depictions of crowds are characterized by activeness, both in their 
portrayal of the dialectics within the crowd itself and as sites of rebellion and resistance to 
authority. In the climactic sequence of Roma, città aperta, the character of Pina ardently attempts 
to rally the crowd that has assembled as the Germans round up the men of the neighborhood. 
When her lover, Francesco, is taken away, Pina physically confronts the SS officers constraining 
the crowd. Breaking free from an officer, Pina runs to the truck where Francesco is being held, 
only to be shot and killed in the process. Instead of solidifying the complacency and fear of the 
crowd bearing witness, Rossellini’s suggestion is that resistance, even if it leads to death, is a 
necessity of freedom, and passivity will no longer be tolerated. 
Rebellion is a central tenet of the crowd scenes in Il Mulino del Po as well; however, the 
effects of resistance are decidedly more optimistic than in Roma, città aperta. Lattuada’s film 
centers on day laborers who work the wheat fields of the Po Valley under miserable conditions 
for little pay and reward. When their dissatisfaction culminates with a refusal to work, 
landowners call in the military to force them back to the fields. Rather than submit, the workers 
(predominantly women) occupy the fields.  As the soldiers prepare to fire upon them, the crowd 
stands united, shouting “up with the union!,” forcing the military to acquiesce rather than 
become agents of mass murder. In this instance, Lattuada conveys how the collective spirit has 
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 Along with serving as a vehicle to oppose authority, neorealist filmmakers also envision 
crowds as instruments of localized unity.  This is particularly evident in a scene from Ladri di 
biciclette in which the central character of Antonio Ricci confronts the young man who has 
stolen his bicycle.  Antonio follows him to his neighborhood, but when he tries to force him to 
return his vital property, a crowd assembles in support of the thief. To the crowd, it is 
unimportant whether the boy is guilty of the crime or not. Paramount is the protection of one of 
their own from the perceived persecution of an outsider [Fig. 2.2].  
 
Landscape   
As part of the desire to equate the nation with historical episodes of cultural and political 
dominance, Fascist depictions of the Italian landscape often glorified majestic and monumental 
aspects of the city. The verticality inherent in their images of urban architecture, ancient ruins, 
and state monuments is symbolic of Fascist hierarchical social stratification. Public space is 
closed, sanitized; it is organized around artifice and icons, heralding the projects of architectural 
modernity and redesign undertaken during the ventennio nero. Their depictions of the rural 
landscape stressed the picturesque, suggesting an essentialized harmony between the agrarian 
peasantry and the land. Conversely, neorealist treatments of landscape reflect a horizontal rather 
than vertical linearity. From depictions of the long banks of the Po River and its valley in Riso 
Amaro, Paisà, and Il Mulino del Po to the expansive, desolate environments of southern Italy 
and the islands in Stromboli and La terra trema, the picturesque is eschewed in favor of more 
realistic treatments of interior spaces and naturalistic physical landscapes. Space becomes open, 
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Although many films have focused on realistic presentations of rural life (particularly 
associated with the Mezzogiorno), the predominant setting of neorealist works is what Lizzani 
has referred to as “the great urban periphery.”25 This location embodies the lived experience of 
the marginalized working classes, and is characterized by a lack of monuments and other Fascist 
artifice. It represents peoples and places excluded under Fascism and offers a new site of 
collective association based less on symbols of ascendancy and state virility than on the social 
conditions of poverty, unemployment, the breakdown of the family, and the uncertainty of the 
future. Ladri di biciclette is the most cogent example in this regard. Set in Rome, this film 
follows the protagonist Antonio and his son Bruno as they move from neighborhood to 
neighborhood in search of Antonio’s stolen bicycle. Throughout their quest, Rome is rendered 
devoid of symbolic greatness. There is no Colosseum, Vatican, Trevi fountain, or Roman Forum, 
no monuments, roads, and buildings from Mussolini’s EUR district.26 In their stead, De Sica 
presents the ordinary working-class neighborhoods, peddlers’ markets, unemployment offices, 
and trolley stops [Fig. 2.3]. By stripping Rome of all things Roman, De Sica’s portrayal allows 
working-class urbanites from Milan, Naples, Palermo, and elsewhere to identify with the plight 
of the Ricci family.  
 
Youth 
 As a primary concern of Fascist ideologues and planners, the representation of youth 
constituted a vital role in the overtly propagandist films of the 1930s. Documentaries and 
newsreels produced by L’Unione Cinematografica Educativa (LUCE), the state organization 
overseeing the production of pro-Fascist cinema, “highlighted the relation of youth to education, 
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qualities of the Fascist movement. Numerous documentaries championed socialization policies 
specific to children, including the vitality of youth groups, adolescent patriotism, and the 
reduction of juvenile delinquency. As Elaine Mancini has noted, these documentaries “were 
designed to instill the Fascist spirit, to teach ideals and to enforce discipline.”27  
Blasetti’s film, Vecchia guardia (Old Guard, 1934) epitomizes such glorifications. The 
story revolves around a young boy named Mario whose death at the hands of the Socialists 
renders him a martyr to the Fascist cause. Other films, including Camicia nera (Black Shirt, 
1933), herald the crucial involvement of children in the squadristi, the “marauding bands of 
black-shirted adherents to Fascism” who “terror[ized] the populace.”28 An underlying theme is 
that children exist as blank slates, and that regimented indoctrination via the Fascist redesign of 
the educational system and reinforcement of the traditional family can squash the potential for 
youthful recidivism.  
 In contrast, neorealist depictions locate children outside the formal educational system, 
embroiled in everyday and real-world struggles to survive in the postwar environment. Children 
are stripped of their innocence, left unprotected as the traditional family disintegrates, often 
orphaned as a consequence of the war and forced to fend for themselves. The reassurance of a 
sheltered domestic life is gone as boys are impelled to take on the role of provider and girls the 
role of caregiver. Sciuscià offers a particularly acute example. Set in Rome immediately after the 
war, the film follows the trials and tribulations of two young boys, Pasquale and Giuseppe, who 
live on the streets and earn a paltry existence by shining shoes and shaking down American 





















Loss of innocence is also echoed in the second vignette of Paisà, wherein a young boy 
named Pasquale “buys the rights” from his fellow street-gang members to pilfer the belongings 
of an American soldier named Joe. At first, Pasquale approaches Joe as a helpful hand, yet when 
Joe passes out drunk, the boy steals his boots. Several days later, Joe catches up to Pasquale and 
forces the boy to take him to his home in order to retrieve the boots. As Pasquale leads him to the 
caves of Mergellina outside of Naples where he and hundreds of others, forced from their homes 
by the war, live in squalor, Joe learns that the boy’s parents have been killed. Realizing the boy’s 
plight, Joe leaves the boots behind as an act of sympathetic charity. His intention of having the 
boy punished is now meaningless since Pasquale no longer exists in the realm of childhood.  
The situation of boys forced to assume the role of men is reiterated by the relationship 
between Bruno and his father, Antonio, in Ladri di biciclette. Scarcity of employment has 
required Bruno to work as a gas-station attendant to supplement the family income, somewhat 
reversing the traditional relationship between father and son. The morning after his bicycle is 
stolen, Antonio is too ashamed to tell Bruno. Later on, when Antonio confronts the thief and is 
subsequently accosted by the crowd, Bruno protects his father by having the wherewithal to 
summon the police. In the penultimate scene, after he is caught stealing another person’s bicycle, 
a desperate and humiliated Antonio seeks forgiveness from Bruno. Bruno is forced to stand 
strong, consoling his distraught father by taking his hand as the two walk towards the camera and 







 Whereas the treatment of youth reflects the realities of social change in the immediate 
postwar period, it is the injection of poverty and its associated destructive elements that provides 
the greatest unifying symbol for neorealist films. This emphasis serves two purposes. First, it 
acts as a response to Fascist valorizations of urban and rural life. It is no surprise that images of 
destitution and economic hardship are almost entirely absent from Fascist depictions of society. 
Whereas city life, as conveyed through the telefono bianco and stracittà films prevalent in the 
1930s, was one of luxury, cosmopolitanism, and leisure and, the country was predominantly 
framed as simple and satisfying, neorealist cinema stresses economic plight in these settings. It 
represents the groups of Italian society excluded from Fascist interpretations of the nation. The 
images of downtrodden working classes in both the city (e.g. Paisà, Roma, città aperta, and 
Ladri di biciclette) and the country (e.g. Stromboli, Riso Amaro, and Ossessione) counter the 
idealization of Fascist modernization principles and economic advancement.  
 The presentation of poverty that characterized the Italian postwar environment also 
functions as a great social equalizer in its suggestion that all citizens, regardless of class, region, 
and urban and rural location, are confronted by the same struggle to survive. The myths of 
cultural backwardness and economic stagnation historically connected to the South are thereby 
transformed into national issues. In such, the Mezzogiorno is renewed as the lynchpin of Italian 
unity because southerners could offer tactics of survival to an industrialized North in which 
widespread economic plight was largely a new phenomenon. Rather than language or a shared 
relationship to history, the primary basis of Italian unity is transferred to the collective task of 
rebuilding both the physical and social landscapes after the war. The endemic nature of 
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destitution wipes the slate clean, breaking down social and regional stratifications and fostering 
new concepts of unity that allow for the retention of cultural heterogeneity.  
 
Re-imagining the Basis for National Unity in Visconti’s La terra trema  
 In terms of form, technique, and content, La terra trema is the most salient effort of 
neorealist film in positing a new path to Italian unity. Realism is inherent in Visconti’s 
construction of image and narrative and in his choice of subject. Shot entirely on location in the 
fishing village of Aci Trezza, Sicily, the film employed no studio or sound sets. The only 
utilization of artificial lighting occurred during night scenes at sea. There are no professional 
actors—the characters in the film are all members of the local community. Moreover, instead of 
post-synching or dubbing the sound, Visconti captured authentic sounds and voices of the town. 
In doing so, “he took a revolutionary cultural stance, refusing standard Italian (as well as the 
official culture it symbolized) for the dialect of the simple people he filmed, believing that the 
authentic expression of the people’s emotions could only be achieved using their own 
language.”29 Since Sicilian was largely unintelligible to the mainland audience, Visconti added 
voice-over narration and subtitles in standard (Tuscan) Italian. His construction of images 
through long, single shots, slow, wide-angle pans, and stationary, extreme depth-of-field frames 
reflects the formalist aspects attributed to documentary film. Great attention is also paid to 
realistic interiors and family life. Stylistically, La terra trema employs the cinematic conventions 
ascribed to neorealism more so than any other film. 
 Thematically, Visconti incorporated attention to verismo unequalled in any other 
neorealist work. The film itself is based on Verga’s novel I Malavoglia (The House by the 
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Medlar Tree, 1881), a story that follows a family of Sicilian fishermen (the Malavoglias) and 
their aspirations for a better life in the wake of Garibaldi’s liberation of Sicily. Visconti’s 
adaptation serves two purposes. On the one hand, it acts as a platform for discussion of the 
Southern Question, instigating a renewed consideration of how the South “has been taken to 
emblematize the problem of state formation since 1859.”30  On the other, it entertains the 
possibility, owing to Antonio Gramsci, of a national-popular alliance between southern 
agricultural peasants and northern industrial workers. This hope is highlighted by initial funding 
for the film from the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and, by the original vision for La terra 
trema as part of a trilogy documenting southern fishermen, miners, and agrarian peasants (hence 
the subtitle Episodio del mare).  
 The support for the film by the PCI is indicative of the broader political ethos 
underpinning neorealist cinema. The years between the end of the war (1945) and the 
establishment of the new Italian Constitution (1948) were marked by great political upheavals as 
multiple parties, including the PCI, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the Labor Democratic Party 
(PDL), the Action Party (Pd’A), and the Christian Democratic Party (DC) that had been 
outlawed under Fascism sought to reorganize, realign, and concretize support for their own 
nationalist projects. The general election of 1946 reduced the number of parties with any realistic 
chance of establishing parliamentary dominance to three: the DC, which garnered 35% of the 
vote, the PSI (20%), and the PCI (19%). In this same year, the results of the Referendum on the 
Monarchy illustrated in sharp detail the political differences of the populace from region to 
region. Northern regions voted to abolish the monarchy and oust the King of Italy, but the vast 
majority of southerners voted for retention. Whereas the center-right DC maintained its strongest 
support in the north, particularly in the northeast (la zona bianca), the PCI found the majority of 
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its backing in the central regions (la zona rossa). As a result, the South, including Sicily and 
Sardinia, and the northwest regions centered around the “industrial triangle” became the areas of 
greatest competition between the two parties.31  
 Owing largely to Gramsci’s influence, the PCI heavily promoted an alliance between 
northern industrial workers and southern peasants. This party had always appealed to working-
class consciousness, but the particular postwar environment offered opportunity to expand its 
support beyond the proletariat. Given the leveling of hierarchical class divisions brought about 
by wartime devastation, the PCI sought to outline a broad-based populist collectivity by using 
multiple media outlets to present the pervasiveness of postwar socioeconomic strife. The party 
therefore lauded many neorealist directors and films of this period for their realistic modes of 
presentation and overarching emphasis on the unifying elements inherent in the struggle to 
survive.  In this respect, La terra trema represented an impeccable vehicle with which to 
promote a new form of national alliance. 
 Visconti’s adaptation centers on the Valastro clan, multiple generations of fishermen and 
their wives, sisters, and daughters who live together in a modest seaside home. The central 
character is one of the sons named ‘Ntoni, who more than anyone else, aspires to free the family 
from long-standing exploitation by local wholesalers [Fig. 2.5]. Because the wholesalers own the 
boats and maintain exclusive contracts with the city markets, they control prices. As ‘Ntoni’s 
anger boils over, he hatches a plan to mortgage the family house in order to buy their own boat. 
This plan is met with resistance, particularly from the family’s older generation. In a crucial 
scene, ‘Ntoni’s grandfather repeats a common saying among the Sicilian poor that “you can learn 




















of Visconti’s underlying notion of the need to escape the past in order to reinvent social 
relations.  
After the family acquiesces and the boat is purchased, ‘Ntoni relishes in the potential 
realization of his bourgeois dreams and flaunts his new position of economic freedom to the 
chagrin of his neighbors. His dream, however, abruptly ends when the clan is forced to fish in 
bad weather in order to make the mortgage payment. The storm destroys their vessel, leaving 
‘Ntoni and his brothers to seek employment on the boats of others. The neighbors, however, turn 
them away as a consequence of their perceived betrayal of their fellow fishermen and the threat 
of dismissal by the wholesalers whom the Valastros have scorned. Without employment, the 
bank eventually forecloses on the house and the Valastros are forced to move. A telling scene 
where ‘Ntoni encounters a young girl repairing his former boat illustrates how he finally 
“realizes his fatal error in basing his hopes on the traditional family rather than on a new sense of 
class consciousness and unity.”32  
In a crucial scene that follows, ‘Ntoni’s awareness of his personal and familial plight is 
transferred to the nation as whole. Framed in close-up, ‘Ntoni addresses the camera (and 
consequently the audience) directly, stating: “We have to learn to stick up for each other, to stick 
together. Then we can go forward . . . .” In an act of self-sacrificial martyrdom, he then returns to 
the office of the wholesalers who, in the process of granting him his old job on one of their boats, 
humiliate him further in front of his peers. Behind the laughing wholesalers’ boss we see the 
washed-over remnants of the Fascist slogan “Andare decisamente verso il popolo” painted on the 
wall [Fig. 2.6]. Whereas the image is meant to associate the corrupt and unsympathetic 
wholesalers with the Fascist regime, the slogan’s faded condition also suggests that, in time, the 


















nationhood to take its place. In the final scene, the camera focuses on ‘Ntoni returned to his 
former place on the wholesalers’ boat. Rather than resignation or defeat, his facial expression 
and intensity indicate a simmering rage [Fig. 2.7]. Amidst the overwhelming tragedy of the film, 
the viewer is led to believe that ‘Ntoni is not done fighting, and that dreams of a more egalitarian 
world lie just beyond the approaching horizon. 
 
 Beyond Realism  
 The neorealist film genre developed in a period of radical political openness and social 
uncertainty, a time prior to the consolidation of power by the Christian Democrats in the national 
elections of 1948. Leading up to the Parliamentary election, several parties of the left, including 
the PCI, PSI, Christian Social Party (PCS), Labor Democratic Party (PDL), and the Sardinian 
Action Party had joined together in an historic compromise, casting away ideological (and 
regional) differences in order to better challenge the DC. With its defeat, however, this Popular 
Democratic Front (FDP) dissolved as quickly as it had formed, taking with it the entire 
movement toward nation-scale political organization and orientation. In its place came a 
“regionalizing regime” lasting until the early 1960s in which the dominant political parties 
focused their energies on solidifying traditional geographical centers of support.33  
The waning popularity of neorealist films in the late 1940s is partly attributable to 
escapism being an inherent aspect of the cinematic medium. Audiences grew tired of confronting 
images and issues related to their postwar struggles, and favored instead the American spectacles 
and melodramas that had begun to inundate theaters as a consequence of United States 
involvement in Italian reconstruction. The political distaste for neorealist projections of the  
 













nation compounded the decline. Neorealism’s association with the PCI and the left became a 
target of the Christian Democrats who had substantial support (and consequently pressure from) 
the United States owing to the global battle against communism. The Andreotti Law of 1949 
threatened censorship (and a denial of distribution rights) to filmmakers who presented 
“unfavorable” conditions of Italian life while offering financial subsidies to those who 
championed the integrative and positive qualities of the DC.  
Neorealism largely evolved into the light-hearted and star-studded films of “pink” 
neorealism in the early 1950s—decidedly more optimistic endeavors that heralded the betterment 
of social conditions tied to the beginning phases of Italy’s economic miracle. The decline in 
popularity of neorealist projects was also symptomatic of the unattainability of the idealism 
underlying much of the political motivation behind these films. Through their uncompromisingly 
realistic presentation of postwar poverty, unemployment, and fractured families, neorealist 
cinema projected a belief in the inevitability of a national-popular alliance free of class, ethnic, 
and regional antagonisms. Ironically, frequent audience perception of a narrative pessimism in 
numerous neorealist films occluded their deeper ideological optimism and political idealism. The 
simple presentation of unifying “social truths” on the screen did not necessarily render them real 
amongst the populace.  
To their credit, neorealist films such as La terra trema returned the Southern Question to 
the forefront of debate surrounding Italian nationalism. Whereas the South had been viewed 
since the Risorgimento as the greatest obstacle in the path to Italian unity, neorealist depictions 
of the Mezzogiorno annulled long-standing characterizations of the region as archaic, socially 
disintegrated, and foreign. By highlighting similarities in work ethic, moral practice, and social 
organization that united cultural practice between the regions, this genre repositioned the South 
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from a relationship of dependence on northern largess to one of mutual benefit. Though 
embedded in a specific period of postwar Italian history, film neorealism has proven to be a 
valuable influence on subsequent Italian and international filmmakers intent on challenging 
hegemonic models of society, place, and identity. From the French New Wave, to Pier Paolo 
Pasolini’s investigation of the homogenizing effect of Italian modernization and consumerism 
(Comizi d’amore, Love Meetings, 1965), to activist documentary projects from the developing 
world, neorealist cinematic techniques continue to be utilized for their contestatory modes of 
presentation. In the realm of representation, realism has become a salient mechanism for 







Chapter 3  
The Periphery of Modernity: An Overview of Cinema and the South during the Economic 
Miracle 
  
 Nineteen fifty-seven was a watershed year for the Italian State. Although one is hard-
pressed to find such gravitas granted to it in popular historical accounts, the year nonetheless 
marked the convergence of three transformative events that would contribute greatly to the 
political, economic, and cultural directions of the nation in the ensuing two decades. As a 
consequence, the Southern Question once again rose to the forefront. The signing of the Treaty 
of Rome in March ushered in a new era of Italian international and intracontinental affiliations 
with the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market). Directly 
correlated to this was the transformation of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno into Phase II, 
characterized by the agency’s widespread reorganization and redirection of its development 
policies toward the South. Of lesser relation but of equal importance culturally and 
economically, 1957 denoted the first year since 1943 that American films garnered less than fifty 
percent of domestic box-office receipts.1 Together, all three factors either required or provided 
for new methods of engaging the long-standing difficulties of incorporating the South into the 
rapidly modernizing State.  
 
The Treaty of Rome and its Implications for the South 
 Symbolically, the Treaty of Rome represented the graduation of the Italian Republic from 
fledgling to flight. In ten years, Italians transformed themselves from a physically decimated and 
politically alienated nation into the tenth-largest economy in the world. The importance of the 
treaty being signed in Rome was astutely understood by the leadership of the Christian 
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Democratic Party (DC), who relished the opportunity to showcase Italy’s remarkable economic 
recovery via the international news media. The metaphor of Rome (and thus the Republic) rising 
from the ashes of World War II like a phoenix was invoked by the Secretary of the DC, 
Amintore Fanfani, to suggest the almost supernatural rapidity of the nation’s reascension to 
international prominence.2 In reality, the treaty signaled the emergence of Italy from under the 
often heavy-handed influence of the United States, which had played a pivotal role in the 
political victories of the DC during the immediate postwar period and in the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of Italy by way of Marshall Plan aid.3 The Treaty of Rome had two overt and 
related purposes for Italy. First, it offered leverage against the perceived dictatorial nature of 
American financial aid in which numerous structural reforms in the Italian monetary, trade, 
labor, and bureaucratic systems were prerequisite. Second, the EEC would provide a degree of 
continental influence and open up new and geographically closer markets for exports, the driving 
force behind Italy’s economic miracle. This second purpose was an obvious necessity for 
achieving the first. With Marshall Plan aid depleted and further financial investment from the 
United States and the International Monetary Fund replete with preconditions, the nascent EEC 
coffers provided more discretionary allocation of resources. In the ensuing years, this strategy 
proved to be successful. Italy would reap the most rewards in sheer currency amounts from loans 
distributed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Agricultural Fund (EAF), and 
the European Social Fund (ESF). Between 1959 and 1969, 58% of all loans from the EIB went to 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno with an additional 25% and 33% of all loans granted by the EAF 
and ESF respectively, going to Italy.4 
 As a founding member of the EEC, Italy increased its influence at the continental and, to 
some degree, the international scales. This outward-oriented approach to economic growth was 
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not without direct consequences at the national and regional scales. In an idealist sense, the 
establishment of the EEC was heralded as the first step towards a Europe united by the expansion 
of social-democratic rights, the unhindered mobility of peoples and capital, and a unified 
transportation infrastructure, all of which would foster an integrated geopolitical alliance. In 
practice, the EEC operated almost exclusively for the next thirty years as an economic free-trade 
union between member states.5 Central facets of the agreement included the abrogation of all 
tariff barriers between member states over a transitional twelve-year period (later shortened to 
ten years) and the establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP enacted both 
a free market for agricultural goods inside the EEC and a level of protectionism against imported 
products from nonmember nations via subsidies, tariffs, and guaranteed prices. At the national 
scale, these tenets seemed immensely favorable to Italy, similar to the advantages gained through 
its membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  
A precursor to the EEC, the ECSC was founded in 1952 and signed by Italy, France, 
West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to promote heavy-industry 
development in member states through the abolition of tariffs on coal and steel. This proved a 
major boon for Italy. With coal being the sine qua non of Italian industrialization and the nation 
terribly lacking in domestic reserves, membership immediately reduced importation costs from 
its northern neighbors. In tandem, the Italian steel industry, owing largely to protectionist 
policies under Fascism and the chance survival of its infrastructure during World War II, had 
developed in the postwar years as the principle engine of industrial growth. Exports of iron ore 
and finished steel products accounted for thirty-eight percent on average of total export-earned 
revenue per year between 1949 and 1956.6 Similar EEC reductions in trade barriers for industry 
and agriculture would, in theory, provide Italy with almost limitless capacity to expand national 
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economic growth through the exploitation of comparative advantage and thus the unbridled 
continuation of its export-oriented industrialization. 
At the regional level within Italy, however, benefits of EEC membership could not have 
been more asymmetric. In 1957, an estimated eighty-five percent of industrial capacity was 
located in the North, with an overwhelming concentration in the “industrial triangle” delineated 
by Turin, Genoa, and Milan.7 In agriculture, the Po Valley contained a similar staggering 
advantage over the rest of the peninsula in production and value-added amounts. As the only 
agricultural plain with a consistent and ample water supply, the Po Valley required substantially 
smaller networks and reliance on irrigation.8 Also, due in large part to the autarkic agenda of the 
Fascist regime, the Po Valley possessed the greatest concentration of pre-existing, large-scale 
commercial agriculture in Italy. Furthermore, agriculture in the area was predominantly capital- 
rather than labor-intensive, implying a lesser degree of volatility. Established cooperatives and 
rural credit unions facilitated the sharing of machinery at affordable rates and simultaneously 
fostered the dissemination of innovative methods. By way of the cooperatives and the 
protectionist policies of the State towards grain crops, farmers in the Po Valley had pre-existing 
access to markets outside of Italy and already provided the greatest share of the country’s 
agricultural exports.9 Although the removal of all agricultural tariffs in accordance with the CAP 
would have a detrimental effect on local wheat production in particular, this short-term loss was 
outweighed by an enormous gain through the exportation of a more diversified cache.10 The 
North, as a result, had everything to gain and nothing to lose from the free-trade agreement. 
The South, on the other hand, had nothing to gain and everything to lose. For people 
there, the scheme of comparative advantage and protection-free trade amounted to very little. 
The small percentage of industrial enterprises that the South possessed were ill-suited to compete 
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against their northern counterparts let alone those outside the border. By 1961, value-added by 
industrial employee was still only 60% of northern levels, and 44% of southern industrial 
workers were employed by firms of ten employees or less versus only 20% in the North.11 
Perhaps more telling, fewer than 10% of southern industrial workers were employed by firms of 
more than a hundred employees. Southern industry as a whole was obviously in no position to 
take advantage of economies of scale, a central logic of comparative advantage. Geographically, 
the extended distance from newly emerging northern European markets and a lack of quality 
transportation infrastructure connecting the South to the North exacerbated the weakness of their 
position. Serious work on the expansion of the Autostrada del Sole, the primary highway system 
connecting Milan to Naples via Rome, was not begun until 1956 and not finished until 1964. The 
total length of all road networks in the South prior to 1961 equaled 42,897 kilometers compared 
to 128,322 kilometers in the North. 12 Allan Rodgers has noted that the rail system was equally 
poor in terms of density and integration. Existent southern railroad lines in 1957 were almost 
entirely bifurcated between the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coastal areas with little connection 
through or to the Apennine Highlands.13  
In terms of agriculture, physical-environmental factors that for centuries had impeded 
productivity and intensification in the South proved just as difficult to overcome in the postwar 
years. The Mediterranean climate, characterized by higher average temperatures, lower annual 
precipitation and greater seasonal variation compared to the North, greatly limited the variety of 
commercial crops that could be grown in surplus. The scarcity and uneven distribution of water 
rendered private irrigation opportunities both minimal and costly. Alan Mountjoy has estimated 
that, of all cultivated land in the South in 1951, forty-nine percent was without drainage systems 
whatsoever.14 The paucity of water supplies for intensive agriculture is worsened by the 
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predominant landforms of the South. The Apennine Mountains that form the spine of the 
peninsula are primarily dolomitic and karstic in the Mezzogiorno. Dolomite produces a 
landscape dominated by steep-sloped peaks and hillsides with sparse soil cover and vegetation. 
Where karst prevails (in the Murge regions of Pulia and Basilicata), the high permeability of the 
limestone makes surface water almost nonexistent. Of all cultivated lands in the Mezzogiorno in 
1957, an estimated fifty-six percent was on land sloped fifteen degrees or more.15 Where plains 
existed, a high percentage of marshlands deterred intensive agricultural endeavors. The Fascist 
program of bonifica integrale had attempted to drain southern marshlands and eradicate malaria-
carrying mosquitoes. However, this progress was almost entirely lost in the first decade after the 
war as the State switched development priorities to land reform and redistribution efforts. In 
sum, the physical-environmental attributes of the South are more conducive to extensive, labor-
intensive, subsistence agriculture than to intensive commercial endeavors. This grim outlook for 
development is also prior to any mention of entrenched structural problems of the South that, in 
turn, aggravate the region’s position of competitive weakness.  
Despite concerted efforts by the State in the immediate postwar period to reform land 
ownership in the South,16 the latifundia system prevailed throughout the 1950s, greatly retarding 
private investment in the intensification and mechanization of agriculture and the creation of 
associated fixed capital. Reform policies did little to enhance the position of the southern 
peasantry. Land redistribution, while socially appeasing, actually amplified the fragmentation of 
southern agriculture. Between 1949 and 1956, the percentage of farmland in holdings of ten or 
fewer noncontiguous plots increased from eleven to twenty percent, resulting in a pattern that 
“does not favor modern mechanized methods of farming nor facilitate crop specialization” and 
“conflicts with the economic trend under the EEC which is for larger operating units in order to 
89 
 
enjoy economies of scale.”17 In total, the Enti di Reforma expropriated less than ten percent 
(approximately 800,000 hectares) of all lands under its jurisdiction. In the South, 90,000 families 
were granted new ownership of land. Although substantial, this total equaled less than fifteen 
percent of the entire landless population of the region, ultimately creating a small, privileged 
class of subproletariats.18 
Attempts at agrarian reform had an equally minimal effect on the labor force. 
Underemployment in the agricultural workforce persisted at prewar levels throughout the early 
1950s with the overwhelming majority of the labor force consisting of day-laborers (braccianti) 
employed only 100-150 days out of the year.19 The little large-scale commercial agriculture that 
existed in the South became heavily dependent on state protectionism and subsidies during Phase 
I of the Cassa, defined by a program of “assistance over incentive.” In practice, this amounted to 
a retrenchment of clientelistic relationships. As a crucial class of southern support for the DC, 
southern landowners received payments in the forms of subsidies, soft loans, grants, bail-outs, 
tax incentives, and positions within the state bureaucracy in exchange for their votes. As Alan 
Zuckerman has discovered, a paltry amount of the total public-to-private financial investment 
from the Cassa during Phase I actually went towards “improvements in mechanization, 
irrigation, crop-specialization, new technological applications, farm-to-market infrastructural 
improvements, higher peasant wages or employment of a greater number of laborers. Per the 
nature of the exchange, southern landowners met little recourse in spending the money however 
they pleased.”20 
As a consequence of these underlying environmental and structural conditions, the only 
comparative export advantage forecast for the South by signers of the Treaty of Rome was in tree 
and vine crops and their associated oils.21 This grim outlook would only be worsened over the 
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following ten years by the gradual removal of all protectionist barriers. Italy’s membership in the 
EEC sealed the dependency of southern agriculture upon local and regional markets. As 
competition from fellow member states increased, focus on the transformation of southern 
agriculture from semi-feudal to semi-modern shifted to the broader national interest of 
consolidation, mechanization, and crop specialization in northern agriculture. In effect, then, the 
formation of the EEC served as the death knell for Phase I of the Cassa. The program’s original 
emphasis on assistance, reform, and redistribution of southern agriculture was shortly abandoned 
in favor of the wholesale promotion of southern industry.  
 
Industrialization, Emigration, and the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 
 Phase II of the Cassa represented a major ideological shift on the part of the State for 
southern development and regional incorporation. The common logic under Phase I was that 
modernization of the agricultural sector in combination with sweeping improvements in public-
works infrastructure and land reform would foster greater efficiency, growth, and employment in 
the Mezzogiorno. However, the slowness and localized nature of economic growth attributed to 
such a “first-aid,” relief-based approach to agricultural development quickly created doubts 
within the central government regarding its applicability to national growth models outlined by 
Keynesian economic theory. Though perhaps necessary to the social integration of the South and 
thus the political hegemony of the DC, investments in social fixed capital contributed little to the 
nation’s economy. Also, emphasis on agricultural expansion as a palliative for regional 
underemployment and disintegration contradicted the principal rationale of development 
theories. These favored secondary- and tertiary-sector growth as requisites for “take-off.”22 As 
early as 1953, the secretaries of the Ministries of Industry and Commerce, Labor and Social 
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Welfare, and the Treasury (three of the seven overseeing agencies of the Cassa) suggested drastic 
redirection of Cassa investment away from agriculture and into industrial infrastructural 
development.23 The model of national growth based on the complementarity of southern 
agriculture and northern industry, largely a political remnant of the Fascist regime, was 
supplanted by a new plan weighted heavily on the promise of export-oriented industrialization.  
 The beginning of Phase II was marked by enforcement of an earlier law enacted under 
the Cassa. From 1957 on, sixty percent of all domestic industrial investment from state agencies 
had to occur in the South. Furthermore, by 1964 the State was required to expend forty percent 
of total national public investment in the Mezzogiorno. In the ensuing decade, this weight was 
carried most heavily by agencies under the direction of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale (IRI), including Italsider (iron and steel), Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI – oil and 
gas), and Breda (mechanical engineering).24 A correlated encouragement of private industrial 
investment was centered on the automobile industry, symbolized by substantial incentive-based 
support of a new Fiat plant in Naples. In all, State-led industrial investment during Phase II 
revolved around a program of regional redistribution of existing industrial strengths as opposed 
to a facilitation of endogenous, small-scale southern industries.25 
Following this logic, the methodology underlying the distribution of public funds was 
based upon the tenets of the Industrial Areas Law passed in 1957 and its call to identify “Areas 
of Industrial Investment” and “Nuclei of Industrialization.” As a primary contributor to Cassa 
aid, the EEC played an important role in these determinations. Identified as “the Common 
Market countries’ most under-developed area,” the EEC’s interest in the Mezzogiorno was in 
accordance with the specific language of the Treaty of Rome that outlined the need for a 
“reduction in the inequality in the economic development of different regions within the 
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community.”26 In 1959, the EEC designated five “industrial development zones” in the 
Mezzogiorno: Bari, Brindisi, Naples, Taranto, and Palermo. Not surprisingly, given the EEC and 
Italy’s shared commitment to export-oriented growth, these “areas” were the largest port cities in 
the South. These urban centers were determined to be the only ones with enough existing 
transportation infrastructure and surplus labor to support large-scale industrial projects.  
The consensus belief was that the establishment of such State-funded heavy-industry 
“anchors” would, in turn, attract private investment in the form of lighter industries. In the case 
of Bari, Brindisi, and Taranto, much was made of creating a southern “industrial triangle” to 
mirror that of the North. This growth-pole approach hinged upon the notion of a ripple effect, 
whereby concentrations of large-scale industry in a limited number of centers would encourage 
the emergence of external economies that would eventually expand outward throughout the 
region, providing consumer goods, services, and jobs to smaller urban and rural areas.  
Although the industry-led development policy of Phase II was heralded as a salient 
attempt to redistribute capital and earnings potential from the most rapidly growing sector of the 
northern economy to the South, in reality it served to strengthen industry in the North via a 
programmatic effort to forestall southern emigration. Between 1951 and 1971 an estimated 
3,500,000 southerners emigrated to northern Italy and abroad. Approximately seventy-five 
percent of this total occurred between 1955 and 1965, the peak years of the Italian economic 
miracle. Emigration to the North of Italy accounted for eighty percent of this total, with Turin, 
Milan, and Rome being the leading recipients.27 From 1951 to 1956 alone, the metropolitan 
population of Milan grew by 1,500,000 while that of Turin increased by 570,000. In-migration 
(versus natural increase) accounted for seventy percent of this growth in Milan and eighty-eight 
percent in Turin.28 Numerous sociocultural components influenced the mass movement from the 
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South to the North, but economic push-and-pull factors were the most powerful causes. The 
unprecedented growth in northern industry in the 1950s and early 1960s coupled with 
substantially higher rates of unemployment and underemployment in the South, encouraged 
millions of southern workers to seek better fortunes. As State attempts to modernize agriculture 
and land tenure in the Mezzogiorno diminished under Phase II of the Cassa, the agricultural 
sector shed nearly two million workers. The percent of the active population of the South 
employed in agriculture dropped from 57% (3,800,000) in 1951 to 29% (1,800,000) in 1971.29 
Guido Cella has noted that two-thirds of migrants did so in stages, moving first from rural areas 
to southern cities and then on to the northern regions.30 This analysis reflects the inability of 
southern urban centers to absorb the substantial number of workers released from the agricultural 
sector, as well as the incapacity of the southern industrial and tertiary sectors to incorporate 
excess labor in meaningful numbers.  
Although it may seem paradoxical given the crucial role that southern migrant labor 
played in the growth of northern industry and the theoretical relationship between profit 
maximization and surplus labor, the State’s industrial emphasis during Phase II was in large part 
designed to keep southern laborers in the South. Politically, the economic advantages of a labor 
increase in the North were outweighed by the need to curb expansion of labor union membership 
there that constituted an essential support base for the Communist (PCI) and Socialist (PSI) 
parties. Socially, the sheer number of emigrants to northern cities in such a short time made it 
impossible to expand urban infrastructure at a sufficient rate to accommodate them. Borgate 
(slums) and coree that emerged in the urban peripheries of Turin, Genoa, Milan, and Rome 
complicated municipal and federal expansion projects and brought issues of social welfare and 
equitable rights to the forefront. The regional and provincial orientation of the borgate and coree 
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fueled antagonisms between the settlements over employment and basic resources, while their 
spatial concentration made it easier for native northerners to differentiate themselves from the 
invading terroni.31  Through the facilitation of industrial employment opportunities in the South, 
the State attempted to alleviate the social and political pressures materializing in the North as a 
function of the second “great wave” of Italian emigration.  
By all accounts, the attempt to slow emigration from the South through industrialization 
failed miserably. Between 1951 and 1971, industrial employment in the South increased only 
200,000. During the same period, seventeen of the thirty-four provinces in the Mezzogiorno 
experienced net decreases of a thousand workers or more in manufacturing employment, 
evidence of Rodgers’ assessment that “the growth of new factories in southern Italy was 
paralleled by a major decline of traditional small workshops (40,000 establishments with less 
than six employees closed between 1951 and 1971).”32 Critics of the Cassa’s heavy-handed focus 
on large-scale industry contended that the program’s efforts resulted in little more than the 
creation of catedrali nel deserto (cathedrals in the desert)—monolithic, capital-intensive 
factories built in isolation that provided little employment of unskilled, southern labor and a 
miniscule amount of external development. Jon Cohen and Giovanni Federico are particularly 
harsh in their overall assessment, suggesting that “instead of promoting social and economic 
change, the huge inflow of funds to the South merely led to the creation of a new political caste, 
the state bourgeoisie, and a new set of client-patron relations.”33 Although many critics have 
cited the State’s infrastructural investments in the South as misguided, some concession is 
granted to the tangible degree of quality-of-life improvements fostered by the public-works 
projects of the Cassa. Ironically, the expansion and modernization of autostrade and rail lines 
throughout the Mezzogiorno expedited migration from the South to the North. This was 
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particularly true in the 1960s as transportation networks were connected for the first time to 
numerous rural, mountainous, and hinterland areas.  
The social costs of emigration were in many ways immeasurable for the South. Out-
migration between 1951 and 1971 amounted to a net loss of eighteen percent of the region’s 
population, with the majority being males under the age of twenty-four.34 This exodus by the 
most productive segment of the labor force had a substantial effect on families. As Rodgers has 
described, this left behind a “feminine and senile population,” particularly in rural areas.35 With 
the loss of the highest-earning members of their households, women and children were forced to 
work in greater numbers, often for less pay. This created considerable stress in terms of child 
health and education and the provision of basic goods and services. Along with the economic 
strain came psychological stress. Land redistribution policies under the Cassa and the Enti di 
Reforma followed a “dispersed settlement” model whereby families were relocated from 
concentrated villages to individual homesteads often several kilometers apart. The isolation that 
resulted was disintegrative, as the increased distance from extended family members, neighbors, 
nonagricultural employment, and essential services harmed established social and economic 
networks.      
   For the emigrants themselves, dreams that the North offered of full-time employment, 
social mobility, and la dolce vita often faded into feelings of estrangement, anxiety, and 
disillusionment. Living conditions in the borgate were often appalling, lacking potable water, 
sanitation, and heating. The absence of female family members who had provided cooking and 
cleaning services required male migrants to make disorienting and emasculating adjustments. 
Migrants from the agricultural sector also realized that they lacked requisite skills for industrial 
employment. Unemployment estimates for the migrant population in the North between 1955 
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and 1968 reached as high as twenty percent, far exceeding average rates for the Mezzogiorno 
during this period.36 Pressure to provide remittances to their families back home pushed many 
unemployed migrants into illicit activities such as theft, robbery, and black-market trafficking. 
Culturally, assimilation into northern life was hindered by differences in dialects and social 
customs that fueled the marginalization of southerners. The individualistic and hedonistic 
attributes of northern cosmopolitan life contrasted greatly with the parochialism associated with 
southern culture. For migrants who did reap some success, their acceptance of bourgeois values, 
no matter how small, separated them from their roles within the traditional family and deterred 
their return to the Mezzogiorno.  
 The effects of the “hemorrhaging of the South”—a commonplace metaphor used to 
describe this second “great wave” of Italian emigration—became central themes in films and 
other cultural productions throughout the 1950s and 1960s.37 The word “hemorrhaging” implies 
flow, loss, diffusion, and an inability to contain, all facets of southern emigration. The word also 
is expressive of broader socioeconomic changes that occurred throughout the country during the 
economic miracle. The success of industrialization required the “bleeding out” of the agricultural 
labor force.  Modernization, particularly in the North, fostered the emergence of 
cosmopolitanism and consumerism that necessitated the abandonment of traditional modes of 
living and values. Losses in the process were both real and symbolic; real, in the disintegration of 
the traditional, extended family, and symbolic, in the exclusion of those southerners left behind 
from new definitions of national identity. The unfettered movement of people provided by 
infrastructural improvement and expansion fostered a rise in individualism (via the explosive 
growth in automobile use) and facilitated the diffusion of commodities and bourgeois culture. 
The ramifications of mobility (and immobility) related to emigration, embourgoisement, 
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consumption, and cultural change were definitive issues examined by Italian cinema during the 
economic miracle.   
 
 
Cinema’s “Decisive Decade”38 
 The level of economic, social, and cultural transformation occurring throughout Italy in 
the late 1950s and 1960s was mirrored in scope by the expansion and transfiguration of the film 
industry. Cinema developed as the primary medium in which ideological assessments of the 
nation’s modernization were constructed and deconstructed. For the South, the growth of the 
“cinematic machine” led to greater incorporation of, and emphasis on, southerners in the process 
of cultural consumption. An increase in theatres and audience attendance between 1958 and 1968 
encouraged filmmakers to target the depths of the Italian film industry to an unprecedented 
degree. The development of numerous popular genres aimed specifically at emerging southern 
audiences was matched by a renewed interest in treatments of the South itself. Overwhelmingly, 
depictions of the South stressed the region’s relationship to a newly modern nation: a backward 
South versus a progressive North. However, the positions in which this dualism was 
contemplated varied greatly.  
John Dickie has summarized the historical, top-down, vantage point as one where: 
The South has been made into theatre for “the shock of diversity,” whether 
provoking moral indignation in the spectator or a fascination for the picture-
esque. . . .Journeys to the South have been woven into the mythos of the foun-
dation and crisis of the nation. . . .From street-corner prejudices to journalistic 
 and academic discourse, the very diverse and changing problems within the 
South, such as those related to underdevelopment and organized crime, have 
 too often been thought of as the problem of the Otherness of the South, seen 
 as an unchanging whole without differences.39 
 
In contrast, views from the bottom-up often heralded the internal logic of southern social 
organization and the cultural heterogeneity of the Mezzogiorno. By challenging the notion of 
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national identity based on western bourgeois values, contestatory filmmakers highlighted the 
unevenness of Italy’s modernization project and the fallacies of a homogeneous Italian culture. 
Portrayals of the complexity of southern incorporation during the economic miracle were 
nonetheless hampered by the difficulty of presenting experiences of the South as different from 
the North without reproducing the southerner as Other. Cinema during this time was self-
reflexive and political, playing a central role in the dissemination of contrasting definitions of 
Italian nationalism.  
 Italian cinema’s level of engagement with contemporary sociocultural issues peaked 
during this “golden age.” Its self-reflexivity was fostered in large part by a simultaneous decline 
of American films in the domestic market. Italian film consumption always has been 
characterized by cycles of American domination. Identification of these peaks (1915-1923, 1943-
1957, and 1976 to the present) and troughs (prior to World War I, the ventennio nero, and the 
late 1950s to mid-1970s) is important since it helps to differentiate periods in which “the public 
has for the most part been consuming the popular culture of another nation” from those where 
production and consumption were primarily internal.40 Between 1958 and 1976, Italian 
production averaged over two hundred films per year. In this same period, American films 
distributed in Italy dropped from 233 in 1958 to a low of 127 in 1967, with an annual average for 
the eighteen years of 160.41 Shares of box-office receipts are more revealing. Between 1963 and 
1976, Italian films garnered over fifty percent of total earnings, reaching a high of 62.5% in 
1972, while American-film shares sunk to a low of 15.1% in that same year.42 
 Production and earnings numbers are instructive, but they alone do not explain either the 
exceptional growth of the Italian film industry during this period or its Italocentric focus. Oddly, 
part of the answer lies with efforts of the Catholic Church. Throughout the 1950s, the Catholic 
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Church built over five thousand parish theatres, primarily in southern rural areas.43 These 
seconda and terza visione soon outgrew the prima visione in number. Geared towards working-
class audiences, they featured second- and third-run, genre and foreign films offered at as low as 
one-third the ticket price of the prima visione. In contrast, the prima visione, located exclusively 
in urban centers, showcased foreign and domestic blockbusters and art films catered to an 
educated, middle- and upper-class audience. By 1958, box-office returns from rural and 
provincial theatres nearly equaled earnings from urban counterparts.44 The creation of the 
thousands of seconda and terza visione incorporated a substantial portion of the population 
previously excluded from the movie-going experience and helped propel Italy into the largest 
film market in Europe.  
 The success of the terza visione, in particular, inspired the development of numerous 
genres during the period. The formulaic aspects of genre filmmaking made filoni (formula films) 
enticing to production companies since sets, screenwriters, actors, props, and costumes could be 
utilized in an assembly-line manner. This reduced both costs and allowed production of many 
more films per year. In this way, a cycle was established with the robust growth of the Italian 
film industry dependent on southern, rural audiences who paid to see genre films in much greater 
numbers than audiences in the North. Although genre has always been integral to the Italian film 
industry, it was only during this decade that audiences witnessed the explosion of so many 
different types simultaneously.  
 Among the filoni genres, the peplum (historical/mythical) and the spaghetti western were 
the most successful domestically and internationally. Other filoni included cappa e spada (cloak 
and dagger), spy (a la James Bond), crime-thrillers, erotic or “sexy,” and strappalacrime (tear-
jerker). Peplum and western films were particularly popular in the South whereas erotic and spy 
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genres did well in the North. In one sense, this can be interpreted as a measure of acculturation 
differences between the North and South as a function of uneven development. In another, the 
correlations between films set in distant, frontier lands (and their appeal in the South) versus 
those set in urban environments (and their success in the North) are more obvious. What is clear 
is that the emergence of a truly popular cinema—in that all classes and regions were granted 
access to the cinematic experience—positioned film as the central communicative device in the 
contestations over Italian unity and identity.    
 Two genres played the most pivotal roles in challenging the hegemony of the economic 
miracle: the commedia all’italiana (Italian-style comedy) and the interrogative or “film inquest.” 
Their contributions to sociocultural and political debate hinged on their ability to bridge the gap 
between northern and southern audiences. In turn, this depended on specific screenwriters, 
directors, and actors who were able to meld popular subjects with innovative technical artistry.    
The “decisive decade” for cinema produced record highs in theatre creation and 
attendance, Italian production and international distribution, and profits. Between 1958 and 
1968, public expenditure on cinema exceeded all other leisure pursuits (theatre, opera, radio, 
television, periodicals, and sports) combined.45 In this small temporal window prior to the full-
scale saturation of television, the coincidence of American weakness and Italian rejuvenation 
placed cinema at the forefront of national cultural production and consumption. It could even be 
argued that to some degree Italian national unity was achieved—in the collective experience 








To Laugh or Cry?: Commedia all’italiana and the Critique of Cultural Change 
 
Take care, these Italians, full of failings are neither you nor me; they are your neighbors, the 
ones you meet on the staircase and whom you do not like to greet.1 
         Alberto Sordi 
 
 Comedy, it is said, has served as the “backbone” of the Italian film industry since the 
inception of the medium.2 Economically, comedic films helped sustain the industry during low 
cycles, including the transition from silent to “talkies” during Fascism and the financial crisis of 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Comedies also drove film production during high cycles such as the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, garnering unprecedented box-office returns domestically and 
internationally that, in turn, provided for an expansion of the industry as a whole. Culturally, 
caricature, parody, and satire have consistently been important self-reflexive devices used to 
address dominant modes of social organization, morality, and behavior associated with specific 
historical periods. From silent-era slapstick, Fascist telefono bianco, commedia brilliante, 
commedia sentimentale, and pink neorealism through commedia all’italiana and commedia 
romantica to postmodern pastiche and mockumentary, comedies exist as the most temporally 
specific cultural representations of transformative periods. Viewed collectively, the comedy 
genre provides an historical timeline of the most significant sociocultural changes occurring 
throughout various stages of Italy’s modernization.  
 The popularity of the comedic form is related to the adage that “nothing is off-limits in 
comedy,” including religion, morality, ethnicity, and sexuality. Aspects of ideology and identity 
ordinarily avoided in everyday discourse are the central subjects of comedy. As a consequence, 
the comedic framework serves a vital communicative function by exposing characteristics of 
private space to the public forum.  
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In a Freudian sense, laughter is often the physical response to feelings of discomfort, 
anxiety, and guilt elicited by a viewer’s identification with the protagonist on screen. This is 
typical of the commedia brilliante of the late 1920s and early 1930s. In this style, a “series of 
errors is compounded until a tangled knot is tied,” underlined all the while by tension 
surrounding the inevitable exposure of the actions by the protagonist.3 In the commedia 
sentimentale of the 1930s and early 1940s, fear of exposure is balanced by pleasure generated via 
the progressive dissociation with the protagonist. As the knot is slowly untied, the protagonist 
resorts to increasingly despicable (and absurd) means to prevent his or her disclosure. Pleasure is 
derived from the moment of exposure itself, achieved only after the protagonist has traveled 
beyond the boundaries of ordinary behavior.  
 The process of moving from identification to distance alludes to another aspect of the 
affective and popular nature of comedy. Implied by Sordi’s comment above, comedy allows 
one’s own defects and vices to be deferred to the exaggerated “everyman” on screen and thereby 
projected onto prevailing stereotypes. Although we may recognize our own character flaws 
depicted by the actors, the farcical, out-of-the-ordinary circumstances that define comedic 
narratives encourage the deflection of judgment away from ourselves and onto an amorphous 
Other. 
Sordi’s tongue-in-cheek remark also speaks of the “double bind” of comedy, in that we 
are all someone else’s “neighbor.” The challenge faced by directors bent on transcending the 
inherently escapist tendencies of the genre revolves around their ability to critique prevalent 
belief systems and modes of behavior without simply reifying dualistic categorizations of 
identity. Although the advantage of the comedic form is its freedom to dissect the most personal 
aspects of identity, its greatest disadvantage lies in the common viewer perception of its lack of 
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seriousness and realism. In Nanni Moretti’s film Ecce bomba (Behold the Bomb, 1978), the 
director alludes to this conundrum in his critique of the cultural impact of Italian film comedy. 
As an audience watches the film Il Moralista (The Moralist, 1959) a young man stands up and 
yells, “it serves you right, Alberto Sordi!”, thus accusing the star and Italian comedy in general 
of benumbing the minds of citizens and discouraging critical analysis of ongoing social and 
political struggles. Noteworthy is Moretti’s awareness, indicated by this scene, of the paradox 
surrounding the traditional leftist critique of comedy as apolitical. The fact that the left, and in 
particular the Italian Communist Party (PCI) throughout the 1950s and 1960s, publicly chastised 
comedies as “pulp distractions,” backhandedly acknowledges the importance of this cinema to 
cultural and political debates. It also indicts these films as part and parcel to the diversionary 
tactics of the political right, affirming the leftist conception that popular culture serves the 
interests of capitalist consumption as well as the hegemony of the ruling Christian Democratic 
Party (DC).  
The minimization of film comedy’s relevance is also contradicted by frequent public 
responses from the right. In contrast to the theoretical criticism of the left, rightist disdain 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s was largely based on literal readings of such films. Recurrent 
representations therein of immorality, deceit, vanity, prejudice, and backwardness amongst 
ordinary Italians ran counter to the projections of civility, sophistication, and bourgeois morality 
being heralded by the DC. The party went so far as to threaten censorship and denial of 
distribution rights to films that “grossly exaggerated and misrepresented the conduct and beliefs” 
of the Italian populace and the State.4 It is not surprising that the films provoking the most direct 
admonishment from the right were those with the greatest domestic appeal and international 
reach. During the period of the economic miracle, these films were predominantly of the 
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commedia all’italiana variety and included Pietro Germi’s Un maledetto imbroglio (The Facts of 
Murder, 1959), Divorzio all’italiana (Divorce, Italian-Style, 1961), and Sedotta e abbandonata 
(Seduced and Abandoned, 1964), Dino Risi’s Il sorpasso (The Easy Life, 1962) and I Mostri 
(The Monsters, 1963), and Alberto Lattuada’s Mafioso (Mafioso, 1962).5   
         The contempt for comedy exhibited by both the left and right conflicted with the 
overwhelming appeal of the genre, particularly in the South, during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Counter to political claims of distraction or perversion, such popularity suggests an engagement 
and identification amongst the masses with their central sociocultural concerns. As a result, an 
analysis of the intent of the commentary contained within film parody, satire, and caricature is 
crucial to understanding the popular reception thereof. The success of the commedia all’italiana 
in particular illustrates how comedy, in communicative function and cultural translation, is 
incorporated into real battles over identity, inclusion, and the representation of the modern 
nation. The elucidation of recurrent themes in the commedia all’italiana enables one to locate the 
sites of cultural struggle instigated by the societal transformations of the economic miracle and to 
identify the subversive qualities that render comedy political.       
 
Commedia all’italiana and the Crisis of Representation 
 Commedia all’italiana is a term retroactively coined by critics to describe a form of film 
comedy that emerged in the mid-1950s. Albeit generic in its descriptiveness, the label 
nonetheless alludes to the uniqueness and international success of the genre. It is a classification 
that attempts to differentiate films of this type from other domestic and international comedies 
via their consistencies in formal, narrative structure and thematic focus on the critique of societal 
customs, beliefs, and behavior specific to Italy. Although the term is derived from Germi’s 
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Divorzio all’italiana released in 1961, Mario Monicelli’s film, I soliti ignoti (Big Deal on 
Madonna Street, 1958), is generally accepted as the first in the genre.6 Based on the 
identification of this starting point, the evolution of the form can, in retrospect, be delineated into 
three periods: the “boom years” (1958-1964), the “downturn” (1964-1971), and the “last gasp” 
(1971-1980).  
 The focus of this chapter is the “boom years.”  This is not simply because of the 
overlapping of this phase with the peak years of the economic miracle. It is also a function of this 
period containing the greatest number of commedie all’italiana which, in total, earned more 
domestic and international box-office returns and awards than those of both subsequent stages. 
During this initial period, the genre reinforced the centrality of the star system to the success of 
the industry. Through recurrent use of Sordi, Vittorio Gassman, Nino Manfredi, Ugo Tognazzi, 
Stefania Sandrelli, Marcello Mastroianni, and Totò, directors capitalized on the incomparable 
appeal of established stars. The public’s attribution of specific personality traits to each actor 
allowed directors the freedom to both reaffirm and deconstruct audience expectations. The 
immense public engagement with this genre characterized by a “dark, bittersweet, and fatalistic 
tone of self-criticism” makes its understanding that much more intriguing. At the same time it 
affirms the genre’s impress on ideological representations of Italianness and the nation.7       
 Films of the commedia all’italiana variety are united in the most basic sense by their 
sharp, even virulent social criticism. There is a constant balancing act between laughter and 
desperation, affirmation and denigration. In tone, the films are related to the tragicomic tradition 
in their cynical humor and often ambivalent and ironic conclusions. Plot lines and character 
sketches are heavily indebted to the commedia dell’arte, an improvisational theatre tradition 
popular from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries that satirized local scandals, current events, 
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and regional tastes by way of the construction and interplay of exaggerated stereotypes. The 
critique of regional social customs and behavioral traits in both forms is done in a self-effacing 
and deflective manner—there is no perfect person against which all others are measured. Instead, 
a juxtaposition of character flaws is presented. The effect is that the audience’s acceptance of the 
sensationalized faults of one character depends on their simultaneous admission of the 
shortcomings of the character’s opposite. Only in this way are they to avoid hypocrisy and 
discrimination.  
The principal characters of the commedia all’italiana exhibit singular or multiple Italian 
defects that are frequently contradictory. Among the most prevalent are a fawning respect for 
authority/cynicism towards government, vilification of subordinates, sexual 
repression/obsession, intellectual shallowness/anti-intellectualism, vanity, laziness, superficiality, 
archaic morality/immorality, and deceitfulness. The critique of these flaws in the commedia 
all’italiana transcends all class, ethnic, and regional boundaries. In so doing, the filmmakers 
allude to a crisis of identity affecting the entire populace during the economic miracle, laying 
bare an undercurrent of social malaise and the painful contradictions of a culture in rapid 
transition.      
Obsession with the effects of economic growth on society and culture differentiates 
commedia all’italiana from other comedic forms. According to Ernesto G. Laura, “it is not only 
a question of a well-defined Italian landscape or of language or even of dialects, but of an 
intimate relationship with the customs, events, periods, and problems of contemporary Italy” that 
distinguishes the genre.8 In their sardonic critiques, these films provide counterarguments against 
the supposedly positive effects of modernization. Rhetorical claims of progress attributed to 
increased wealth, consumption, and mobility are mediated by an emphasis on the real 
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consequences of the loss of traditional values, the demise of the agricultural and provincial base, 
the emergence of a new, urban middle-class, the dehumanizing effects of consumer culture, the 
solitude of the individual, and the fracturing of the family. A strong vein of moralism 
accompanies the debunking of progressive idealism. This enlivens the self-reflexive irony of the 
films given their penchant for displaying the grotesque immorality of ordinary Italians. In this 
sense, the categorization of the genre as “neorealism at a comic angle—turned on end and 
parodying itself” is understandable.9 In contrast to neorealism, commedia all’italiana favors 
pessimism and ambiguity over humanistic optimism. It is more a commentary on “what we are 
becoming” than “what we can be.” The promise offered by the literal and figurative leveling of 
class difference in the immediate postwar period is replaced by the reality of degenerative results 
that accompanied consumer culture during the economic miracle. 
Attempts to portray the economic and social unevenness of Italy’s rapid modernization 
predominantly revolved around the reorientation and reconstruction of the South as archaic, 
underdeveloped, and foreign. As Angelo Restivo has suggested:  
The South becomes the ideal site in which to explore the changing manners and 
mores of a new society; for the South, in its very “backwardness,” its cultural 
distance from modernity, provides the widest possible distance requisite for the 
effects of comedy. . . . In this way, the South becomes for the nation a site of 
displacement, the place upon which its own anxieties about the transformations 
wrought by modernization can be displaced.10 
 
Changes in social structure, behavior, values, and mores attributable to the emergence of 
modern, capitalist culture are analyzed via their contraposition to the stasis ascribed to the South. 
Given that the economic growth of the nation was directed by the industrial expansion of 
northern urban centers, the process of sociocultural transformation itself is equated with the 
North. Progress is seen as occurring from top to bottom, in both a class-based and geographically 
imagined sense. Judgments concerning its social effects at the regional and national levels are 
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therefore grounded in the real and metaphorical distance between the North and the “historically 
frozen” South. The extent to which changes in sexuality, morality, consumption, and civility are 
deemed acceptable is measured in their relation to a southern society rendered as antiquated, 
immobile, and absurd.  
 Herein lies the problem of commedia all’italiana. The satirical juxtaposition of a modern 
North with a backward South is intended to unrobe distortions of progress and equality 
accredited to the economic miracle. On the one hand, the films do present evidence of the 
dangerous and disintegrative contradictions of modernization. However, this recognition is 
necessitated by what André Bazin has called, a “deep” reading of the films; one that requires the 
viewer to analyze beyond the filmic boundaries of time, action, and setting.11 A “deep” reading 
of commedia all’italiana in particular, involves Hegelian dialectical thinking, in that the mutual 
contradiction of two opposites (thesis/antithesis) needs to be replaced by the higher level of truth 
of a third proposition (synthesis). In contrast, a superficial reading of the films may entrench 
stereotypes of the South. Given the general absence within the commedia all’italiana of 
redemptive qualities (on the part of the individual) and resolutions for regional incorporation, 
these films run the risk of merely reiterating the Otherness of the Mezzogiorno.  
This problem centers on the audience’s freedom to decode the message subjectively. 
Decoding, according to Stuart Hall, occurs from three hypothetical positions: the dominant-
hegemonic, the negotiated, and the oppositional.12 Rather than being static, these positions exist 
in a continuum, allowing movement between the divisions in response to alterations in the 
“preferred meanings” of cultural texts and changes in class allegiance. For Hall, these positions 
are not “personal (mis)readings of isolated viewers.” Instead, they are “ideological positions 
concerning particular social groups.”13 Hall, however, asserted that these groups cannot be 
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reduced to class alone; no guarantee exists that a working-class audience, for instance, will 
produce oppositional readings to projections of bourgeois conspicuous consumption or 
bureaucratic corruption. Although acceptance of the multivarious nature of decoding may appear 
to diminish the ability to make concrete conclusions about the public’s reception of the 
commedia all’italiana, the general opposition of the political left and right to the messages 
communicated by the genre suggests a discernable effect on ideological imaginations of the 
modern nation.  
The message of the South as a site of displacement is integrated into the construction of 
the nation during the economic miracle in two crucial ways. First, it implies the need to conceive 
the South as a postcolonial space within the nation itself—a region dependent upon northern 
socioeconomic guidance yet ultimately responsible for its own development. Second, it requires 
regional divisions to be taken into account in advance of claims for national unity. Southern 
culture needs to be included rather than assimilated in national identity. The difficulty lies in 
reconciling the creation of symbolic opposition between the North and South with the myths of 
homogenization and equity ascribed to economic growth. According to Restivo, this is 
predominantly a function of the timing and rapidity of Italy’s modernization, in that: 
The construction of Italy as a coherent national entity occurs not under the 
discourses of modernity in which the other great Western nations were 
constructed but rather within the tensions between that modernist, democratic 
impulse and an incipient postmodernity that would valorize (for the purposes of 
consumption, of course) the very dispersion that renders the idea of the nation 
already an antiquated one.14 
 
The predicament underlying the construction of national unity is not simply a matter of rectifying 
the dualism of premodern and modern. It demands finding a negotiated position between 
premodern and modern that is conscious of emerging postmodern factors (e.g. globalization; 
post-Fordist capitalism) that diminish the importance of fostering national unity at all.  
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 As a consequence, a negotiated reading of commedia all’italiana films that both adopts 
and opposes the veracity of the genre’s prevailing binarisms of modernity/antiquity, 
individual/society, mobility/immobility, and traditional versus nuclear family is most 
informative. The contradictory aspect of the negotiated position mirrors the internal conflict of 
the hegemonic construction of the nation-state during this transformative period. It also 
encourages a deconstruction of the relative nature of comedy itself, for what is laughable for one 
is reason to cry for another. 
 
From Modernity to Antiquity: Mafioso  
 No other film of the commedia all’italiana genre tackles the dichotomies between the 
North and South better than Lattuada’s Mafioso. This film focuses on the clash between modern, 
northern customs and “an archaic southern code of conduct that persists in an era of 
transformation.”15 In tone, it is critical of the treatment and exploitation of the South, yet it 
“reveals the difficulty of portraying the complexity of the ‘Southern Question’ without falling 
into the position of reproducing the southerner as Other.” 16 In general, the film is a tragicomedic 
ethnography of Sicily, constructed through the dual lens of a returning native and his outsider 
wife. What Lattuada offers specifically is a contrast of the very different social orders of three 
forms of family: the traditional/extended, the nuclear, and the mafia. This is developed within the 
broader iconic comparison of the physical and cultural landscapes of Milan and Sicily.  
 The protagonist of Mafioso is Antonio Badalamente (played by Sordi), a Sicilian who has 
emigrated to Milan and worked his way up the ladder at an automobile manufacturing plant. He 
is a chronometrist—an efficiency expert who obsessively times the repetitive motions of the 













massive Fordist factory, highlighting the bureaucratic, hierarchical, and alienating aspects of 
modern industrial work. The camera follows Antonio on the last day before his vacation. He has 
decided to take his wife, Marta, and two daughters, Caterina and Cynthia, to his hometown of 
Calamo, Sicily, for the first time. The city blocks he traverses on his way home are bustling and 
crowded—a chaotic Milan is presented in high velocity, replete with imposing buildings, modern 
tenements, shops, and thousands of people and automobiles all in motion. When he arrives home, 
the viewer is instantly made aware of the outsider role Marta will play. She and the couple’s 
young daughters all are fair-skinned and blond. They are identifiably nonsouthern in their 
appearance, dialect, and mannerisms. Marta’s unease concerning the trip indicates her fear of 
meeting Antonio’s family and of traveling outside of “the civilized world.”  
 Time is emphasized again in the family’s journey South. Traveling sequences, in their 
length, suggest slowness and distance. Images of the southern landscape from train, boat, and car 
are picaresque and exotic, accentuating the vast emptiness and quiet of the Mezzogiorno. When 
their ship begins to cross the Strait of Messina, the camera pans with Antonio as he points across 
the water and eagerly says, “There’s Sicily.” Marta, looking in the opposite direction, comments 
sadly on Italy “slipping away,” which prompts an exasperated Antonio to ask, “Isn’t this Italy 
too?” As they begin the long drive to the western coast of the island, Marta’s discomfort is 
compounded. Surveying the desolate landscape from the car, she laments that “It’s obvious we 
have left Italy behind.” Her disdain is countered by Antonio’s exuberance in extolling the simple 
and carefree life of Sicily. When they pass a funeral where mourners are eating and drinking next 
to the corpse, Antonio lauds the peaceful sincerity of Sicilian ways. However, upon asking about 
the cause of death, he is nonchalantly told it was from “two pistol shots.” The indifferent 
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response to murder presages Antonio’s own response to his brutal actions to come, and 
associates violence as a fact of everyday life in the South.  
 Marta’s culture shock is exacerbated at the eventual meeting with Antonio’s family. They 
are greeted by dozens of family members waiting eagerly in front of the house. The camera 
scrolls over each person, encouraging the viewer to take measure of the familiar archetypal 
images of southerners. Numerous older women are present, dressed in black and wearing 
headscarves, together with burly, scruffy uncles and neighbors, half-dressed children, and 
Antonio’s sister, Rosalia, a dark-haired young woman with a discernable mustache. (Comically, 
it is Rosalia’s facial hair that initiates Marta’s opening up to the family later in the film.) The 
sheer expanse of the traditional, extended family is parodied in Antonio and Marta’s movement 
through the procession. Antonio greets his uncle and rhetorically asks, “You’re still alive?” 
before staring bewilderingly at his sister’s mustache. He hugs the first older woman he sees and 
exclaims, “Mama!,” only to be brushed aside by the lady who turns out to be his aunt. The same 
occurs with the second woman (also his aunt) before he finally embraces his actual mother. The 
absurdity extends into the crowded house where twelve people spanning four generations live. 
As guests, Antonio and Marta are given the best bed, leaving Antonio’s mother and father to 
sleep on the floor.  
 Marta’s presence, met with suspicion and silence, is immediately contrasted with the 
image of southern femininity. Her revealing attire renders her out of place and warrants lurid 
glances from the older women and ogles from the men. The women are also astounded by her 
bourgeois behavior, indicated by her reluctance to eat the rustic food they have prepared and her 
gall in lighting a cigarette at the table in front of men. Marta’s vanity is emphasized by her 
disgust for the squalid living conditions and lack of amenities in Sicily, as well as the subservient 
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position of women in the Sicilian family. She cannot comprehend why the young girls are kept 
cloistered away or why she is unable to be seen alone in public. Although Marta’s liberated 
position in line with northern cosmopolitanism is used to satirize antiquated gender roles of the 
South, Lattuada is careful not to affirm her freedom as entirely better. He shows Marta’s 
individualism as alienating via her self-centeredness, denigration of her husband, and 
indifference towards her children. This contrasts with the closeness and solidarity of the 
traditional family. Although Lattuada suggests the need for a compromise in family structure 
given that each version contains distinct disadvantages, he ultimately leaves judgment to the 
viewer.  
 The theme of family is compounded by the introduction of the mafia midway through the 
film. Antonio is told to pay a visit to the town patron, Don Vincenzo, who not coincidentally is 
head of the local mafia. That the don is waited on by a senator, a priest, and a band of criminal 
associates indicates his position at the top of the social ladder. It also suggests that the mafia in 
general still runs things in the South and that patronage is rampant, regardless of the amount of 
State intervention. Although Antonio thinks he is merely paying his respects to Don Vincenzo, 
he soon learns that the boss has a job for him [Fig. 4.2]. What the audience learns prior to 
Antonio’s arrival is that his success in Milan had been due entirely to the don’s influence. As a 
consequence, the heretofore unknown favor requires a substantial repayment on Antonio’s part. 
Antonio’s “gratitude” is to be paid by killing a man in New York who has betrayed the “family.”  
 Through the character of the don, Lattuada alludes to the persistence of the historical 
alliance between southern landowners (who, in Sicily, were predominantly mafiosi) and northern 
industrialists, a partnership maligned by Antonio Gramsci as a primary hindrance to proletarian 















escape the social codes of the South simply by emigrating from it. Although Antonio is one of 
the few successes of southern migrants in the North, he cannot separate himself from the 
obligations that still define the social structure of the South. His predicament parallels the 
inability of the North to simply divorce itself (in terms of national unity) from the dependency 
and difference of the South. Antonio’s agreement to commit the murder acknowledges his 
commitment to upholding codes of southern political culture over his moral responsibility to 
both of his other families.  
 Cleverly, the film expands on the basic allusion to allegiance, individualism, and the 
Southern Question in a sequence showing an inversion of such traits. At the beach, Antonio and 
his friends critically discuss the isolated position of southerners: 
Man #1: But if alienation is an industrialization problem, doesn’t that mean we 
               are all alienated? What are we otherwise, happy and content? 
Man #2: The South’s sickness isn’t psychological. It’s due to economy and 
               society. 
 Man #3: You’re wrong. We are psychologically isolated. 
 Man #4: People don’t communicate. That’s another issue. 
Man #1: They’re two sides of the same coin. Sure we don’t communicate. Among  
   friends we do. We know all about each other. But with the ladies, we 
   never communicate. Hence, alienated.  
 
The focus of the conversation abruptly devolves to an argument over the “northernness” of a 
naked figure of a woman the men are building in the sand. In this scene, the film transposes the 
existential crisis of the individual espoused in art films of the time onto the Sicilians. Ultimately, 
the unexpected intellectualism of the men is rendered an aberration of southern existence by an 
exposition of juvenile sexual attitudes. When Antonio joins the group, the men press him about 
his sexual conquests in Milan. As Antonio begins to recount his experiences, he notices that the 
men are no longer listening to him. Instead, they are gazing at Marta in her bikini. Annoyed, 
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Antonio exclaims, “That’s my wife!” and warns the men, “Watch it. I may live in Milan, but I’m 
still Sicilian!” He then hurriedly walks over to Marta, covers her up, and leaves the beach. The 
moment reiterates not only how southern “masculine honor is tied to the female body as male 
property,” but also the depth of Antonio’s self-identification as a southerner despite the 
prosperity and freedom he has acquired in the North.17 
 Under the guise of a weekend hunting trip, Antonio is escorted to New York where he 
proceeds to follow through with his duties. He returns to Sicily and then to Milan with his wife 
and daughters as if nothing happened. The film ends with Antonio back at work in the factory. 
Repeating the opening sequence, Antonio again compulsively times the movements of the 
workers. However, this time the camera pans out to a depth greater than in the beginning scene. 
The increased distance between the camera and Antonio suggests a new level of alienation. His 
heinous act has distanced himself further from moral obligations to family. At the same time, the 
experience has made him aware of his inability to escape the past. No matter how much his life 
has changed in Milan, he cannot untie the knots that continue to bind the antiquated customs of 
the South to conceptions of northern progress.  
Mafioso shrewdly locates the profound cultural differences between the two regions 
within a framework of interdependency. As Landy has adeptly summarized: 
The film provides a broad vista on the “Southern Question” and attempts the 
impossible task of integrating the economic situation of Southern life with the 
vestigial remnants of familism, subordination of women to the codes of honor, the 
segregation of those who work against custom, and the role of the Mafia as 
integrally associated with landlordism, patronage, and violence. Moreover, the 
North is not exempted from this analysis, since the Mafia is part of northern 
industrial life.18  
 
In Mafioso, Lattuada attempts to locate the debate over the “real” Italy squarely in the present, 
for much like Antonio’s need to reconcile his inbetweenness of place, the identity of the nation 
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as a whole must be negotiated between divergent spaces (the North and South) and times (the 
past and future). The South cannot simply be left to history, just as the North cannot be imagined 
exclusively as harbinger of the future.  
  
Moral Distance: Pietro Germi’s Divorzio all’italiana and Sedotta e abbandonata                    
 The critique of an archaic and persistent code of southern morality is undertaken with 
greater depth and focus in Germi’s films Divorzio all’italiana and Sedotta e abbandonata. The 
principal plot lines revolve around marital tension, sexual oppression, and divorce; however, 
Germi develops these themes in relation to broader, underlying characteristics of Sicilian society 
including onore (honor), omertà (code of silence), patriarchy, corruption, and violence. The 
narrative form of both films can be described as reductio ad absurdum—a sardonic portrayal of 
customs wherein “a social question is magnified, reducing the action to chaos and the social 
question to absurdity.”19 Through the unfathomable, illogical, and ridiculous actions of the 
characters on screen, Germi renders Sicilian culture as incongruous with emerging 
transformations in sexual morality, gender roles, and the family occurring throughout urban 
Italy. Although scrutiny of the embedded social customs and codes of the Mezzogiorno has 
historically occurred “without a shred of comedy,” what finally opens them to laughter and 
parody in the early 1960s is the discernable increase in distance between an immobile South and 
a rapidly modernizing North.20 Rather than simply reaffirming the stereotypical backwardness of 
the region, the films incorporate the South into national dialogues concerning sexual liberation, 
women’s rights, and gender equality by exploring these issues within the feudal symbolic order 
of the South. 
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 Produced prior to the legalization of divorce, Divorzio all’italiana centers on one man’s 
desire to free himself from his nagging, unaffectionate wife. The protagonist is Ferdinando 
“Fefé” Cefalù (Marcello Mastroianni), a decadently vain and listless Sicilian aristocrat who 
dreams of divorcing his wife Rosalia (Daniela Rocca) so that he can marry his teenage cousin 
Angela (Stefania Sandrelli). Being without legal option, Fefé attempts to drive his wife to 
commit adultery so that he can murder her. Per Silician custom, his act would be considered a 
“crime of honor” and thus met with lighter punishment. Having weighed his options of “three to 
seven years” incarceration versus a lifetime of marital imprisonment, Fefé concludes the former 
to be more tolerable.  
 The film follows Fefé’s failed attempts to catch his wife in the act of betrayal. He has 
hired his wife’s former lover, a painter named Carmelo, to restore a fresco in their house. After 
secretly placing a microphone in the room, Fefé continually devises ways to get Rosalia and 
Carmelo alone together. Fefé’s time in the interim is spent longingly spying on his cousin, 
listening to his clandestine recordings, and loafing about the house in his robe. After several 
days, Carmelo and Rosalia have re-established their bond. But, just when Fefé thinks he has 
caught them professing love for each other, the tape runs out on the recorder.  
Flustered, Fefé hatches a new plan. This time he encourages Carmelo to come to the 
house at night, when he and the rest of the family, except for Rosalia, are at a movie. He intends 
to leave the theatre midfilm so as to arrive home unexpectedly, grab a gun he has stashed, and 
shoot the lovers in the act. Upon reaching the house, however, he discovers the couple already 
gone, having boarded a train for an unknown location. Fefé spends the next few weeks taking 
internal delight in his stigmatized public identification as a cuckold, hoping that in time the 
townspeople will become sympathetic to his fate and thus offer no objection to the courting of 
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his cousin. Unfortunately, he still technically remains married, forcing him to locate his wife and 
complete the divorce, “Italian-style.” After tracking down the adulterous couple, Fefé readies 
himself, pistol in hand. But, as he climbs the cliff to where they sit, two shots ring out and a 
woman runs past him. To his horror, the woman is Carmelo’s wife, who has exacted her own 
revenge by killing her husband. In a grotesque yet comical conclusion, Fefé runs to the scene of 
the crime yelling, “What about my honor?” and proceeds to kill Rosalia [Fig. 4.3].  
The final sequences detail Fefé’s conviction and sentencing. He receives the minimum of 
three years for the murder. The film then cuts to him returning on a train after being released. He 
is greeted at the station by a throng of family of friends, treated as a hero returning from war. In 
the last scene, Fefé is on a boat with Angela, his new bride, happily living his new life. However, 
as Fefé kisses her, the camera pans over Angela to show her simultaneously caressing the young 
boathand with her foot, suggestive of the recurrence of marital betrayal, this time surely 
unwanted.  
  In Divorzio all’italiana, Germi portrays persistent Sicilian codes of morality and honor 
as hypocritical and socially disintegrative. Although this portrait forces the audience into a 
viewpoint highly critical of Sicilian life, it provides a forum to analyze national-level debates 
over divorce and gender equality. This is done by framing southern culture as antithetical to 
modern rationalism, thereby offering the South as a measuring stick for progress. Sicilian society 
is envisioned as oppressive, insular, misogynist, and contradictory. Townspeople watch each 
other with suspicion from balconies, windows, and street corners, and obsess over other people’s 
private matters; men long to be lotharios yet ridicule their cuckolded friends; fathers subject their 


















dominant sexist views of morality as their duty to tradition; and the courts uphold masculine 
honor over the sanctity of life.     
Germi’s disparaging depiction is not, however, intended simply to render the South as 
antiquated and hypocritical. It is also an indictment of the failure of the political left and right to 
confront social change. Following the screening of La dolce vita (The Sweet Life, 1960), where 
the entire audience watches the seductive gyrations of Anita Ekberg with astonishment, the town 
priest attributes Rosalia’s adulterous behavior to the “sinful” and “illicit” example of liberated 
female sexuality in the film [Fig. 4.4]. He extols Christian democracy and family values and then 
calls for the wholesale rejection of cinema—of “shameless pictures, unworthy mystifications of 
art that flaunt and exalt sin, debauchery, and immorality.” This is succeeded by a scene where a 
representative of the Communist Party speaks to a crowd of men. After mentioning how pleased 
he is to visit Sicily for the first time, the official orates about democracy and female 
emancipation, and how the Chinese provide an excellent example of how to accomplish both. 
When he asks the audience, “What is the calm, objective judgment that Mrs. Cefalù deserves?” 
the crowd yells “Whore!” in unison.   
The left is ridiculed for its perceived avoidance of the region and its inability to 
understand the (Gramscian) “common sense” of the South. The Communist Party is presented as 
naïve, incapable of relating to southern parochialism and the resistance to social change that 
accompanies it. On the other hand, Germi’s criticism of the right cleverly alludes to the DC’s 
publicized disaffection for the commedia all’italiana and its unflattering presentation of Italians. 
In so doing, Germi highlights the irony of the priest’s admonishment of cinema in general, 
considering that the Catholic Church, in cooperation with the DC, established thousands of 








Figure 4.4. Divorzio all’italiana, 1961. La dolce vita arrives in Sicily to mixed
 





“industrial puritanism” of the right—an ideological desire for transformative economic 
development devoid of changes in morality and social organization.21        
  Sedotta e abbandonata expands upon the critique of Sicilian social customs in a much 
darker and less comical fashion. Humor is less overt, generated primarily through the audience’s 
recognition of the absurdity and irrationality that accompanies the main characters’ steadfast 
adherence to family honor and codes of morality. Sedotta e abbandonata reiterates many of the 
stylistic caricatures of Divorzio all’italiana: Daughters are forced to undergo examinations to 
confirm their virginity; the objectification of women by men is contrasted with latent 
homoeroticism; male honor is bounded by clientelism and ritual; and individual freedom is 
contained by the oppressive voyeurism that subsumes the town. The film revolves around the 
Ascalone family, headed by the stern patriarch Vicenzo, who values honor and respect from his 
peers over the happiness of his daughters Agnese and Matilde. Contradictory and disintegrative 
elements of Sicilian social customs are highlighted, most explicitly through the transformation of 
Agnese. Matilde’s fiancé Peppino, in violation of codes prohibiting premarital sex, seduces 
Agnese and gets her pregnant. When their sin is uncovered, Peppino refuses to marry the young 
woman since she is no longer pure, defending his decision via the unwritten rules of Sicilian 
society that require brides to be a virgins. Castigated by townspeople and beaten by her father, 
Agnese is made into a pariah. Ultimately, through the collusion of her family and the local 
police, Agnese is forced to do the honorable thing and marry Peppino. Before accepting her fate, 
however, she courageously breaks the code of omertà by publicly charging Peppino with 
seducing her, “thus bringing down upon her and her family (rather than upon Peppino) the 
disapproval of the entire neighborhood.” 22  
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Uncompromising obedience to codes of masculine honor and feminine purity is presented 
as cause of the splintering effects on the family. Agnese’s sanity begins to slip away, her sister 
Matilde is placed in a convent to protect her virginity, their father indirectly dies from his 
insurmountable shame, and their mother is left heartbroken and alone. The message is that 
individual rebellion is useless within an inflexible moral code that actively resists change. 
Individualism, especially on the part of a woman, threatens the symbolic patriarchal order of the 
South as well as the traditional family, historically realized as the foundation of Italian culture.  
 In Sedotta e abbandonata, Germi reaffirms his portrayal of the South as immobile and 
poorly adaptive to the changes wrought by modernization. Importantly, his critique of the 
antiquated moral code is not intended to simply denigrate southern “backwardness.” In both of 
these films, the director situates stereotypical depictions of Sicilian culture within the broader 
issue of how, if at all, the South can be incorporated or assimilated into constructions of the 
nation. Attempts to encourage social change through the passive extension of economic growth, 
infrastructural development, state bureaucracy, and political lip service are rendered ineffectual 
by their neglect of cultural specificity within the South. Sedotta e abbandonata summarizes the 
lack of realistic and empathetic proposals for modernizing the South. In a scene emblematic of 
this problem, an apathetic and irritable northern policeman stares dumbfoundedly at a map of 
Italy. He proceeds to cover Sicily with his hand, exclaiming, “That’s better,” with a sigh of relief 
before wondering aloud whether an atomic blast “would improve matters on the island” and rid 
Italy of its “ball and chain” [Fig. 4.5] The South is again depicted as outside of the nation—


















The View with the Top Down: Il sorpasso   
 Dino Risi’s Il sorpasso explores the increasing distance between traditionalism and 
modernism from the opposite view of the aforementioned films. Focus is shifted from the 
antiquated symbolic order of Sicily to various signs and symbols of emerging consumer culture. 
The film is a veritable catalogue of the new Italian lifestyle, highlighted by “the hastened tempo 
of life, frenetic and alienated leisure activities, and attitudes towards Americanness, tradition 
versus modernity, work, technology, and sexuality.”23 Set in Lazio and Tuscany, Il sorpasso 
displaces to the North such familiar issues as southern backwardness, immobility, and resistance 
to change. This effectively relocates regional differences within a broader, national rural/urban 
dialectic. The term il sorpasso refers to the act of passing another car on the road, a process that 
occurs literally dozens of times in the film. Metaphorically, it is indicative of Risi’s principal 
message of traditional culture left in the dust of history, overtaken by modern values.    
 Described as the Italian road movie par excellence, Il sorpasso revolves around an 
aimless drive by two strangers between Rome and Viareggio, a resort town in northern Tuscany. 
The action begins with the main character, Bruno (Vittorio Gassman), frantically searching the 
streets in the outskirts of Rome for a telephone. To his dismay, all the businesses are closed for 
the ferragosto vacation—the universal holiday taken on August fifteenth. By chance, a young 
man named Roberto (Jean-Louis Trintignant) sees Bruno out his window and offers him use of 
his phone. Before being interrupted, Roberto had been studying for his law exams. His disregard 
for the ferragosto holiday—a symbol of the national identification with leisure time during the 
economic boom years—immediately renders him out of sync with modern times. 
 The initial contrast between Bruno and Roberto serves as the catalyst for Risi’s general 
comparisons between old and new. Bruno is an arrogant, superficial extrovert prone to 
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impulsiveness. Obsession with his car, the quintessential symbol of “Italy’s belated entry into a 
consumer society,” epitomizes his individualism and vanity.24 His occupation is never made 
explicit. He lives by the arte di arrangiarsi, “a kind of improvisational way of getting by through 
a combination of bravado, seductiveness, and smarts.”25 Roberto, on the other hand, is a 
conservative and pensive introvert bound by structure and discipline. After much prodding, 
Bruno convinces Roberto to take a break from his studies and go for a spin in his convertible. 
What begins as a short joyride, however, turns into an epic journey, with Bruno relentlessly 
attempting to teach Roberto about the obsolescence of the old values and ideals. 
 Throughout the drive, the film presents a litany of the images and sounds of mobile, 
consumerist Italy: Roads are lined with billboards and utility poles; restaurant menus feature 
“American hamburgers”; vending machines and scooters form rows in front of stores; teenagers 
wear surfer and beatnik attire; and a continuous loop of pop music plays everywhere. 
Importantly, all this is measured against a backdrop of traditional life that surfaces occasionally 
for shock value. At one point, the duo passes a man on a bicycle, prompting Bruno to yell, “Get a 
Vespa!”  When they speed by a family of farmers piled into a jalopy loaded with possessions, 
Bruno sarcastically remarks, “Ah, those fine Italian families” [Fig. 4.6]. Later, they come upon a 
group of priests standing by their broken vehicle. The fact that the men are stranded suggests the 
inability of the Catholic Church to keep up with changes in morality wrought by consumer 
culture. Their arguing in Latin further situates the priests in the past. In a scene paradigmatic of 
the confluence of old and new, Bruno and Roberto stop to observe a party in rural Tuscany. 
Farmers, in their work clothes, dance the twist to accordion music, provoking great laughter from 










e 4.6. Il sorpasso, 1962. O
 






relegated to history by the frenetic and nonstop pace of the duo’s mobility and the freedom it 
affords.  
 The obsession with leisure and consumption equated with modern Italy is emphasized by 
Bruno and Roberto’s numerous stops at restaurants and nightclubs. Without any distinct purpose, 
their time is filled with eating, drinking, and chasing after women, largely undertaken by Bruno. 
Roberto is forced to pay for everything. He realizes, despite Bruno’s promises, that he will never 
be repaid, and accepts with resignation that he is being used. Each time Roberto reaches his limit 
with their aimless wandering, Bruno convinces him to continue on. Ultimately they reach a 
beach near Viareggio, where Roberto finally submits to the carefree life as best he can. On the 
road again, he joyfully thanks Bruno for “the best two days of my life,” before encouraging him 
to pass the car in front of them. However, this time they are forced off the road, sending the car 
hurtling over the cliff and Roberto to his death.  
 The morbid conclusion is symbolic of the primary message of the film: The growth of a 
new consumer class and value system is marked by the simultaneous annihilation (rather than 
assimilation) of a traditional social order. In this regard, Risi’s casting is particularly noteworthy, 
for it is Bruno the elder who teaches his younger pupil about the need to break with history in 
order to embrace the present. The suggestion is that changes in morality and culture occurring 
during the economic miracle are not exclusively generational; they are also a function of the 
differing degrees to which traditional values are embedded in geographic and class divisions. 
The fact that Roberto is played by a non-Italian actor further identifies the old ways of life as 
foreign, just as the South of Mafioso, Divorzio all’italiana and Sedotta e abbandonata, in its 
adherence to an antiquated social order, is framed as outside modern Italy.    
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 Risi’s presentation defies a simple affirmation of new consumer-class values. Through 
Bruno, the rationale underlying the burgeoning cult of consumption is exposed as superficial and 
individualistic. His pleasure seeking requires instant gratification, which forces him to view 
commodities and people as disposable. Although he is constantly in motion, his actions are 
always motivated by the present, devoid of direction or consideration for the future. The carefree 
life of leisure Bruno appears to live is revealed to be not without its complications. Near the end 
of the film, the audience is shown that he has a wife and teenage daughter whom he has not seen 
in three years. When Roberto and he pay them an unannounced visit, the consequences of “the 
easy life” are made apparent. His wife treats Bruno coldly, as a weary waitress would her last 
diner. Upon arriving home with her much older boyfriend, his daughter brushes off attempts at 
fatherly discipline. Bruno’s inability to provide for them, along with his lack of any sense of 
patriarchal responsibility, has alienated him from his family for good. 
 The juxtaposition of Bruno and Roberto intimates the difficulty of imagining the new 
Italian citizen as the embodiment of mobility and the European work ethic. In Il sorpasso, the 
immobility of a traditional, rural worldview is weighed against the impermanence of an 
emerging urban, bourgeois value system. Locating where the two positions find common ground 
(if at all) is a central concern in the film, for in the tenuous relationship between tradition and 
modernity, the problem of constructing a populist vision of the archetypal Italian in this 







Interrogating the Hegemony of the Italian Economic Miracle 
 
 The extraordinary economic, social, and cultural transformations initiated in the early 
postwar years were realized materially and ideologically between 1958 and 1963, the apex of 
Italy’s economic miracle. In each of these six years, the gross national product grew by over 
seven percent, fueled by immense expansion of heavy industries and consumer goods 
production. Automobiles replaced scooters that had only recently replaced bicycles. Machinery 
replaced agricultural workers. Skyscrapers and tenement blocks replaced the bombed-out 
buildings of the immediate and distant past. Millions of Italians were on the move—from region 
to region, countryside to city, and city center to newly created suburbs. Southern villages 
emptied and northern cities overflowed, resulting in an unprecedented intermingling of peoples, 
dialects, lifestyles, customs, and morals.  
A nation was being constructed through the promises and desires of neocapitalism. The 
model Italian now had a new subjectivity, spoke a new standardized, technocratic language, and 
adhered to a new logic that equated consumerism with civic duty. Economic prosperity 
facilitated a leveling of class difference and regional inequalities. In less than two decades, the 
majority of the Italian workforce moved from the agricultural to industrial and service sectors. 
During this same period, the population, which had been split almost evenly between rural and 
urban at the end of the war, shifted overwhelmingly to the latter. These changes (in terms of their 
occurrence rather than their consequences) underpinned a vision of national identity based on 
cosmopolitanism. The physical constructs of modernization and industrialization in the cities 
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merged with a view of urban culture as an egalitarian melting pot to create an image of Italian 
development on par with the United States and Western Europe.  
The urban sphere was heralded as a promised land wherein Italy was being rejuvenated at 
breakneck speed. The potential achievement of steady employment, good wages, and housing 
enlivened the prospect for social mobility. Procurement of material wealth and commodities of 
convenience such as refrigerators, air conditioners, washing machines, televisions, and 
automobiles appeared within grasp. The concept of leisure time morphed from fantasy into an 
almost obligatory reality. Female emancipation began in the workplace (if not yet in regard to the 
body) with employment gains in factories and service industries. The growth of urban subways, 
tramlines, and buses enabled an unprecedented freedom of movement, while the explosion of 
urban retail markets offered a dizzying array of new options. The modernization of the cities 
united Italians in their mass-produced relations to mass-produced commodities. Consequently, 
the State abandoned its attempt to “make” Italians by forced assimilation in favor of a mass 
acculturation strategy under the pretense of choice—a tactic of creating consensus through 
consumption of mass culture.1 
This rendering of a nation united by middle-class aspirations and bourgeois democratic 
values depended, appropriately enough, on salesmanship—on the promotion of consumerism as 
a collective endeavor and the attainment of la dolce vita as an inevitability for all Italians.   
 
Projecting Modernity: Cinema, the State, and the Deceit of Urban Luxury 
 The Andreotti Law of 1949 marked the first step in the Christian Democratic Party’s 
(DC) campaign to replace the “false images” of neorealism with those “suitable . . . to the best 
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interests of Italy” that presented a “ray of sunshine” and a “healthy and constructive optimism” 
toward Italian reconstruction.2 The law established the Direzione Generale dello Spettacolo 
(General Directorate of Entertainment) under the Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali 
(Ministry of Cultural Activities and National Patrimony). This agency was empowered to 
subsidize films that promoted a positive image of postwar social and economic change and to 
censor those that did not. Films deemed unacceptable via their “bleak, pessimistic, and 
degenerative” presentation of society were denied export licenses (thereby criminalizing their 
screening abroad) and severely limited in their domestic distribution.3 The financial rewards for 
individual films were administered on the backend, with monetary returns from the government 
based on a percentage of the film’s total box-office receipts. This practice encouraged 
filmmakers to produce mainstream films of a formulaic variety. During the first half of the 
1950s, theatres were inundated with light-hearted melodramas, “pink” neorealist films, and star-
driven comedies largely devoid of overt social and political criticism.  
 The Andreotti Law simultaneously curtailed the grip of the United States on the Italian 
market. Quotas were established that limited the number of American movies imported annually. 
Legislation also required that box-office profits made by foreign films remain in the country. As 
a result, the best way for foreign production companies to spend their earnings was to reinvest in 
Italian coproductions that could then be exported out of Italy. These films, of course, had to be 
specifically Italian in subject matter and content. This particular policy had an extremely positive 
effect on the growth of the cinema industry in the 1950s in that it generated a level of private 
investment in domestic production companies, studios, theatres, and technology greater than 
what the federal government could provide on its own.   
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 The bolstering of the industry by the State was not undertaken simply out of economic 
altruism. Leaders of the DC had learned from Fascism that cinema had immense potential as a 
vehicle of propaganda, one that was still unsurpassed (in the 1950s) by other media in its 
geographic and demographic reach. In 1951, Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi formed the 
Centro Documentazione under the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (Documentation Center 
of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers) with the explicit purpose “to document and 
disseminate, both at home and abroad, information on activities of the public administration, 
with a special focus on reconstruction.”4  
 Although the center had a small, internal production company, most work was contracted 
out. The private firm, Industria Cortometraggi (INCOM), and the reborn federal institute, 
L’Unione Cinematografica Educativa (LUCE), produced most of the State newsreels.5 Between 
1952 and 1959, over six hundred film shorts, usually less than ten minutes in length, were 
commissioned. The government ensured mass exposure of its messages through special 
legislation. Theaters in Italy were required to run such newsreels before foreign movies and 
domestic feature film premiers, and they had to agree to show them as part of every screening for 
at least four days. On average, the center made fifteen hundred copies of each newsreel to be 
viewed concurrently in an equal number of theaters. A large percentage were dubbed in English, 
Spanish, French, and Portuguese for exhibition throughout Europe and the Americas.6  
 Thematically, the productions were united by a pro-American, pro-DC, 
prointernationalist, and procapitalist idealism. They varied from the documentation of treaty 
signings and meetings of political leaders, public works and housing projects, and military 
operations to depictions of factory life, schooling, leisure activities, and local festivals. This 
diversity, however, was united by a recurrent tone and narrative structure that referenced all 
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Italian culture to a concept of State-driven progress. In the first part of the decade (1952-1954), 
leaders emphasized reconstruction projects and international collaboration. In the latter half 
(1955-1959), the dominant message trumpeted economic growth and consumerism.  
 Two of the first newsreels, Ieri e oggi (Yesterday and Today) and Meglio di ieri (Better 
Than Yesterday), made in 1952, were exceedingly positive portrayals of the rebuilding 
accomplishments of the Christian Democrats during the first four years of the Republic. Ieri e 
oggi is a montage of shots of monasteries, churches, piazzas, and bridges either fully restored or 
in the process of being rebuilt, intermixed with sequences of public works employees paving 
roads and turning on water pumps in front of grateful onlookers. The voice-over narration 
proclaims that these actions “from the streets of Milan to the fertile fields of Basilicata” are 
evidence of diligent efforts by the government to “replace the memory of the last twenty years” 
with a reality that enables all Italians to “not only dream about but live the future.”  
Meglio di ieri departs from the routine structure of the newsreel by blending it with a 
fictional storyline. The protagonist is a Piedmontese man named Nalin who works in a small 
factory in the alpine Dora Valley. He takes great pride in his job but feels that his skills, work 
ethic, and sense of duty are underutilized in the countryside. Luckily, he hears a report on the 
radio from the Prime Minister himself, who calls for all hard-working and able men to fulfill 
their patriotic duty in the State-held factories of Milan and Turin. Nalin jumps at the opportunity 
and heads to Milan where he is shown happily operating a sheet metal press in a meticulously 
organized, clean, and well-lit industrial plant. In the concluding scene, Nalin relaxes at a café in 
the city center, satisfied by the nice meal he has just finished and the rewards of his new life. The 
intended message is twofold. Industry will guarantee economic development and a better life for 
those willing to contribute, and industrial employment itself is an issue of national pride. 
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 Braccio e lavoro (Arms and Work, 1952) continues along these lines, heralding a 
seemingly endless list of manufacturing enterprises (e.g. automobiles, flatware, washing 
machines, telephones, radios, patio furniture, lamps, clocks). In this instance, the emergence of 
these products is framed in relation to their provision of job opportunities rather than their 
desirability as luxury goods. The jobs created are highlighted as complementary to the 
government’s interest in reducing unemployment. The setting again is Milan. Unemployment is 
referenced only in its urban occurrence and the rate of job creation underway in the industrial 
sector is said to be so great that “within no time there will no longer be too few jobs but too few 
workers in the great Italian cities.”  Made in Italy (1953), a newsreel produced in English for 
circulation in the United States, reiterates the scope of economic recovery achieved through 
manufacturing. Notably, none of the commodities mentioned are agricultural and the national 
connotation “Made in Italy” is eschewed in favor of the localized articulations “Milan fashion,” 
“Roman films,” and “Turin cars.”  
 Several newsreels showcased the physical reconstruction of cities as undertaken by the 
State. Ricostruzione edilizia (Housing Reconstruction, 1952) highlights the government-funded 
houses “of the future,” designed not only to meet essential needs but to provide modern 
consumer wants. Oggi in Lombardia (Lombardy Today, 1953) presents this building boom 
specific to Milan, the “moral and economic capital of the nation.” The narrator further expounds 
that “it is not just a case of rebuilding the old, but also of building the brand new,” before 
excitedly repeating “houses, houses, everywhere” as the film jumps between shots of several 
suburban developments. In these planned and isolated neighborhoods, the narrator avers, “the 
well-being and tranquility . . . are signs of a solid and lasting prosperity.” In Ai margini della 
città (At the Edge of the City, 1954), the setting is moved to Rome where a similar unstoppable 
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change for the better is also transpiring. A traveling shot begins with rebuilt, upscale apartment 
buildings, transitions to new modernist tenements, and ends abruptly with the first sight of a 
borgata that has sprung up in the urban periphery. The use of color (still a novelty in 1954) to 
depict the new developments compounds the notion that modernity has arrived. 
 A similar theme is laid out for Naples in Campania industriale (Industrial Campania, 
1953). Amid scenes of commercial, industrial, and residential building projects, the narrator 
asserts that “the overriding imperative is to rebuild, rebuild.” Textile factories, foundries, and 
public works stations are touted as economic catalysts that fuel the expansion of “more than 
adequate” suburban neighborhoods “far away from the slums of the city center.” The film 
suggests that a future, utopian version of Naples is to be located outside of the old city, free of 
corruption, crime, homelessness, and deviance.  
 Newsreels that center on rural life and the South were in large part propaganda for the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Fund for the South). One of the earliest mentions of the development 
program occurs in La terra nuova (The New Land, 1952). In title and form, this is an obvious 
reference to, and repudiation of Luchino Visconti’s neorealist film, La terra trema (The Earth 
Trembles, 1948). Through a sequence of voyeuristic longshots, La terra nuova documents the 
ways federal projects are contributing to the mechanization and intensification of southern 
agriculture. Scenes of newly planted, large-scale orchards and fields of wheat are followed by 
shots of oranges and milled grain being delivered to numerous city markets and bakeries.  
In 1953, LUCE produced a series of shorts on each region. Those for Basilicata, Puglia, 
Sicily, Calabria, Campania, and Molise all stressed the Cassa’s influence on transforming 
inefficient, localized, or subsistence forms of southern agriculture into efficient, modernized, and 
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nationally incorporated systems. The Calabrian newsreel also presages the principle doctrine of 
Phase II of the Cassa (begun in 1957): a shift from the promotion of agriculture to industry in the 
South. The narrator boasts about the government’s immense progress in providing potable water 
and electricity to remote areas of the region and how this service has had an “unimaginable” 
impact on “the productivity of the agrarian workforce.” Still, despite such accomplishments, the 
man’s voice warns that the true salvation of the South will only be achieved “through industrial 
expansion in rural areas. Industry, not agriculture, is the solution to employment concerns and 
the harbinger of the future Italy.”    
In the second half of the decade, the newsreels turned more toward the unifying aspects 
of consumerism and Christian Democratic values, the assumption being that reconstruction had 
been fully achieved by the mid-1950s. I nostri divertimenti (Our Leisure Pursuits, 1955) was one 
of the first to highlight the rewards of economic progress. This film catalogues the first Italian-
made commodities of everyday convenience and highlights their widespread availability. 
Automobiles and household appliances provide an unprecedented degree of free time, the 
narrator suggests, and this in turn enables the populace to enjoy window-shopping, sporting 
events, and trips to the seaside. The recurrent use of our to preface these leisure activities seeks 
to conflate individualized actions with collective experience. This is particularly acute in regard 
to vacationing at the beach, which is presented as the quintessential meeting space where Italians 
from throughout the country can “rejoice in the universal growth in prosperity.”  
Additional newsreels endorsed playing the lottery (Il lotto, The Lottery, 1955) and 
attending soccer matches (La partita dello scudetto, The Match for the Championship, 1956) as 
hobbies of mass consumption. Cicli e motori (Bikes and Cars, 1956) glamorizes the freedom of 
mobility accorded by personal transportation. The vehicles are discussed either as marvels of 
140 
 
Italian styling and engineering or as enablers of pleasurable and aimless drives through the 
picturesque countryside. No mention is made of their importance for getting to and from work. 
Strada panoramica (Panoramic Route, 1955) and L’austrada del sole (The Sun Highway, 1959) 
showcase the newly built portions of the State-funded highway system, the largest public works 
endeavor of the 1950s. Although both films briefly acknowledge the transportation system’s role 
in uniting the country and facilitating unhindered movement, more time is devoted to roads as 
sites of indulgence. The modern highways are to be enjoyed more for breathtaking views and 
quaint roadside restaurants than for simple utilitarian function. 
The State also commissioned several newsreels to promote the new medium of television. 
From the first signal transmission in 1954 until the early 1960s, only one domestic channel 
existed and it was controlled by the State agency, Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI).  TV giovedì 
sera (Thursday Night TV, 1956) encouraged Italians to join in the collective and live experience 
of watching. The newsreel specifically highlights a Thursday night quiz show, Lascia o 
Raddoppia? (Double or Nothing?), hosted by Italian-American Mike Bongiorno.7 This program 
was a wildly popular version of the American game show, “The $64,000 Question,” and 
similarly tested contestants’ knowledge of history, current events, and mass culture. TV giovedì 
sera ritualizes the act of viewing into a national spectacle. It shows throngs of people, in rural 
villages and urban neighborhoods alike, parading to the local bar, restaurant, or upper-class 
household lucky enough to have a television set. Ensuing scenes display people reveling in this 
group activity—eating, drinking, and playing along with the game as a means of testing their 
own level of Italianness.  
The importance of disseminating a common language throughout the peninsula is 
outlined in La lingua di oggi (The Language of Today, 1958). Along with shots of children being 
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taught to “correctly” pronounce words free of dialect, the newsreel presents adults learning new 
phrases associated with modernization such as “zoning permit,” “administrative approval,” and 
“air-conditioning.” The last film made by LUCE for the Documentation Center, Il domani non fa 
più paura (Tomorrow No Longer Frightens Us, 1959), is a patriotic summation of the 
accomplishments of the DC during the 1950s. Its overarching tone suggests that reconstruction 
and economic growth have indeed created extraordinary changes in social relations. Moreover, 
these modifications have normalized society and replaced uncertainty with a clear outline of 
progress. “Italy,” the narrator triumphantly declares, “has not been rebuilt, she has been remade 
into one of the greatest international economic powers.” 
 
Exposing the Paradoxes of Modernization: Auteur Cinema and the Urban Problem 
The rosy idealism put forth in the newsreels of a newly modernized nation united by 
prosperity, mobility, and middle-class values was countered in the late 1950s and early 1960s in 
emerging international “art” films. Directors such as Federico Fellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, 
Luchino Visconti, Pier Paolo Pasolini, and Francesco Rosi challenged the authenticity of the 
State’s optimistic message via presentations of “everyday realities rendered invisible” by the 
processes of economic development.8 Cinematic discourse between visions of the “real” Italy 
espoused by the State and those by the auteur directors is emblematic of Michel de Certeau’s 
distinction between the use of strategy and tactics in hegemonic struggles. To de Certeau, the 
top-down deployment of social control administered by a centralized power involves strategic 
maneuverings by governments, corporations, and institutions to define space and cultural 
practice as unified wholes. In contrast, tacticians for the “practices of everyday life” strive to 
carve out spaces of resistance to authoritative forces and to contest State-defined parameters of 
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acceptable behavior and morality.9 In the art films produced during the economic miracle, 
directors offered acute critiques of the contradictions of modernization and collective exposure 
of the ways numerous Italians were excluded from the process.  
The paradoxes of neocapitalism and consumer culture were particularly scrutinized, 
especially their supposed ability to manufacture national unity. A common theme of many of the 
auteur directors was that the State strategy of industrial growth exacerbated the unevenness of 
regional development. The tenets of economies of scale and international competitiveness 
dictated policy bent on fortifying existing industrial centers in the North. As a function of this, it 
was believed to be more cost-effective to bring southern labor to northern factories rather than 
the reverse. In Visconti’s film, Rocco e i suoi fratelli (Rocco and His Brothers, 1960), the mass 
exodus of southerners to the cities of the North is stripped of any idealistic notions of freedom 
accorded by personal mobility or instantaneous affluence. The film documents the relocation of a 
family from Basilicata to Milan and their subsequent moral, psychological, and familial 
disintegration. Their dreams of a better life are met with the realities of northern prejudice, 
unemployment, and isolation.  
In its treatment of Milan’s urban space, Rocco also exposes the fallacy of the city as a 
cosmopolitan melting pot, wherein the intermixing of peoples from throughout the peninsula 
eliminates class and cultural boundaries and enables the cultivation of new, modernized Italians. 
As in Fellini’s Le notti di Cabiria (Nights of Cabiria, 1957), Pasolini’s Accattone (1961) and 
Mamma Roma (1962), Antonioni’s Il grido (The Cry, 1957), and Rosi’s Le mani sulla città 
(Hands Over the City, 1963), the great cities of Milan, Rome, and Naples each are presented as 
fragmented along economic and ethnic lines, with distinct spatial divisions between center and 
periphery. Within these films urbanization has, in reality, taken the form of an abstract mosaic in 
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which the borders between lower- and upper-class, northern and southern neighborhoods appear 
as clearly defined tiles on a map. The recurrent juxtaposition between images of the newly 
improvised, working-class margins and the luxurious spectacle of the old city centers frames 
urbanization as a process that merely entrenches existing socioeconomic inequalities. The most 
notable alteration (critiqued with particular vigor in Pasolini’s films), was that urbanization 
condensed sociocultural disparities previously dispersed across the nation into the focused 
geographical space of the metropolis. To Pasolini, this had the deleterious effect of reducing 
cultural heterogeneity to a measure of economics, in that social relations developed specific to 
place were being compressed by the horizontal limits of urban space and the vertical hierarchy of 
neocapitalism.   
In a way, Pasolini’s cinematic assessment predates postmodern theories developed by 
David Harvey, Frederic Jameson, and Edward Soja, who have argued that neocapitalism 
transforms space such that relations of exploitation are rendered invisible. As Jameson has 
suggested, it is only through certain privileged “technologies of vision,” such as film, that the 
subordinating relationship between capital and labor, which has become cloaked by the built 
environment, is made visible.10 In Le mani sulla città, the liquidation of traditional social 
relations and localized identity is presented as a dreadful consequence of land speculation and 
the building boom in Naples. The unbridled transformation of the urban landscape is exposed as 
a corrupt and socially negligent process conducted by unscrupulous politicians and developers 
eager to capitalize on the influx of federal funds and tens of thousands of potential renters. The 
residents of established working-class neighborhoods in the city center are pushed to the ever-
expanding margins, condemned to monolithic public tenements built by the same firms 
responsible for the luxury high-rises that have replaced their old homes. Disruptions to 
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employment, services, and community are dwarfed by an obsessive desire to liberate the central 
core of the nefarious imprint of the lower classes and to consolidate new migrants in the 
outskirts, thereby rendering their existence in the city center acceptable only as laborers.  
Several “art” films, particularly works by Fellini and Antonioni, also exposed the 
contradictions of creating consensus through consumerism. As Antonioni noted, the paradox of 
such an ideology is that, whereas consumption of mass-produced goods and culture is imagined 
as a collective experience based on the implied frequency of the term mass, the act of consuming 
something is purely individualistic.11 Taken further, the availability of various models of the 
same products reduces personal choice to a symbol of status, while commodities of convenience, 
such as automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, and televisions, encourage isolation. The 
alienation of the individual as a symptom of middle-class privilege is a repeated theme in 
Antonioni’s films. An infectious ennui circulates among the main characters of L’avventura (The 
Adventure, 1960), who show little concern for the wellbeing of a friend that has disappeared 
during their weekend getaway aboard a yacht. Amidst their halfhearted search, the protagonists 
rue the emptiness of their lives of wealth and leisure. Attempts to establish connections with 
others are superficial and fleeting, exemplified by an affair that ensues and immediately 
dissolves between the missing woman’s fiancé and her best friend. The overriding aimlessness of 
the characters is used by Antonioni to symbolize a social anomie festering amongst the middle- 
and upper-classes in which apathy, neurosis, and moral degradation emerge as doleful responses 
to the solitude of the individual in modern society.   
  Estrangement from others as a consequence of modernization’s alteration of the material 
and social landscapes is also the underlying theme of La dolce vita. However, Fellini’s focus 
extends beyond interpersonal relationships to a critique of the hedonism and moral deviance of 
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upper-class culture. Sexual obsession, gluttony, and vice are the new benchmarks of the 
privileged class wherein the consumption of things fosters an objectification of people. The film 
follows the weeklong exploits of a tabloid reporter named Marcello who wheedles his way into 
extravagant parties of socialites, aristocrats, and intellectuals in order to unearth the latest bits of 
celebrity gossip and scandal. Although the plot predominantly revolves around Marcello’s own 
narcissism and subsequent lack of meaningful relationships with his father, friends, and women, 
Fellini situates his behavior as a reflection of the immorality and vanity that pervades the elite 
classes of Rome. In tone, La dolce vita questions the viability of the DC’s attempt to push 
conservative bourgeois values and mass consumption as cultural unifiers. 
 Maintenance of the traditional family, high moral standards, and religious faith, in 
tandem with qualities of frugality, decency, chastity, discipline, and respect is presented as an 
impossibility in the works of Antonioni and Fellini, given the simultaneous promotion of 
materialism and individual freedom as the rewards of economic progress. This commonality of 
the two directors underscores a difference between them and the other aforementioned auteurs. 
Whereas Antonioni and Fellini focus almost exclusively on the upper classes, Visconti, Pasolini, 
and Rosi center their gaze on working-class groups marginalized by the processes of 
modernization. The protagonists of their films are the peasants, urban proletariat, and deviants 
(e.g. pimps, prostitutes, drug pushers, thieves, youth, and homosexuals) excluded from the State 
vision of modern Italy. More often than not, it is the southerner’s experience of the miracle that 
is used to exemplify the unevenness of economic development and social change, and as a means 




Northern Dreams, Southern Nightmares: Rocco e i suoi fratelli  
In many ways, Rocco can be understood as a sequel to La terra trema, Visconti’s 
neorealist masterpiece centered on the tragic inability of a Sicilian family to escape poverty and 
oppression. The migration of the Parondi family from rural Basilicata to Milan in Rocco echoes, 
ten years later, the saga of the Valastro clan. Both films focus on a clash of differing value 
systems—that of the traditional, southern peasant family and its archaic codes of loyalty and 
honor with the individualistic drive and liberal morality endemic to industrial society. Visconti 
utilizes this symmetry between the families to question whether the accomplishments of 
reconstruction and modernization since the immediate postwar period of the Valastros have 
actually proven beneficial to southerners. By moving the setting from the South to Milan, he also 
enables a critique of the purported empowerment garnered by migration and the effect urban 
industrialization has had in bridging the socioeconomic gap between regions.  
Rocco opens with the arrival of the Parondi matriarch, Rosaria, and four of her sons at the 
central train station in Milan. They are immediately rendered out of place by their shocked 
reactions to the cold weather and their unfamiliarity with the city map. The emptiness of the 
station and the fact that no one has come to greet them continues this feeling, as does Rosaria’s 
exchange with the ticket collector of the tram they board. Although they speak roughly the same 
language, the conversation is hindered by a mutual lack of understanding, as the two mimic each 
other’s responses. As Gian Piero Brunetta has suggested, “the repetition of the words is a sign of 
an absolute estrangement between the two worlds, of the nearly-galactic distance between them . 
. . . To communicate they are reduced to single words, gestures, photographs.”12 Along the way 
to their destination at the “end of the line,”—the eastern, migrant neighborhood of Lambrate—
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the sons marvel at the city sights and the pervasive neon glow, which prompts one of them to 
exclaim, “It’s like daylight all the time!” [Figure 5.1].  
The Parondis’ excitement towards the possibilities of city life initially remains intact, 
despite a litany of experiences that foretell impending hardship. Rosaria’s proclamation that 
“God has truly blessed this city. There is work for everyone!” proves to be naively idealistic, as 
her sons all deal with the very real consequences of urban unemployment, prejudice, betrayal, 
and isolation. The story that unfolds is structured around five vignettes loosely centered on each 
of the five brothers. In condensing the varying experiences of southerners in relation to northern 
urbanism and industrialization to a single family, Visconti achieves “a certain economy of 
historical explanation.”13 Whereas each brother symbolizes a different archetypal response to 
migration and socioeconomic transformation, their fates are united by an inability to preserve 
traditional familial bonds as a consequence of the selfishness required in their individual 
struggles to survive.  
The Parondis’ move to the North was instigated by the passing of the father, which 
suggests that the family’s ties to the past and to the land have been irretrievably severed. 
According to tradition, the role of provider befalls on the eldest son, Vincenzo, whom the rest of 
the clan seeks out in Milan. Vincenzo, however, does not want this responsibility. Following a 
stint in the military, he chooses to live in Milan rather than return to his hometown. The 
patriotism manifested in his military service is rejuvenated by his happy assimilation into 
northern industrial culture. His fiancée, Ginetta, is from an established, middle-class Milanese 
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When his mother and brothers arrive unexpectedly, Vincenzo is faced with the burden of 
the past and the irreconcilable differences between his old and new life. His initial attempt to 
bridge the two is thwarted by Rosaria, who takes offense at the bourgeois decadence of Ginetta’s 
family and their lack of allegiance to traditional codes of loyalty and morality. Her actions 
encumber his relationship with his fiancée and ultimately result in Vincenzo losing his job. 
Vincenzo reluctantly finds a cellar apartment for his family, but then returns to the environs of 
his new life, rarely to be seen by Rosario and the family again. Visconti uses Vincenzo’s literal 
and emotional distance to frame him as one of the lucky few able to escape the confines of the 
rural South and achieve a better life in the northern city. This ascent, however, is clearly 
distinguished by its timing, in that Vincenzo’s path to success began prior to reconstruction in a 
period of social and economic leveling, as opposed to coming from within the rigid hierarchy of 
industrialization.  
The experience of the second brother, Simone, alludes to the destructive and dangerous 
effects of urban life. A handsome yet brutish lout, Simone sees boxing as a means to attain his 
desired life of luxury. Unfortunately, his promising career is undone by a lack of discipline and 
his incessant drinking, gambling, and carousing. He has a tumultuous affair with an immigrant 
prostitute named Nadia and Simone resorts to stealing in order to continually impress her. 
Nadia’s unwillingness to commit to him fully leads to his psychological degeneration. He 
attempts to repay an exorbitant debt to a boxing agent through homosexual favors, only to be 
beaten and arrested in the process, leaving his brothers to cover the losses.  
The middle brother, Rocco, is the saintly figure of the family. Rocco remains hopeful 
throughout all the Parondis’ travails and constantly sacrifices his own interests to the welfare of 
the clan. An internal conflict does arise, however, when Rocco falls for Nadia. His genuine love 
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and respect for her contrasts sharply with Simone’s antiquated view of her as property. Simone’s 
anger at what he sees as his brother’s betrayal leads him to rape Nadia in front of Rocco, before 
severely beating him. Still the unflinching martyr, Rocco tells Nadia afterwards that she must 
return to Simone because he needs her in order to survive. Although he has no passion for it, 
Rocco then becomes a prizefighter in order to cover Simone’s debts. The celebration of his rise 
to Italian champion is tragically interrupted by Simone’s admission that he has killed Nadia. 
Rocco quickly claims that he can fix things once again before realizing in this penultimate scene, 
that the sacrifices he has made to keep the family intact were all for naught. The implication, of 
course, is that faith and good intentions alone cannot overcome the disintegrative effects of urban 
estrangement and moral degradation on the traditional family.  
Rocco stands as a transitional character between his two older and two younger brothers, 
as a man trapped between a disappearing world where social codes exist in black-and-white, and 
an emerging one in which the lines are malleable and blurred. His younger brother Ciro is less 
torn. He comes to firmly reject the traditional codes that have destroyed his older brothers and to 
accept the ethos and morality of modernity. Ciro finds work in construction and goes to night 
school to train as a mechanic. After graduating, he lands a job in the Alfa Romeo plant and 
subsequently meets a young Milanese woman. In similar fashion to Vincenzo, he begins to 
separate from his family and establish himself amongst the upwardly mobile working-class. 
Following Simone’s murder of Nadia, it is Ciro who turns him in to the police, thereby choosing 
modern justice and the sanctity of his future over loyalty to the family. Rather than being entirely 
skeptical of the promises of modernization, Visconti uses Ciro to represent those southerners 
who, through hardwork, tenacity, and thick skin, “made it” in the urban North during the miracle. 
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The last vignette focuses on the youngest brother, Luca, not yet ten years old. His 
inability to comprehend the drama unfolding within his family renders him at odds with both the 
past and present. He blames Simone and Ciro equally for the destruction of the family: the 
former for bringing shame upon them through his sins, the latter for betraying his brother. He 
longs to return home but is not sure why. The uncertainty that surrounds his future is indicative 
of the ambiguity that underpins the rapid transformations taking place in Italian society 
generally. The absence of a definitive resolution in the film attests to Visconti’s assertion that, in 
1960, it was premature to equate national economic growth with sociocultural progress.  
Aesthetically, Visconti highlights the spatial fragmentation of Milan in his selection of 
settings. The majority of Rocco takes place in the new migrant neighborhoods of the city 
fringe—areas never before seen on film and generally unknown to most established Milanese at 
the time. Visconti’s periphery is a dark, flat, and monotonous landscape that, although populated 
by tens of thousands of immigrants, is generally devoid of public life [Figures 5.2 and 5.3]. Its 
overwhelming emptiness emphasizes internal and external alienation. The desolation not only 
distinguishes this new Milan from the vibrant city center, but also exposes the seclusionary 
response of migrants to the absence of social bonds. The only time these new neighborhoods are 
shown populated is in shots of the Alfa Romeo workers on break. This, however, is an anomaly, 
given the controlled environment of the automobile factory complex and its symbolism as 
modernity’s rare breach of the periphery.  
Visconti’s portrayal of Milan’s margins as bleak, lifeless, and disaggregated is little 
exaggerated. Through comparison of the film’s images with print media photographs from the 
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Visconti filmed the actual haunts of the lumpenproletariat (e.g. the smoke-filled bars, gyms, 
boxing rings, underpasses, and concrete wastelands) and accurately portrayed the people of this 
fringe area as predominantly southerners.  
The director’s shots of the city center stress an estranged relationship of rural southerners 
to the modern city, as opposed to simply using the physical symbols of old Milan as an aesthetic 
contrast to the margins. The city’s iconic landmarks are not presented as invocations of grandeur 
and modernity. Instead, they are framed as sites of despair and anxiety for southern migrants, 
epitomized by a scene that occurs atop the Duomo [Figure 5.4]. After being told by Rocco that 
they can no longer be together, Nadia surveys the dizzying chaos of the city below. Her 
aloneness in this moment leads her to a contemplation of suicide by jumping off the cathedral, an 
act that, in Nadia’s words, would “contaminate the city the way it has contaminated me.” 
Simone’s visit to the upscale apartment of his boxing agent causes a crisis of moral desperation 
that marks him as out of place and signals his point of no return. Rocco is affected as well. 
During his brief stint as an errand boy at a dry cleaner, he endures the constant belittlement of 
the women he works for, who equate his innocence and politeness with stereotypes of southern 
backwardness and stupidity.  
Visconti claimed that he filmed Rocco in black-and-white because that was how Milan 
appeared to southerners during the miracle.15 Ultimately, this Manichean rendering of the 
migrant experience is encapsulated in the contrast between Rocco’s idealism and Ciro’s realism. 










Figure 5.4. Rocco e
 





If only we had the means to live decently where we grew up. I’m lost in the city. I 
was neither born nor raised in one. Not only me, but my brothers and my friends,  
too. Some get used to city life, and they seek the pleasures of city people. Not me.  
I don’t think that it’s right. . . . I mean, I want an automobile, too, but after the 
things that come first. . . a steady job, a home, and eating every day.  
 
Rocco continually holds to the dream of returning home and to the belief that such an occurrence 
will keep his family together. Ciro, on the other hand, realizes that Rocco has romanticized the 
world they left behind and knows that even southern villages cannot withstand the march of 
modernity. In the final sequence of the film, Luca confronts Ciro about his decision to turn in 
Simone. 
 Luca: Are you happy now that they have taken him away? 
 
Ciro: I was a kid when we left home and it was Simone, not Vincenzo, who made 
me understand that in our hometown we were beasts of burden, forced to work with 
blind obedience. “We are not slaves,” he said, “but we must not neglect our 
responsibilities.” But Simone forgot all that and, in so doing, ended up the way he 
did, ruining himself and bringing shame on us all. Simone once had good roots. . . . 
He just let weeds overtake him. Even Rocco’s goodness and generosity are 
misplaced. Rocco’s a saint, but what can he do in this world? 
 
Luca: If Rocco goes home, I want to go with him. 
 
Ciro: I doubt Rocco will ever see our home again. But you might Luca. And if you 
do, what do you think you will find there? Things will change there, too. Many 
have little faith in a changed world, but I do. You, Luca, will lead a more upright 
and honest life. 
 
Ciro exhibits a reluctant acceptance of modernization in his recognition that the progress 
unfolding throughout the country involves a consumption of peoples and places as much as of 
material goods. To him, the prospect of a better life for his younger brother and future 
generations is worth the destruction of the traditional family and the antiquated social system of 
the South that is occurring as a consequence of industrialization, urbanization, and consumerism. 
The critical responses to Rocco were highly varied, mirroring the pronounced divisions 
within the film. Despite its gloomy tone and length (over two-and-a-half hours), Rocco managed 
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to be one of the top-ten grossing films of 1960 in Italy. It received over a dozen nominations and 
awards from prestigious outlets such as the Venice Film Festival, the British Academy of Film 
and Television, and the Italian National Syndicate of Film Journalists. The Socialist Party’s 
newspaper, Avanti!, praised the film for “destroy[ing] the myth of the big city of general 
progress and well-being,” and L’Unità, the Communist Party periodical, claimed Rocco had 
revealed the “dark zones of our social and civil life” and “uncovered what was rotten” with 
neocapitalism.16 The general consensus among the press was that, in his presentation of the 
previously invisible areas Milan, Visconti initiated a more open aesthetic approach to the urban 
periphery.  
The State, however, did not share the same fondness. Visconti was indicted on charges of 
obscenity and indecency over his refusal to remove the film’s rape and murder sequences. Even 
though these scenes remained in edited form, Rocco was still heavily censored by the State film 
board before release. The city council of Milan banned the film entirely, claiming it was a 
blasphemous and exaggerated work of fiction that attempted to undermine the overwhelmingly 
positive effects of immigration and industrialization.17 Apparently, Visconti’s cinematic city 
posed a real threat to Milanese politicians who wished for the unknown Milan of the periphery to 
remain hidden. 
 
Pasolini and the Search for the “Real” Italy 
 In the realm of intellectuals and artists of the midcentury, modernization had no greater 
critic than Pasolini, who, as Ben Lawton has stated, “from the mid-fifties until his death in 1975, 
participated vigorously in every major political, ideological, and intellectual controversy in 
Italy.”18 A venerated poet, novelist, director, and journalist, Pasolini became the icon of the 
157 
 
scrittore scomodo—the “disturbing writer”—one who makes others feel awkward, 
inconvenienced, and annoyed. What made him a special case—an agitator of the right and left, of 
young and old, of governments and revolutionaries—was the way he relentlessly “irritated and 
disturbed the quiet pond where Italy of the economic boom rested. Everything seemed to be 
going so well, so his reaction seemed intolerable.”19 Between 1955 and 1975, over thirty lawsuits 
were filed against Pasolini by the State, with charges ranging from immorality, obscenity, and 
slander of federal officials to “contempt of the religion of the State” and “contempt of religious 
sentiment.”20 Although he applied a critical eye to various topics including Catholicism, 
Marxism, television, youth culture, sexuality, abortion, education, semiotics, language, and 
politics, his canon of work is united by an impassioned and often scandalous critique of the 
destructive practices and ideological contradictions of neocapitalist development.21      
     Pasolini’s deep loyalties—to “everything nonbourgeois, to Marxism, to language as 
expression rather than instrument, and to otherness”—all stand in opposition to the defining 
characteristics of post-World War II Italian development.22 To him, modernization had taken the 
form of a “multi-headed Hydra” embodied by the coemergence of a rapidly industrializing 
economy, a ballooning bureaucratic and repressive State, and an accelerated linguistic and 
cultural homogenization of society.23 His critique of industrialization expanded on Gramsci’s 
earlier claim that State-led economic development had, since unification, served to maintain the 
subjugation of the South by the North in an internal colonial relationship of dependency and 
dominance. Aside from the fundamental difference in magnitude, Pasolini distinguished 
industrialization of the postwar period from the past in two specific ways. Whereas previous 
strategies necessitated sociocultural differentiation of the regions in order to legitimate a program 
of strengthening the strong, the ideological underpinnings of new industrialism sought to identify 
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its sociological components (e.g. urbanism, internal migration, consumerism, and bourgeois 
values) as national virtues. Thus, in Marxist terms, the measure of Italianization of the country 
shifted from superstructural phenomena (northern culture and institutions) to the base (economic 
class).  
Pasolini suggested that a principle and destructive consequence of this transformation 
was the emergence, for the first time in Italian history, of a truly national language. Instead of a 
language “of culture” that had organically evolved over centuries from the most archaic strata of 
the populace, the new idiom was based on the economic and technocratic demands of 
neocapitalism. Although he acknowledged: “it is the industrial North that possesses that 
linguistic patrimony which tends to take the place of dialects,” Pasolini viewed the effects of this 
linguistic turn to “those technical languages that we have seen homologize and instrumentalize 
Italian as a new unitary and national spirit,” as more than simple reiterations of northern 
supremacy. In supplanting the “expressive” language of oral tradition and literature, the 
“instrumental” language of neocapitalism fostered the replacement of “the old dominant (but not 
hegemonic) humanistic bourgeoisie with a new technocratic bourgeoisie (with strongly 
hegemonic tendencies).” By eschewing the specificity of dialects in favor of the “communicative 
efficiency” of an international language of economic function, Pasolini felt the emergence of a 
sterile and mechanical form of Italian marked the end of the “cultural period in which it was 
believed that the Italianization of Italy might happen under the sign of equilibrium and joint 
contributions of the various popular sublanguages.”  
The fact that this new national language originated from within the northern aristocratic 
and industrial-bourgeois economic classes was particularly alarming. The danger related to the 
relative rapidity of the Italian industrial process, in that “while in other linguistically united 
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nations the technological spirit presents itself as evolutionary, . . . in Italy it presents itself as 
revolutionary insofar as it coincides with the formation of a (at least potentially) hegemonic 
class.” Prior to this moment, the Italian bourgeoisie had “not known how to identify itself with 
the nation” and thus, had remained a social class. The potential result of national adherence to a 
new idiom reflective of the bourgeoisie’s customs, privileges, and morality was the complete 
obliteration of the division between “bourgeois language and lower-class dialect that literary 
Italian had always perpetuated.”24 
 Pasolini’s obsession with the hegemonic power of language was not born simply from a 
concern for literary aesthetics. He utilized the issue as a symbol for the multitude of 
sociocultural, physical, and economic transformations wrought by neocapitalism that were 
reshaping not only Italy but the world. “Italian dialects,” he wrote: 
no longer belong to a particularistic national world but belong to a world that by 
definition is dialectical, that includes approximately half the human race, and 
which is placed in a scandalous dialectical relationship with the entire 
neocapitalistic or socialistic industrialized world.25    
 
Indicative of his Marxist leanings, this statement sheds light on the underlying motivations of the 
artist’s lifelong cinematic and literary emphasis on defending peasant and paleoindustrial culture. 
The new mode of production was resulting in no less than a “genocide” of the lower classes. 
Democratization was now equated with conformity to a “hedonistic consumption of superfluous 
goods.” Its success, Pasolini averred, was met by the attainment of “bourgeois entropy,” whereby 
class connotations became purely economic, and the only opening for proletarian and 
subproletarian inclusion in the national project was their ideological acceptance of middle-class 
values, regardless of the material impossibility of achieving such standing.26  
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In this way, Pasolini establishes a correlation between his “Linguistic Question” and the 
Southern Question. His concern is firmly with preserving Roman-Neapolitan working-class and 
southern peasant culture, which he feels are the social strata most resistant to acculturation, as 
well as the most difficult to co-opt. Yet, the “profound cultural mutation” initiated by postwar 
development prompted Pasolini to position the role of the subaltern differently than his 
predecessor. Whereas Gramsci was interested in locating the entry points of the agrarian and 
proletarian masses into “the mainstream of Western thought and culture” via a “radical 
democratization of culture,” Pasolini pessimistically felt that modernization and Christian-
Democratic rule had eliminated this possibility. Instead, he championed a wholesale refusal by 
the southern masses “of a society grounded in the false values of consumerism and conformity 
qua liberation.”27    
This abnegation of the “false consciousness of bourgeois materialism” by the Roman 
working-classes is a principle theme of Pasolini’s first two feature films, Accattone and Mamma 
Roma. Loosely based on his controversial novel, Ragazzi di vita (1955), Accattone centers on the 
life and death of a thieving pimp living in the borgata of Gordiani, an isolated enclave southeast 
of Rome. Hastily constructed in the 1930s, the Gordiani tenements were made of the cheapest 
materials and lacked running water and electricity. At the time Pasolini was shooting Accattone, 
the already dilapidated neighborhood was undergoing fullscale demolition and reconstruction as 
a target area of Rome’s urban expansion.28  
In the film, Pasolini presents proletarian culture of the borgata as insular, entrenched, and 
proudly antimodern. This distinguishes his cinematic envisionment of the Roman margins from 
Visconti’s Milanese outskirts in Rocco. Whereas Visconti wanted to expose the lack of social 
bonds and community inherent in the new, predominantly migrant, urban periphery, Pasolini’s 
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goal is to reveal the social and moral vibrancy of the “old” working-class peripheries even as 
they are being obviated by the new urban plan facilitated by the economic boom [Fig. 5.5].  
In Accattone, the Roman borgata is positioned as an inbetween space whose degree of 
physical and cultural survival is a symbolic measure. The film focuses on the feasibility of 
resisting a homogenized future without being reduced to history. In an opening sequence, the 
principle character, Accattone, as part of a bet, leaps from a bridge into the Tiber. His jump, as 
Marcia Landy has suggested, signifies the audience’s “immersion into another dimension of 
reality.” Accattone’s emergence from underwater and arrival upon the bank evokes Dante’s 
Purgatorio (an allusion also made in the intertitle at the beginning of the film).29 This reference 
also carries a spatial connotation. As a realm of limbo between heaven and hell, purgatory is a 
perfect metaphor for the borgata: a physical space positioned between Pasolini’s personal hell of 
the modern, transformed city and his idealized heaven of the subproletarian countryside [Fig. 
5.6].  
Pasolini frames the borgata and its inhabitants as emphatically opposed to prevailing visions of 
modern Italy. He accomplishes this by utilizing many tropes of neorealist filmmaking: 
nonprofessional actors, lower-class subjects, location shooting, natural lighting, a documentary 
“feel,” and, most important, the specific dialect and slang of the Gordiani youths.  However, the 
film deviates from the neorealist tradition in two crucial ways. It is devoid of the ideological 
optimism of its predecessors. This is symptomatic of the director’s assertion that neorealism was 
a “dead expression” tied to the immediate postwar period, whose power to persuade “ended with 


































Accattone and his cohorts are not heroic; Pasolini makes no attempt to present the main 
characters as prototypes of an alternate, working-class national culture. No progress occurs from 
a life of deviance to one of moral decency. Accattone himself has no redeeming qualities: he 
prefers being a pimp to any form of labor; he steals from anyone and everyone (including his 
son); he abandons his wife and all familial responsibilities; and he is destructively narcissistic 
and fatalistic. Yet, it is these characteristics that render his assimilation into the mainstream an 
impossibility, for he measures his wealth by the power he lords over prostitutes and the respect 
he garners from fellow crooks. The lure of consumer goods and upright employment has no 
value according to his archaic code of honor. As evidence, he eschews his given name, Vittorio, 
for Accattone (“beggar,” “scrounger”) since the latter holds greater merit in the world in which 
he circulates. 
Contamination is a primary theme of Accattone, which also serves to differentiate 
Pasolini’s work from classic neorealism. The film is more appropriately a pastiche, as neorealist 
elements are intermixed with a poetic and lyrical aesthetic. Pasolini inverts Catholic iconography 
throughout the film and, as Peter Bondanella has noted, Accattone is easily read “as a Christ 
figure in reverse.”31 There is an overarching juxtaposition of past and present and of high and 
low culture: the music of Bach and Mozart frame the reprehensible acts of thugs and thieves; 
Dante’s prose is followed by slang vulgarities; and the faces of the subproletarian characters are 
framed in ways reminiscent of Quattrocentro and Mannerist paintings. This recurrent blending of 
sacred and profane is a subversive device. Pasolini suggests that attempts to acculturate the 
marginalized lower classes foster an undesirable cross-contamination of bourgeois culture. 
However, the technique is also an admission, for the director acknowledges that the very threat 
of this potential corruption leads the hegemonic classes not to evangelize but to demonize (and 
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ultimately liquidate) the subaltern. This juxtaposition, then, is intended to force the viewer “into 
an awareness of the loss sustained from industrial development and the acquisition of self-
consciousness”—for Pasolini, a bourgeois vice—and it underlines the mythical qualities of life 
abandoned by modern culture.32 
The film’s “radical reversal of judgment on the subproletariat” seeks to simultaneously 
undo and reinforce myth.33 Like Visconti’s presentation of the everyday realities of “unknown” 
Milan, Pasolini’s naturalistic portrayal of the borgata and the lives of the Roman lower classes 
intends to demystify middle-class stereotypes of the urban subproletariat that have arisen from 
detached imagination rather than direct experience. His desire to convey a realistic portrait of the 
peripheral and marginalized segments of the city stems from an insistence that, at the time 
Accattone was made (in 1961), “no middle-class person knew exactly what the urban 
subproletariat (and specifically the Roman subproletariat) was and how it lived.”34 Pasolini saw 
this ignorance as a useful tool of the bourgeoisie. The dominated classes could be framed as 
nothing short of an inferior “race,”—an Other whose livelihoods, speech, appearance, and codes 
of morality existed outside of the contemporary world. Thus, the “radical and objective 
destruction of this world” was rationalized as a necessity of the progression of the modern 
nation.35         
Pasolini’s paean to life at the margins is not a plea for acceptance or integration of the 
southern working-classes into mass culture. Rather, he seeks to counter the belief that defining 
characteristics of subproletarian culture have no place in conceptualizations of postwar 
nationalism. Accattone is presented as evidence against the conviction that “modernity, by 
definition, is life without myth”—an assertion that includes a metaphor of backward-versus-
modern and implies that a “correct” historical trajectory exists for the nation-state.36 He posits 
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life of the borgata as primordial and preindustrial, bound by an epical-religious superstition and 
an antimaterialist social hierarchy. It is a world that, as Gino Moliterno has stated: 
for all its material poverty and its atavistic violence, its misery and apparent 
amorality – or perhaps precisely because of them – is nevertheless one of the few 
remaining sites of resistance to the spread of secular bourgeois morality and its 
concomitant religion of affluence and consumerism.37 
 
For Pasolini, it is locating and exposing the concreteness and viability of this mode of life in the 
contemporary world that enables his interrogation of the hegemonic success of neocapitalist 
culture arising from the economic miracle.  
 
The Myth of Consensus and the “Sexual Problem”: Comizi d’amore  
 Of Pasolini’s major cinematic works, the 1964 documentary, Comizi d’amore (Love 
Meetings) is the one least known and critically analyzed outside of Italy. Yet, it is the most 
accessible and straight-forward film by the director. Lacking the nuanced visual aesthetic and 
complex allegorical weavings of his fiction films, Comizi d’amore is a bare and uncompromising 
assessment of the country’s lack of ideological and moral consensus at the apex of the economic 
miracle [Fig. 5.7]. This “national inquest on sex,” as Pasolini called it, effectively maps the 
absence of accord throughout the entire country (including Sardinia and Sicily). Although 
Pasolini clearly provokes the North-South dichotomy through a contraposition of responses from 
northern intellectuals and southern peasants, he is equally intent on highlighting the vast 
diversity in attitudes and behavior within the two macroregions. This is done by prefacing all 
interviews with a textual identification of location (e.g. “An Artisan’s Workshop in Florence,” 
“A Soccer Field in Veneto,” “In Front of the University of Bologna,” “Outside a Factory in 
Milan,” “Anywhere in Calabria,” “Inside the Mafia’s Sicily,” “A Bar in Catanzaro,” and “Debate 






















 The overarching theme of sexuality is particularly informative, for it stands at the 
intersection of Pasolini’s personal, theoretical, and symbolic interests. Lines of questioning 
traverse birth, marriage, divorce, virginity, promiscuity, prostitution, and female liberation. 
Pasolini’s public homosexuality also adds an additional air of intrigue, for the director is clearly 
interested in demarcating class-based and geographical differences in the abhorrence and 
tolerance of his own “deviance.” Yet, the act of making sexuality public via the documentary is 
not itself subversive. Owing to Michel Foucault, Angelo Restivo has noted how the “very act of 
speaking sex is. . . precisely the social project of modernity.” Italy had reached the stage of 
advancement where sex had become an “issue,” in which the “regulation of bodies” attempted to 
establish a national consensus regarding a wide range of practices.38  
 For Pasolini, the symbolic relevance of sexuality is tied to the way it resists 
commodification. That is, sexual practice defies inclusion as a material object or service of 
bourgeois consumerism, since consumption that establishes monetary value (e.g. prostitution) 
exists firmly outside the bounds of acceptable moral behavior. In Comizi d’amore, the 
supposedly secular and rational attitudes of the educated upper classes are shown to be 
contaminated by myth and archaic tradition. The constructedness of the Symbolic Order is 
exposed through the vacillating and often hypocritical responses of Italy’s “modern” citizens: 
e.g. a Tuscan man who can accept adultery but not divorce (since the latter desecrates the 
sanctity of the family); a Bolognese student who feels she is free to be sexually active before 
marriage but “chooses” not to out of respect for her parents; and a Milanese professional who 
views homosexuality as “against God” but sees prostitution, humorously, as a part of “the way 
things have always been, even since Adam and Eve!” The incongruity of these replies reinforces 
Pasolini’s main claims. The fact that individual belief systems are rife with contradictions does 
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not bode well for the attainment of national consensus. Also, the liberation of the individual (a 
tenet of modernization) neither necessarily fosters greater tolerance of difference nor eliminates 
the influence of class and community on personal belief.  
     These assertions are shrewdly examined in two scenes. The first is a segment entitled, 
“To Be a Don Juan or a Good Father?,” in which Pasolini asks a group of soldiers about their 
personal preferences to be a lothario or a family man. The men are filmed in front of the Palazzo 
della Civiltà del Lavoro (nicknamed the "Square Colosseum"), the most iconic structure of 
Mussolini’s EUR (Esposizione Universale Roma) development [Fig. 5.8]. The intention is 
clearly to equate the military with Fascism and to position the army “as the traditional site by 
which the national subject can be wrested from local ties and turned into an ‘Italian’.”39 Once the 
visual association is made, however, Pasolini deconstructs the notion that the military is a 
monolithic national symbol of Italianness. He distinguishes the men individually by addressing 
them with nicknames based upon their regional origins, as in “Tu, abbruzzesino,” “Tu, romano,” 
and “Tu, toscano.” Each time, the camera pans the crowd and then zooms in on the face of the 
appropriate man. This framing technique emphasizes the predominance of the local over the 
national by “tricking” the viewer into believing physiognomic characteristics are uniquely tied to 
place. The men’s divergent responses are thereby intimated to be influenced by regionally 
specific value systems that ultimately defy the symbolic conformity expressed by their uniforms.  
In the second sequence entitled, “Disgust or Pity?,” Pasolini turns his inquiry toward 
differences in attitudes  about homosexuality between the northern bourgeoisie and southern 
lower classes. This juxtaposition is constructed as a means of uncovering the level of tolerance 
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Outside a dance hall in Milan, Pasolini asks a young woman if she has heard about sexual 
“inverts.”  
Woman: Yes, but I don’t know what they are. 
 
Pasolini: One day you will marry and will have children who could be like them. 
 
Woman: Let’s hope not. Maybe if they are as children they can be taught to 
              change—to be normal. 
 
This is followed by a young man who expounds how appealing he is to women on account of his 
proper upbringing and university education. Pasolini asks if he knows what “inverts” are, and the 
man answers nonchalantly that he once dated a lesbian, and he has met men who live as women. 
But when the director inquires about his feelings toward these people, his response is “disgust,” a 
sentiment reiterated by two teenage girls. 
On a commuter train in Turin, several middle-aged businessmen are interviewed. Their 
remarks about abnormal sexuality are laden with words such as disgust, horror, revulsion, and 
repugnance. One man comments that “if indeed it does happen, it should be severely repressed.” 
Another angrily takes offense to Pasolini’s hypothetical scenario involving the man’s son being 
homosexual. He asserts: “sexuality should be considered only to the right degree: for 
reproduction, exaltation of the family, and the species.”  
This line of questioning is continued on the streets of Catanzaro (in Calabria) where the 
director asks both young and old men, “Why is someone inverted?” Their answers are virtually 
identical: “It’s nature;” “He’s born with the desire to go with other men;” “There is no scientific 
reason;” and “It’s not learned from practice.” Pasolini’s follow-up question—“What do you feel 
for these people?”—is met with a similar uniformity. The overwhelming response is “pity,” 
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which one man reasons is the rightfully sympathetic attitude to have toward “those condemned 
by the mainstream for being themselves.”     
These scenes portray northerners as bound by a conservative moral code that predicates 
their responses of disgust, anger, and the threat of violence to nonconforming behavior. In 
contrast, southerners exhibit apathy and passive acceptance of the abnormal. The irony is thick, 
for the audience’s expectations are in opposition to the reality presented by Pasolini. The North, 
so identified with progressivism, modernity, and emancipation of the individual exudes a hard-
line intolerance to difference, while the South, so archaic and traditional, exhibits permissiveness 
of alternative and subversive lifestyles.  
The penultimate chapter of Comizi d’amore, entitled “The Real Italy?,” effectively 
summarizes Pasolini’s underlying message of the film. Posited as a question, the statement 
alludes to the director’s assertion that the profound lack of consensus he documents casts doubt 
on hegemonic claims that define “real” Italians as those united by the “industrial Puritanism” of 
consumer culture.40 Of course, the uncertainty of the title also acknowledges Pasolini’s 
theoretical skepticism concerning the possibility of locating the “real” at all. The inability to 
validate the truthfulness of the respondents’ answers contributes to this problem.  
The six scenes of the sequence all occur on a beach. Here, Pasolini supplies a thorough 
sampling of regions with interviews from the coastal playgrounds of Rome, Milan, Calabria, 
Liguria, and Tuscany.41 This sameness in setting is crucial symbolically, for the beach “is the 
place in which the new social totality is imagined: as a mobile, undifferentiated mass diverting 
itself in a national ritual of vacation.”42 In each place, Pasolini asks a similar set of questions on 
marriage, divorce, and gender equality. The editing in these scenes is pointed and transparent. 
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The remarks he chooses to include are meant to reinforce prevailing impressions of regional 
specificity.  
The Romans appear passionate and argumentative, and there is a great disjunction 
between young and old concerning the subservience of women and the desire to see divorce 
legalized. The Milanese project a calm and detached rationality to Pasolini’s question of the 
importance of sex in their lives. One man comments that “sex is a hobby, not a central facet of 
life. We neglect activities not closely connected to work.” The attitudes of the Calabrians are 
shown to be thoroughly archaic and mythic. On the topic of sexual honor, a young man explains 
how, in the South, a woman is “like an angel. . . . Like Dante saw her. Purity is necessary. 
Spiritual, physical, moral.” When Pasolini asks if this requirement only applies to women, the 
man answers, “yes.” This sentiment is echoed by the women he interviews, who express 
traditional views of gender roles and inequalities. On the beaches of the Italian Riviera, the 
women display a complete disdain for this “antiquated and oppressive morality of the South.” 
Lounging in bikinis and faddish accoutrements, two women take pride in their sexual freedom 
and disinterest in ever marrying.  
The two scenes of the Tuscan beach expand these regional differences to the sphere of 
class. Although they are the same space, Pasolini divides the beach into “Working-Class” and 
“Bourgeois” sections. In the former scene, a concessions worker discloses her conviction that 
marriage is the answer to the “sexual problem,” before admitting that divorce is the most 
reasonable solution for couples unable to get along. In the latter, Pasolini privileges the response 
of a father holding his son, who feels that divorce will only desecrate the sanctity of marriage. 




Man: Yes, indeed. 
 






Man: Because that’s how it is. I’ll explain: The family provides training for the 
children, so it forms the citizen, the future nation, the future people. So, if 
children aren’t reared to respect the family, how can they become adults with 
moral rectitude?          
 
The father’s response reflects “the traditionalist notion that the State is simply an extension of 
the family,” and evokes a central tenet of Mussolini’s nationalist program. Pasolini subsequently 
frames these comments as evidence of a “Christian-Democratic fascism,” which he contends is 
nothing less than a repressive continuation of “Fascist fascism.” The only change that has 
occurred is an alteration in method, in that the dominant strategy of generating national unity has 
simply morphed from the use of force to a cultivation of consent and then again to the 
conformism of bourgeois consumer society. 
 In summary, the main objective of Comizi d’amore is to subvert the notion that consensus 
is being achieved via national adherence to the moral logic of modernization. Through a 
cinematic mapping of the heterogeneity that exists in dialect, appearance, behavior, and belief, 
Pasolini questions the viability of constructing the archetypal “modern” Italian. However, his 
interest in empowering the voices of the subaltern is hampered by a visual romanticization. 
Although the voyeuristic long-shots of the southern peasantry in particular are designed to 
convey their Otherness, they unintentionally reinforce the social class as an object [Fig. 5.9]. 
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question acts as a tactic of resistance to hegemonic discourses. Might it instead reflect the very 
strategy that posits the region as outside the realm of inclusion? This “double bind” is epitomized 
by the director’s interview with the journalist Oriana Fallaci. Fallaci argues that even working-
class woman have attained a sexual and emotional freedom unknown until the last few years. 
Pasolini interjects to qualify, “In Milan, Fallaci. In Milan!,” then queries: “What about the 
Calabrian subproletariat?” Fallaci stares dumbfounded for a moment before responding with 
resignation, “That’s another planet!”       






           
             
 
        
 
 




Popular Cinema and the Deconstruction of the Myths of Modernization 
  
Concurrent with the formal, ideological, and political innovation characteristic of auteur 
cinema of the late 1950s and 1960s, a series of popular genres emerged as direct result of, and 
response to, the economic boom. In contrast to the layered aestheticism and psychological 
abstraction of the art films, and their association as products of northern intellectualism, the 
genre pictures as a whole were steeped in escapist spectacle—replete with transnational and 
transhistorical allegory, parodic sensationalism, and a Manichean rendering of good and evil, 
insider and outsider. Most favored of the numerous formula genres were the 
historical/mythological epics, or “peplum,” and the Italian, or “spaghetti” westerns.1 The 
particular success and longevity of these genres was almost entirely dictated by their appeal to 
southern audiences, rendering popular cinema of this period decidedly a “cinema for the South.”2  
Economic growth facilitated by postwar industrialization led to a reinjection of funds into 
the State-run Cinecittà studio at a level unseen since the formation of the film complex under 
Fascism. Beginning in the late 1950s, Cinecittà adopted an assembly-line approach à la the 
Fordist model, emphasizing rapidity and quantity in film production that mirrored the underlying 
design of the entire manufacturing sector. With the overwhelming proportion of durable and 
nondurable goods consumed by northern urbanites, film was seen as a viable consumption for 
southerners and therefore a means of incorporating them into the national economy. Although 
this targeting of southern audiences had clear ideological underpinnings, it also had a more 
simplistic economic function. The creation of thousands of terza visione (third-run theaters) in 
the Mezzogiorno during the 1950s endowed the film industry with a substantial untapped market. 
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Whereas these predominantly rural and provincial theaters had been solely the recipients of out-
dated films from the prima and seconda visione of northern and urban areas (and thus, where 
domestic and foreign films “went to die”), in the late 1950s they began to show movies made 
specifically for their audiences.  
This terza visione strategy naturally required producers to ascertain what kinds of films 
southern theater-goers would buy. In this instance, consumption habits defined production, a rare 
reversal in which southern tastes were empowered with a tangible input into national mass-
culture production. Of course, this position of influence was beset by a lack of self-determination 
that once again rendered southern culture vulnerable to stereotyping. Even though movies made 
successful (i.e. profitable) by the millions of southern audience members did not originate from 
the South, the popularity of certain genres in the region led to a conflation of the themes and 
tones of these films with southernness. Along with often implausible and fantastical plotlines, the 
hackneyed and laughable production value of many of these films fostered their outright 
dismissal by critics as “pulp distractions.” The political left also chastised them for amounting to 
nothing more than panem e circenses (bread and circuses) for the masses, devoid of any relevant 
sociopolitical criticism.  
 As a result, critics explained the unfathomable popularity of the peplum and spaghetti 
western genres chiefly as a function of the unsophisticated and uneducated tastes of southern 
audiences. They resoundingly discarded any thought that the narrative theses of these films 
fostered discursive engagement among southerners. Christopher Wagstaff’s assessment of Italian 
cinema-going habits of the 1960s unintentionally reiterated this belief. In a denunciatory 
summation of the generic southern terza visione patron, he stated that the typical (male) viewer 
“would not bother to find out what was showing, nor would he make any particular effort to 
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arrive at the beginning of the film. He would talk to his friends during the showing whenever he 
felt like it, except during the bits of film that grabbed his (or his friends’) attention.”3 Similarly, 
Christopher Frayling condensed the prevailing critical (and in Frayling’s words, “northern”) 
sentiment toward the genre films into a simple and derisive motto: “They were not for us, you 
understand, but for them—the less demanding punters queueing up outside the Roxy Calabria.”4  
Such generalizations fueled a derogatory correlation of the subjects and subject matter of 
the peplum and spaghetti westerns with the southern lower classes. Elitists reasoned that pulp 
genres were popular in the South because they culturally and spatially represented the 
contemporary reality of the region—an antimodern, primitive, and isolated place irrationally 
bound by folklore and myth. The feebleminded heroes of the peplum films who relied on brawn 
over brains were merely antiquated incarnations of the peasant labor force; the chauvinistic 
treatment of women as subservient objects echoed the archaic gender roles of parochial society; 
the penchant for violence as the principal method of conflict resolution equated with 
longstanding claims of the South as a savage and criminal space; and the distant and desolate 
settings of the ancient world and the Wild West provided verisimilitude to the natural and built 
environment of the rural Mezzogiorno.   
Although the visual iconography and story lines of these films in no way reflected 
modern southern society, they nonetheless have been fused into postulations of the region’s 
identity. Over the last forty years, little critical assessment has challenged or dispelled such 
superficial connections between popular cinema and the South.5 In this chapter, I theorize that 
the popularity of the peplum and spaghetti westerns is indicative of a southernist reaction to 
modernization. This is not to deny that Italian mass cinema of the 1960s was apolitical and 
acritical, rife with escapism and anti-intellectualism. However, the social relations presented in 
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the peplum films provided a metaphorical relevance to the strata of the southern population 
excluded from postwar industrial growth. The glorification of banditry and the rise of the 
antiestablishment hero in the spaghetti westerns offered a pointed critique of social justice and 
the nation-building process in 1960s Italy, while the prolific revision of the most symbolic of 
American film genres alluded to the South’s schizophrenic feelings toward the United States. 
The U.S. was still the “land of opportunity” as imagined by millions of southerners during the 
first great wave of emigration, and its lead role in the liberation of the South from the Axis 
Powers had not been forgotten. Yet, its domineering influence on Italian postwar culture and 
economic development increasingly fueled a portrayal of America as an imperialist boogeyman 
in collusion with the North, intent on nothing less than the complete subjugation of the South. In 
this light, it is possible to reposition hypotheses concerning the overarching intent of the 
spaghetti westerns from an exogenous deconstruction of the Frontier Myth to an endogenous 
inquest on the myths of Italian modernization. 
 
The “Triumph of the Torso”: Subproletarian Ethos and the Peplum      
       Between 1957 and 1965 (coinciding with the apex of the economic miracle), nearly 
three hundred peplum films inundated Italian theaters. Also known as “sword-and-sandal,” and 
“film storico-mitologico,” the peplum dominated the domestic box-office during this period, 
accounting for over sixty percent of cinema revenue. In 1962-63, this extended internationally, 
with pepla earning as much as forty-six percent of all Italian exports.6 The basic formula was 
simple: a strongman hero battles (and defeats) various agents of “evil” in predominantly ancient 
settings, all in the name of freeing an oppressed people, rescuing a fair maiden in distress, or 
both. The protagonists were mythical (Achilles, Ajax, Hercules, Ulysses), historical (Spartacus, 
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Thaur), biblical (Goliath, Samson), literary (Saetta, Ursus), and invented (Maciste) musclebound 
specimens of masculinity. Their weapon of choice was brute strength which, in tandem with their 
unsurpassed improvisational skills, aided in defeating a litany of sadistic despots, mythological 
beasts, marauding armies, savage natives, and corrupt politicians and landowners.  
The two most popular and recycled figures were Hercules and Maciste, the former being 
the hero of twenty-two films, and the latter over thirty.7 The character of Maciste embodies a 
specifically Italian, albeit fictional, heritage. Conjured as a freed Roman slave from the Marche 
region, his presence in the 1960 film, Maciste nella valle dei re (Maciste in the Valley of the 
Kings) marked a cinematic reappearance after a thirty-year hiatus. Maciste had made his debut in 
the 1914 silent classic, Cabiria, assisting the Roman noble, Fulvio Axilla, in the rescue of the 
title character from the hands of the Carthaginians. Unprecedented international success for this 
nationalist epic made the strongman a highly recognizable icon of on-screen populist heroism 
and catapulted the actor, Bartolomeo Pagano, from dockworker in Genoa to film legend. Pagano 
went on to star as Maciste in twenty-six “sequels” between 1915 and 1926.8 These films 
provided both the narrative template and historical connection that propelled the resurgence of 
the pepla in the 1960s.  
The postwar manifestations, however, differed from their predecessors in three important 
ways. In aesthetics and tone, they shed the cloying aspects of earlier incarnations, replacing 
melodrama and sentimentality with spectacular action and overt sexuality.9 At the level of 
consumption, the films of the 1960s represented a major demographic shift. Whereas the silent-
era epics were seen almost exclusively by an urban, bourgeois, and literate audience (capable of 
reading the intertitles and affording the luxury of cinema-going), the renascent versions 
captivated newly emergent rural, peasant, and working-class audiences, particularly in the South. 
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Concerning production, pepla of the economic miracle initiated a fifteen-year cycle of American 
collaboration, financing, and influence on the Italian film industry. Although the U.S. had 
maintained the greatest part of the foreign-film market in Italy since the end of World War II, the 
genre pictures churned out by Cinecittà beginning in the late 1950s signaled a movement toward 
American control of domestic production, in terms of direction, casting, and content, and the 
incorporation of Italian films into the Hollywood-designed global distribution network.  
The international relationship was evident from the outset of the peplum genre, 
epitomized by the first breakout hit, Le fatiche di Ercole (The Labors of Hercules, 1957). The 
role of Hercules was played by American bodybuilder, Steve Reeves, a former Mr. Universe 
long on muscles and short on acting ability [Fig. 6.1]. Panned by critics for its amateurish 
production and acting, infantile dialogue, and historical inaccuracies (ironically, to traditional 
myth), the film was a huge hit amongst the domestic audience. Raking in over nine hundred 
million lire in less than a year, it became the highest grossing film in Italian history—an honor it 
would hold only briefly before being overtaken multiple times by the sequels and imitators it 
spawned. Ercole garnered a similar international bounty, owing largely to an extravagant 
publicity campaign unleashed by Boston film mogul, Joseph E. Levine. Levine spent over five 
times the film’s original budget on advertising in the U. S. prior to its 1959 release. Grossing 
over eighteen million dollars, Ercole’s astronomical returns enticed other American investors to 
seize upon the profitability of peplum films.10    
The mark of Hollywood was most visible in the men chosen for the heroic leads. 
Reeves’s instant popularity inspired the casting of other American bodybuilders including Mark 
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sparked the formation of The Society to Protect Italian Musclemen, a lobbying group that 
pressured Cinecittà to hire Italian fusti (bodybuilders) for peplum films.11 Still, even when 
Italians were cast as major characters, they usually assumed anglicized names (e.g. Sergio Ciani 
as “Alan Steel;” Adriano Bellini as “Kirk Morris”). Surprisingly, successful actors were rarely 
associated with singular heroes. Instead, they each played multiple figures that defied the 
conventional logic of serial formulas. This suggests an industry belief in the value of the actor 
over the character and, according to Maggie Günsberg, rationalized the use of American leading 
men as a means “to attract audiences addicted to Hollywood productions.”12   
Günsberg has reasoned that the Italian fondness for pepla starring Americans derived 
from a combination of economy and memory. Postwar inundation of American films on the 
Italian market meant that, for nearly fifteen years, cinema attendees consumed, and subsequently 
came to desire, cultural productions of the United States more so than their domestic 
counterparts. Fueling a vicious cycle of American dominance in product creation and profit 
extraction, this occurrence severely retarded the redevelopment of the Italian film industry. Even 
though this phase ended in the late 1950s as domestic films grew, Italians had developed a 
“taste” for the stars, directors, style, and America-centric themes of Hollywood pictures.13  
The extraordinary popularity of peplum films in the South, as Günsberg has suggested, 
was also indebted to the emotional imprints of past experiences specific to the region. The 
American-led liberation of Italy during World War II unfolded from the “bottom up,” beginning 
in Sicily and quickly advancing through the southern regions, Rome, and eventually the North. 
Whereas the Italian resistance movement played a major part in the final defeat of Fascism and 
Nazism from their strongholds in the Northeast, it was virtually nonexistent in the South.14 By 
extension, the adoration for American film stars could be explained in terms of cultural 
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resonance, “for their use in the role of heroic protectors of the oppressed in the peplum films may 
have struck a positive chord in relation to these historical events of over a decade earlier.”15 
 The veracity of this wartime explanation is compounded by recognition of the 
strongman’s role in rural tradition. In this way, the popular affinity of southern audiences for 
peplum heroes can be viewed as a rational response to the discouraging experiences of 
modernization. By reassuring viewers of situations where strength prevails over intellect and 
political power, the peplum hero provided an emotional outlet for the millions of agrarian 
laborers who migrated from the South to the North, only to find their physical skills undervalued 
by their industrial counterparts. Instead of being a ruler, the strongman was a man of the people. 
As a fighter for the populist cause, his actions defied the individualistic ethos of bourgeois 
consumerism and offered an alternative vision of success “for those excluded from the new, 
increasingly industrialized base of economic prosperity.”16   
 One of the most prolific directors of pepla, Domenico Paolella, contexualized the social 
significance of the genre’s southern popularity in an article entitled, “La Psicoanalisi dei Poveri” 
(“The Psychoanalysis of the Poor”). Responding to the general dismissal of a genre that 
“captivated seven out of every ten cinema-goers from 1957 to 1965,” Paolella argued that the 
peplum conquered the box office because it effectively identified the power relations inherent in 
modernization. By privileging the visual over the literary and the emotional over the intellectual, 
the genre allowed all strata of the population to understand and to participate in the debate over 
social change. Paolella posited that the vast migrations from the South to the North and from 
countryside to city, the loosening of family bonds, the rise of consumerism and technocracy, and 
the diffusion of bourgeois values all occurred with such simultaneous rapidity that it became 




The films are full of images which are part of the language of dreams, and hidden  
within them, in symbolic form, are all the obstacles encountered in everyday life.  
The monsters are the factories or workshops, the towns, the offices; the enemies 
are other people; the elaborate weapons of the adversary are complicated 
machines; the rivers of fire, the no less dangerous streams of traffic which choke 
our towns. And, in the middle of this hostile and confusing world, full of traps and 
snares (or, in other words, reality) there is the individual with his extraordinary 
muscles who can only in the end count on himself.17  
  
 The “triumph of the torso” thus served to reassure those disenfranchised by the dizzying pace of 
socioeconomic transformation that they were not entirely inept in the modern world. 
 Despite the genre’s drift toward comic absurdity, with heroes transgressing time and 
space to battle Moon Men, Mole People, Russian Czars, Mongols, and the Inca, the universal 
applicability of a primordial mastery of physical might and the need for populist liberators of the 
oppressed remained central themes. For the southern rural and lower-class audiences so 
enamored with these films, the strongman represented a traditional and indigenous symbol of 
pride. Even if his skills had no place in the modernizing nation, they had great symbolic value to 
those wanting to curtail the maddening march of social and economic change. At the very least, 
the peplum genre paved the way for the spaghetti western in two vital ways. First, it successfully 
developed a substantial audience predisposed to the outsider hero and defender of the exploited. 
And second, the genre’s reassertion of myth as an ideological contrast to technocratic 
rationalism, laid the groundwork for the use of new mythic heroes and historical eras that 
contained greater symbolic resonance and metaphorical translation in relation to the divisive 






Between History and Modernity: The Bandit 
The peplum genre may have created the industrial framework that enabled the subsequent 
ascendancy of the spaghetti western, but the message of the Italian outlaw films was heavily 
indebted to two award-winning auteur pictures of the early 1960s: Banditi a Orgosolo (Bandits 
of Orgosolo, 1960), directed by Vittorio De Seta, and Salvatore Giuliano (1962), by Francesco 
Rosi.18 The films have two principal commonalities. Thematically, they analyze the viability of 
banditry as both a legitimate response to economic marginalization in the modern nation, and a 
pillar of folkloric reason and resistance. Aesthetically, Rosi and De Seta deploy narrative 
structures and filmic techniques that evoke the neorealist tradition; however, their methods more 
accurately reflect the “film inquest” articulated by Cesare Zavattini—a reassessment of 
neorealism that moves “from an attitude toward the phenomenal world to an analysis of the 
world.”19 Together, the films bridge the gap between low and high cinema. Their presentation of 
populist heroes of the rural South unfolds within an ideological lens critical of postwar politics, 
neocapitalism, and bourgeois morality.  
The commonalities of Rosi and De Seta would greatly influence the works of Sergio 
Leone, who recognized the disseminative power afforded by melding popular narratives of genre 
films with visual artistry of auteur cinema. Leone’s films captivated both the art-house crowds of 
the prima and seconda visione and the audiences of the terza visione. Other spaghetti directors 
seized upon the precedent set by Banditi a Orgosolo and Salvatore Giuliano to inject genre 
cinema with sociopolitical criticism in a way that amounted to a slight reversal of Rosi’s and De 
Seta’s contamination of auteur film with rural and southern myth. Most importantly, these two 
films acknowledged the subversive power of the bandit, thus emboldening allusions to the 
postunification period when banditry was seen as a positive attribute of resistance within the 
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South. Transferred to modern Italy, its continued existence illustrated the incompleteness of 
modernization and the failure of economic development to create national consensus.     
A symbol of class pride, the bandit resonated particularly with southern subproletarian 
culture, since he historically “comes out of very concrete conditions: he is a figure of peasant 
societies, and specifically, from the mobile, surplus population of those societies.”20 Although 
banditry has existed throughout history, its occurrence has been almost entirely wiped out in the 
modern world. In fact, the extermination of the phenomenon is framed as a primary measure of 
modernity’s success. As Eric Hobsbawm has noted, the extension of transportation and 
communication infrastructures, the expansion of economic markets and points of production, and 
the encroachment of national bureaucracies into rural areas effectively removed the conditions 
necessary for banditry to exist.21  
Consolidation of the bandit under the generic label of “criminal” or “thief,” however, 
creates an unintentional paradox. By reducing banditry to history, it reifies the significance of the 
myth of the bandit coalesced in the fables and songs circulated amongst the peasantry. The 
extinction of the bandit by modernity frees the exaltation of this figure from hypocrisy. Given 
that the real activities of bandits—violence, intimidation, and destruction of property—are 
admonished by all social strata, the end of their actual existence empowers legend that can frame 
them as heroic defenders of the people, resistors of tyranny, and redistributors of wealth. The 
bandit’s evolution to a purely symbolic level complicated the idealist portrait of postwar 
development. On the one hand, it suggested that the emergence of the new “Italy” involved the 
silencing of certain groups. On the other, the popular return of the bandit in the spaghetti 
westerns reinserted the social and political functionality of myth into imaginations of the modern 
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nation—a state of progress supposedly defined by its elimination of folklore and superstition as 
bases of acceptable world views.   
In Banditi a Orgosolo, De Seta portrays banditry as far from extinct in 1960s Italy. Shot 
on location in Sardinia with nonprofessional actors drawn from the local population, the film is a 
quasidocumentary depiction of the agrarian/feudal economy of shepherdry and the social 
conditions that impel ordinary people to resort to aggravated robbery [Fig. 6.2]. The story centers 
on Michele, whose humble herding life is disrupted by his wrongful implication in a crime. 
Michele witnesses a group of bandits hiding some stolen hogs in a barn. When the authorities 
come to question him, they are ambushed by the bandits and Michele is accused of being 
complicit in the theft and the murder of one of the officers. Notably, these lawmen are not local 
police but carabinieri, who are “always portrayed as an occupation force sent by a distant 
colonial government from the mainland.”22 The shepherd’s similar distrust of local law 
enforcement and the legal system discourage him from turning himself in and awaiting a fair 
trial.  
Michele chooses to flee into the hills with his flock (since he has not repaid the loan used 
to purchase the sheep). Unfortunately, the animals all die from exhaustion and starvation, and 
Michele is forced into banditry in order to save himself from the carabinieri and the bank. After 
returning to his village and experiencing the intensified hardship faced by his family, Michele 
steals a fellow shepherd’s flock at gunpoint. In the final sequence, the once honest shepherd is 
shown driving the stolen sheep across a plain as the victim calls him “a bandit.”  
Allusions to neorealism in Banditi a Orgosolo are clear. Whereas the “victim-into-
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economic conditions dictating social behavior evokes the message of La terra trema. The setting 
of Sardinia is particularly important, for as Hobsbawn has indicated, it was one of the few places 
in all of Europe where banditry still existed in the 1960s.23 The film effectively “naturalizes the 
process of becoming a bandit” by suggesting that theft is a rational tactic of survival for those 
devoid of economic opportunity.24 Although this seems obvious and not necessarily specific to 
rural areas, De Seta repositions banditry from an historic and mythic attribute of peasant society 
to a contemporarily viable response to the geographic exclusiveness of postwar growth.  
Whereas Banditi a Orgosolo addresses the persistence of the socioeconomic conditions 
that enable banditry, Salvatore Giuliano focuses on the circumstances that bring about its 
demise. This latter film unfolds as an investigative docudrama. Through flashbacks and 
reenactments, Rosi stitches together the events leading up to the murder of Salvatore Giuliano, a 
man hailed as “the last bandit” in all of Italy. Giuliano was a Sicilian criminal who played a 
violent role in the island’s independence movement following World War II. Blamed for the 
1947 May Day bombing that killed several communist supporters, he spent the next three years 
on the run before his assassination in 1950 at the age of twenty-eight. Official accounts asserted 
that the carabinieri had killed him, but Giuliano’s lieutenant, Gaspare Pisciotta, later claimed 
that he was responsible. When Pisciotta was killed in prison in 1954, it became clear that the 
police and the mafia had colluded in Giuliano’s case “to eliminate a man who had become 
embarrassing to everyone.”25  
In presenting these “facts,” Rosi inverts the typical outline of the bandit story. Instead of 
following the rise and fall of the title character, the film begins with Giuliano already dead 
[Fig.6.3]. This directional decision renders the audience’s engagement with Giuliano and his 
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of historical evidence by positing it as a myth unto its own. Giuliano’s identification as a Robin 
Hood figure and antiestablishment hero is no less valid than official depictions of him as a 
terrorist and criminal. This is because (as the film uncovers) officials grossly exaggerated the 
latter identities in order to obscure that the real bandit was a pawn manipulated by the 
carabinieri (to quell the Sicilian independence movement) and the mafia (to scare people into 
accepting their protection services). Thus, Giuliano is reimagined as victim of a corrupt social 
and political order, his fate symbolizing that of the subproletariat in general: utilized by the 
hegemonic forces of modernity until no longer necessary, then liquidated to history.  
 
The Last Frontier:  Spaghetti Westerns and the Myth of National Unity 
 Ironically, the decline of the peplum was influenced greatly by industrial mechanisms 
that this genre’s success had established. The international fortune garnered by Sergio Leone’s 
film, Per un pugno di dollari (A Fistful of Dollars, 1964), initiated an immediate and fullscale 
transition in production from the mythological epic to the western. Although roughly twenty-five 
Italian westerns were made prior to it, the unprecedented success of Per un pugno di dollari 
marked the arrival of the genre that would dominate the domestic box-office for nearly a 
decade.26 Between 1964 and 1976, over four hundred spaghetti westerns were made, a number 
that easily enshrines this genre as the most prolific of the filoni (formula films) during the 1960s 
and 1970s. The fact that at least two western films occupied the top ten in domestic box-office 
revenue every year from 1965 to 1971 similarly attests to the remarkable longevity and 
popularity of the genre.27   
    Spaghetti westerns flourished in large part through repetition of the production and 
distribution framework established by the peplum. The reuse of costumes, props, extras, 
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directors, and sets in Spain and southern Italy allowed films to be made quickly and 
inexpensively. The western theme also proved a logical choice given the extraordinary degree of 
American financing for filoni. It offered the possibility of exploiting the U. S. market during a 
downturn in Hollywood production and capitalized on the popularity of American westerns from 
the 1950s that were circulating in the terza visione in the early 1960s. This partly explains initial 
attempts to pass off Italian westerns as authentic American products. Italian directors, actors, 
scriptwriters, music composer, and cinematographers disguised their identities with American 
pseudonyms, and numerous films, although shot in Italian, were dubbed in English, with 
subtitles or redubbing added for the domestic audience.28      
    Spaghettis followed the peplum model in two other important ways. They usually cast 
at least one recognizable American actor. Although Clint Eastwood is the best-known example, 
thanks to his starring role in Leone’s Man with No Name trilogy, the star list included Henry 
Fonda, Lee Van Cleef, James Coburn, William Holden, and Rod Steiger.29 The westerns also 
promoted serial characters in the same vein as Maciste and Hercules. Django, Ringo, Sabata, 
Sartana, and Trinity were popular and replicated protagonists. As in the pepla, once the 
character’s appeal was confirmed, an assembly-line production of unsanctioned knock-offs 
ensued, with multiple actors assuming the title role. This trend was epitomized by Sergio 
Corbucci’s Django (1966). An international sensation, this film led several production 
companies to retitle their pictures as Django products abroad, even though they did not include 
the character whatsoever.   
Industrial/economic functionality, however, is insufficient explanation of the spaghetti 
western phenomenon. So is the combined “pulp distractions/unsophisticated audience” argument 
for explaining why the genre was the overwhelming favorite in the South. Even though eighty 
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percent of domestic revenue earned by spaghetti westerns between 1964 and 1976 was generated 
from the Mezzogiorno, to claim this statistic as evidence of “blind consumerism” is erroneous, 
for southerners clearly chose these films over other filoni of the 1960s, such as spy intrigues, 
shockumentaries, police dramas, horror, and “sexy” films.30 As Lino Miccichè has postulated, 
the supplanting of the peplum by the western in the South coincided with a specific moment in 
Italian history—the abrupt end of the economic miracle: 
The great expectations and the grand illusions of the early years of the decade  
were replaced by new frustrations and fresh delusions. . . . So it is that the Italian 
Westerner, far from reflecting the somewhat “mystificatory” epic of the frontier, 
impersonates, in ways which are paradoxically entertaining (and too explicitly  
cynical to trouble the conscience) a commonplace of the everyday psyche of the 
“average” Italian—the urge to overwhelm (or to help someone else do it for you) 
in order to not be overwhelmed, the urge to guarantee that you will not become 
anyone’s victim (using the only objectively recognizable “values”—money and 
power, which go hand in hand).31 
 
Paolella framed this transition as a sign of Italians “growing up,” in terms of their social 
and political consciousness and awareness of the semiotic and ideological devices of mass 
media. Paraphrasing Paolella, Frayling has stated: 
Whereas the epic catered for “infantile tastes” (the hero copes with a variety of  
obstacles by sheer muscle, he represents a force for “good,” and he does not have 
to rely on cunning or technology), the Western caters for “adolescent” tastes (the 
hero copes with a variety of obstacles by guile and “technique,” he is working for 
himself, and he must learn to dominate his instincts or he will be taken for a 
“sucker”).32  
 
Paolella aligned this individual growth with what he saw as political progress—namely, a push 
to the left demonstrated by the election of a Socialist president in 1964, the formation of a 
moderate-left coalition government, and a rise in Communist voting strength that began mid-
decade, particularly in the Northwest “industrial triangle” and the South as a whole.33 He 
surmised that this political transformation was met by a similar maturation in engagement with 
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cinematic iconography and the ideological messages that underlay visual spectacle. To Paolella, 
the success of spaghettis in the South attested to a conscious identification by southerners with 
the genre’s dissentious symbolism, and with its ability to simultaneously critique American 
economic and military imperialism and Christian Democratic hegemony, which relied so heavily 
on the model set by the former. This explanation clearly contexualizes the spaghetti western 
phenomenon as an embodiment of the southern experiences with modernization and nation-
building instead of simply being a popular, aesthetic parody of Hollywood westerns.   
 
 
Tropes of Subversion: The Formalist Analysis 
Before continuing with contextual analysis of the spaghetti western, it is important to 
outline the basic components of the formalist approach, which has dominated critical discussion 
pertaining to the genre’s affect and influence. Although this framework reduces considerations of 
spaghetti westerns to the purely cinematic, rendering it susceptible to semiotic abstraction and 
film theory esotericism, it does elucidate the artistic methods used within the genre to invert the 
standardized tropes of the American variant. This recognition of aesthetic revisions informs an 
understanding of the genre’s Italian-specific content and ideological arguments. 
In his book, Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study of the Western, Will Wright defined 
Hollywood Westerns as falling within four basic plot structures: the classical, transitional, 
vengeance, and professional. Whereas Wright recognized that the professional plot developed as 
a response to European westerns, he considered the transitional and vengeance narratives to be 
variations (more than distinct formulas) of the classical plot, which stands as “the prototype of all 
Westerns, the one people think of when they say ‘All Westerns are alike’.”34 The classical 
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western dominated from the silent era of the 1910s to 1955 and thus established the visual, 
symbolic, and ideological codes of the entire genre. Although the “traditional” western is most 
often associated with the films of John Ford, Wright considers Shane (1953), by George Stevens, 
to be the apotheosis of the formula. Notwithstanding the great degree of variation within the 
classical plot, the typical storyline centers on “the lone stranger who rides into a troubled town 
and cleans it up, winning the respect of the townsfolk and the love of the schoolmarm.”35   
Whereas the classical formula is based on binary oppositions—insider/outsider, 
good/bad, strong/weak, moral/amoral, and wilderness/civilization—that clearly posit “right” as 
overcoming “wrong,” such identifications are rendered problematic in the spaghetti westerns. 
Building upon Wright’s classification, Frayling has divided the Italian inversion of the classical 
plot into three phases: foundational (1964-1967), transitional (1966-1968), and Zapata-spaghetti 
(1967-1971).36 In the first two phases, the setting remains the American West of the late 1800s, 
and the films attempt an authentic presentation of life on the frontier by utilizing the same visual 
codes (e.g. landscape, clothing, technology) of their American predecessors. The difference lies 
in the alteration of binarisms. The oppositions at work in the spaghetti westerns are more 
appropriately identified as victim/executioner, gringo/Mexican, profaction/antifaction, family-
oriented/self-oriented, amity/enmity, and money/commitment to a cause.37 Sanctimonious 
treatment of the conquest of savagery and taming of the wilderness is eschewed in favor of a 
pessimistic assessment of the onset of civilization as bound by violence and corruption. The 
question in the classical western, of whether the hero can successfully liberate the townspeople 
from the tyranny of outlaws and Indians and thereby enable the expansion of democracy and 
American values, is reworked in the spaghetti westerns. It becomes whether the townspeople are 
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worthy of saving in the first place, as idealist conceptions that equate modernization with 
freedom, equality, and progress are scrutinized.  
Spaghetti westerns often countered the romantic envisionment of the frontier legacy 
through parody, pastiche, and symbolic inversion of the Hollywood standard. Leone’s film, 
C’era una volta il West (Once Upon a Time in the West, 1968), epitomizes this revision. Set in 
the fictional town of Sweetwater, the story focuses on a series of conflicts that develop between 
five main characters: Jill, a young woman looking to escape from her past in New Orleans; 
Cheyenne, an aging gun-for-hire; Harmonica, a mysterious outlaw; Mr. Morton, an unscrupulous 
railroad tycoon; and Frank, a sadistic hitman hired to protect the railroad’s interests.  The 
interplay of the characters centers on the arrival of the railroad and the battle for control of 
resources. Having secured the land where the refueling depot is to be built, Jill becomes the 
target of Mr. Morton and Frank, who resort to violence, intimidation, and murder in order to 
maintain the company’s monopolistic grip. Cheyenne and Harmonica join forces to defend Jill, 
but their motivations are based on personal satisfaction rather than an altruistic defense of the 
oppressed. Cheyenne wants to win Jill’s affection and Harmonica seeks revenge on Frank, who 
murdered his family when Harmonica was a child. The film’s resolution is more ambivalent than 
optimistic. Harmonica kills Frank and Cheyenne is killed by Mr. Morton, who is severely 
wounded and left for dead. Jill succeeds in securing the depot yet, as a solitary woman on the 
frontier, her future is far from secure.      
   In contrast to classical westerns, the coming of civilization in C’era una volta il West is 
hardly celebratory. For Leone, the railroad is a harbinger of death and social destruction. As 
much as its arrival symbolically marks the end of the wild, lawless, and primitive West, the 
railroad also brings with it the real and negative characteristics of economic disenfranchisement, 
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political corruption, and violence endemic to eastern cities. Leone’s method of contaminating the 
traditional, mythic view of progress involves an exhaustive repetition and revision of visual 
Hollywood icons. Frayling and Oreste De Fornari, among others, have identified over one 
hundred visual references to classical westerns in C’era una volta il West.38 The opening 
sequence showing two men waiting for the train to arrive carrying Harmonica exemplifies 
Leone’s tactic. The would-be assassins are played by Jack Elam and Woody Strode—two of the 
most familiar character actors of American westerns. When the train finally comes, Harmonica 
gets off and, after a brief confrontation, shoots the men, who then vanish from the story 
altogether. The sequence is an obvious reference to High Noon (1952) [Fig. 6.4]. In the first five 
minutes of the film, Leone effectively “tantalized his audience with familiar Western faces, then 
removed them after they have served their purpose as iconographical representations of a 
familiar genre which he is in the act of transforming.”39 Throughout C’era una volta il West, the 
establishment of an apparent authenticity defines Leone’s attempts to “deconstruct one 
mythology and reconstruct another: to demythologize, rather than demythicise.”40   
C’era una volta il West also contains one of the most common revisions made by 
spaghetti western directors: the casting of American actors against type. The role of cold-blooded 
killer Frank was played by Henry Fonda, best known in the realm of westerns as John Ford’s 
heroic Wyatt Earp in My Darling Clementine (1946). In another reversal, Charles Bronson, who 
was one of the gunfighters that defended a Mexican village from bandits in The Magnificent 
Seven (1960), played the self-serving outlaw Harmonica. The most renowned example, of 
course, is Leone’s use of Clint Eastwood as “The Man with No Name.” Until his appearance in 



























television series, Rawhide. Initially a hot-headed, second-hand man, Rowdy became a noble 
problem-solver and dispenser of justice on the open range, eventually maturing in the series to 
trail boss and exemplar of civility. His performance as the nameless loner in Leone’s trilogy 
turned his previous persona on its head and served as the template for subsequent antiheroes in 
the Italian films. 
By casting against type, Italian directors were able to complicate viewer’s expectations of 
good and bad and, as a consequence, bring into question the validity of their moral judgments. 
The archetypes of heroism established in the American versions were put in peril by the 
suggestion that the “righteous cause” they fought for was only of value to those who accepted a 
particular ideology based on Manifest Destiny, racial superiority, and economic expansionism. 
The rise of the antihero in spaghetti westerns signals a transformation toward moral and ethical 
ambiguity by presenting protagonists as socially flawed, self-centered, money-hungry outlaws, 
bandits, and bounty hunters. Importantly, the antihero exists outside of society and has little 
interest in participating in the march of civilization. His “heroic” qualities are his prowess with a 
gun, resistance to assimilation, and defiance of the politically and economically powerful. In 
general, the antihero’s only weakness is his thirst for “a fistful of dollars.”  
Perhaps the greatest revision made by spaghetti westerns is the insertion of Marxist 
ideology into the genre. Following the model set by Sergio Sollima’s film, La resa dei conti (The 
Big Gundown, 1966), a series of Italian westerns entertained the relationship between bandits 
and peasant communities, the appropriateness of violence in the struggle against political 
subjugation, and the possibility of subproletarian hegemony. These “Zapata-spaghettis” relocated 
the action from the American West of the late 1800s to Mexico during the revolution of 1910-
1920.41 They generally centered on two protagonists: a “Mexican peasant or bandit who is or 
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becomes a revolutionary,” and an American or European hired-gun “who opposes or assists the 
Mexican.”42 More often than not, the gringo is a counterinsurgent mercenary hired by either the 
Mexican government (of Porfirio Diaz, Francisco Madero, and Victoriano Huerta) or U. S. 
forces, including industrial capitalists and the military.  
The interaction between the outsider and his Mexican counterpart produces one of three 
possible outcomes: The soldier of fortune stays true to his original goal and undermines the 
revolution, as in Quién sabe? (A Bullet for the General, 1967); he severs ties with the bandit but 
maintains respect for his cause, as in La resa dei conti; or he abandons his own interests 
altogether and joins the revolution, as in Vamos a matar, compañeros (Compañeros, 1970). 
Regardless of which conclusion occurs, the ideological stance of the Zapata westerns clearly 
situates the revolutionaries as fighters for the righteous cause. In so doing, the political variants 
of the spaghetti western elaborate an acute criticism of American interventionalism while also 
presenting the Mexican revolution as an historical inspiration for contemporary southern Italians 
desirous of land reform, equal representation, and internally defined inclusion into the nation. 
 
Where South and West Collide: Resonance and Resistance at the Edge of Modernity 
 In a sense, Italian revision of the myths of the American West represents a unique form 
of time-space compression. Perhaps a more appropriate description would be the convergence of 
time-space compressions, for these developments within cinematic space do not necessarily 
reflect the conceptual imperatives and material implications of “the annihilation of space by 
time” imagined by Karl Marx and elaborated upon by David Harvey.43 What the spaghetti 
western genre does embody is collision of the two most-often-cited epochs of time-space 
compression—“the middle of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First World War, and 
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again towards the end of the twentieth century”—in which there occurred “a radical restructuring 
in the nature and experience of both time and space.”44 If the first period marks the transition 
from premodern to modern, and the second signals the movement from modern to postmodern, 
then scrutinization of nineteenth-century nationalist constructs within spaghetti westerns bears 
remarkable relevance to the postwar Italian South. For the South of the 1960s can be understood 
as an inbetween space historically and ideologically—one largely excluded from the processes of 
modernity, but in the act of direct transformation from premodern to postmodern.  
Deconstructions of the foundational myths of modern America certainly can be read as 
indictments of modernity. What many spaghetti westerns imagine is an alternate history, one in 
which Jeffersonian populism prevails over Rooseveltian progressivism. Whereas the traditional 
western heralds the supremacy of corporate economy and managerial politics, the Italian version 
theorizes unity through agrarianism, economic individualism, and social mobility. In the 
progressive view, transformation of the frontier is an economic gain; in the populist conception, 
the same transformation amounts to an historical break. As Richard Slotkin has noted, the 
populist vision “defines the crisis of modernization as a loss of the democratic social 
organization, the equitable distribution of wealth, and political power of the agrarian past.”45 The 
creation of the antihero instills the populist ideal with modern realism, for his “urge to 
overwhelm, in order to not be overwhelmed” is a preemptive form of resistance that 
acknowledges the hegemonic position of industrial capitalism and centralized governance. 
As a defender of agrarian democracy and the producing classes, the bandit/outlaw 
antihero of the spaghetti western provides viewers who identify with him the ability to “indulge 
sentiments of resentment and rebellion without having to adopt a radically alienating stance 
toward society and its traditional ideology.”46 Insomuch as the antihero’s personal motivations 
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suggest a corruptive and amoral influence of the “almighty dollar,” the causes that he is enticed 
to fight for (at least temporarily) are those that reinforce defining characteristics of southern 
society. Luigi Barzini has intimated that the underlying intent of spaghetti westerns was to 
reassure southerners that campanilismo (allegiance to local social bonds) remained a rational 
response to “the colonialist maneuverings of northern capital.”47 This relates to Slotkin’s 
suggestion that the nation-building process, as configured according to frontier myth, involved 
the liquidation of oppositional groups: “If modernization on the Americanist plan represents the 
only valid path to historical progress, resistance to that model is equivalent to an attempt to 
reverse the course of history.”48 The parallels drawn between the Italian South of the 1960s and 
the historic American West suggest neither an antimodern mindset nor a southern penchant for 
an historically regressive form of progress. 
The displacement of time and place to revolutionary Mexico in the Zapata westerns 
provided heightened allegorical relevance for the contemporary South, especially in light of 
emerging discussions of the region as a postcolonial space.49 The focus on land ownership by the 
peasantry, a central issue of the Mexican Revolution, “bore some similarity with the problems of 
a predominantly agricultural, underdeveloped and impoverished Southern Italy,” while the 
struggle for economic and political self-determination mirrored southern resentment of northern 
profittatori (carpetbaggers) in regional positions of government.50 Directors Sergio Sollima and 
Damiano Damiani intended for their Zapata films to “be read as parables about the relationship 
between the Third World (represented by ‘Mexico’) and the capitalist countries of the West 
(represented by the ‘outsider’).” To Sollima in particular, the Mexican bandit-hero symbolized 
the emancipatory desires of the Italian South, while the Anglo mercenary embodied the 
predatory will of the Italian North.51  
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Günsberg has suggested that the metaphorical correlation between Mexico and the Italian 
South alludes to the divergent racial associations of the regions that date back to the 
Risorgimento.52 As neither black nor white, Mexicans represent an inbetweenness that resonates 
with southern Italians who historically have been imagined as occupying a middle ground 
between Europeans and Africans. Whereas northern Italians identify themselves ethnically and 
culturally with Northern Europe, southerners share with their Mexican counterparts a 
Mediterranean heritage. Just as Mexicans are the predominant Other of the U. S., and their 
presence across the border has been conjured as a threat to the purity of Anglo-Saxon identity, 
southern Italians have been framed as the greatest contaminating force confronting the North. 
This xenophobic rhetoric was particularly strong during the massive migration of southerners to 
northern cities in the 1950s and early 1960s.  
One of the best Zapata-spaghetti illustrations of the Othering of the peasantry is the 
opening sequence of Leone’s last western, Giù la testa (A Fistful of Dynamite, 1971).53 This is 
somewhat ironic since Leone intended the film to be a critique of the political westerns that had 
come to dominate the genre after 1967. Nevertheless, the first third of the film is more 
summation than parody of the subgenre. Giù la testa opens with a quotation from Mao Tse-tung 
that foreshadows the excessive carnage that ensues: “The revolution is not a social dinner, a 
literary event, a drawing or an embroidery; it cannot be done with elegance and courtesy. The 
revolution is an act of violence.” The film then introduces the protagonist, Juan, a barefoot and 
disheveled peasant who negotiates a ride on a passing stagecoach. The driver of the coach agrees 
to transport Juan not out of compassion, but out of spite for the patrons he is escorting, who he 
knows will be uncomfortable with the Mexican’s presence. The aristocrats, businessmen, and 
priest react with expected abhorrence before debating the worth of the peasantry as a whole in 
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front of Juan. They equate peasants with animals in need of taming and express revulsion toward 
their imagined practices of incest and bestiality. One man chastises peasant revolutionaries for 
trying to take away land from “civilized” peoples while another speculates that these 
“unfortunate brutes living in promiscuous heaps like rats in a sewer” will infest humanity if not 
kept in check. Instead of challenging these claims, Juan sits in silence until his six sons and their 
cohorts, as per the plan all along, ambush the stagecoach and subsequently kill or humiliate the 
prejudiced passengers [Fig. 6.5].  
In the stagecoach sequence, Leone juxtaposes shots of Juan listening stoically with 
extreme close-ups of the affluent characters eating gluttonously. Whereas these images portray 
hedonistic consumption as a bourgeois vice, they also insinuate the hypocrisy of the upper 
classes in stereotyping the peasantry as slovenly and piggish. Juan is the subject of the 
conversation, but he is visually framed as observer instead of object. His silence ultimately 
marks his understanding that no civility exists amongst the civilized, words are of no use in the 
fight for equality, and violence is the only persuasive argument of the oppressed. 
Insomuch as C’era una volta il West stands as a survey of the ideological devices of the 
traditional western, Giù la testa catalogues the predominant themes of the Zapata variants. As 
Frayling has noted, these include: 
The decadence of provincial military governors; the weakness of local 
administrations; a graphic presentation of the plight of the “wretched of the 
Earth;” the difficulties of setting up a postcolonial regime; the need to believe in a 
“social bandit,” often seen as an indicator of a community’s state of 
consciousness; a detailed presentation of violent counterinsurgency measures; and 
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 Leone’s desire for Giù la testa to be read as a parody of the Zapata subgenre 
acknowledges the director’s criticism of political westerns as parochial diversions.55 Other 
critics, particularly those on the political left, echoed Leone’s concerns by suggesting that the 
injection of a “discourse on revolution” into a popular genre “anaesthetized genuine 
revolutionary commitment.” The Marxist film critic, Pierre Baudry, alleged that this resulted 
from the political westerns being produced within the industrial-capital framework of Cinecittà, 
which sanitized radicalism by prioritizing profit over content. Baudry also claimed that attempts 
to debase the hegemony of the U. S. by reworking the symbolic tropes of the American western 
created a dangerous situation where “a colonial ideology is being used to criticize a colonial 
reality. . . and in the end, all we get is a repetition of nineteenth-century stereotypes (the 
dignified poor and the immoral rich).”56 James Roy MacBean has offered similar skepticism 
concerning the ability of the political western to inspire action: 
These films are useful in stirring up emotional support and sympathy for the 
revolutionary cause, as well as in stirring up a healthy sense of revolutionary 
outrage at the paramilitary machinations the ruling class uses to maintain its 
power and privileges. . . . But, if revolution is to be truly liberating, it must be 
much more than just the emotional revenge of the oppressed.57 
 
The critical consensus, therefore, casts doubt on the capacity of popular genre cinema to raise 
political consciousness, since the tactics of subverting the status quo are perceived to reify “the 
bourgeois concept of representation” in mimicking the visual and narrative codes that establish 
an “authoritarian relationship between film and audience.”58   
 Perhaps it was of some relief to the critics when the focus of the Italian western 
transitioned from revolutionary politics to comedy in the twilight of the genre’s popularity. The 
most successful comic westerns were the “Trinity” films made by Enzo Barboni, starring 
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Terence Hill and Bud Spencer as the “Abbott and Costello” of the West. In the series, the duo 
aimlessly roams the frontier, inadvertently caught in situations of mistaken identity and farcical 
conflicts between gullible townspeople and inept villains. A litany of physical gags, elaborate 
stunts, and absurd caricatures determines the story, not political allusion. Gunfights are 
transformed into slapfights and barroom brawls take precedence over shootouts. When bullets 
are fired, the preposterous marksmanship and trick-shooting depicted effectively sanitizes the use 
of violence by stretching the level of credibility.59 Remarkably, . . . continuavano a chiamarlo 
Trinità (Trinity is STILL My Name!, 1971), the sequel to Lo chiamavano Trinità (They Call Me 
Trinity, 1970), grossed more money in Italy than any previous film—a testament to the picture’s 
exceptional appeal to demographics beyond the typical southern, male viewer of the genre’s 
predecessors.60    
 The financial success of comic westerns is often taken to imply a devolution of the 
spaghetti western genre from critical cinema to pulp distraction and, by extension, confirmation 
of the claim that popular media precludes subversive politics. Alternately, the comic western’s 
popularity can be explained as a recurrence of the same transformation that befell neorealism in 
the early 1950s. Then, audiences grew weary of seeing the starkness of their everyday lives 
reinforced on screen and began to favor the light-hearted “pink” neorealism variants. Perhaps the 
ever-escalating and grotesque violence of the Zapata westerns similarly reflected too much the 
everyday realities of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The student riots of 1968 initiated a decade-
long episode of violence and political terrorism that erupted throughout the peninsula. Known in 
retrospect as gli anni di piombo (The Years of Lead), the period was characterized by widespread 
political assassinations and public bombings conducted by forces of the far left, the far right, 
organized crime syndicates, and covert paramilitary forces.61   
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Regardless of one’s conclusions about the anaesthetizing influence of mass media on 
contestatory ideologies, the affect of spaghetti westerns cannot be denied. At the very least, this 
genre illustrated the possibilities of confronting dominant forms of representation from the 
inside. Whether the genre’s revolutionary themes and violence inspired real action or simply 
reflected the sociopolitical antagonisms of the time is, ultimately, a question of little use. More 
important is recognition of the ways that popular, mass media is made political and imbricated in 
discussions of identity and equality.  
Aware of the theoretical difficulties surrounding the politicization of popular culture, 
Gillo Pontecorvo, director of the acclaimed film, La battaglia di Algeri (The Battle of Algiers, 
1996), defended the tactic: 
Cinema can be a way of revitalizing a people’s deadened responses. We have 
been conditioned to absorb a false vision of reality that is dominated by the tastes, 
morals, and perceptions of the “establishment.” To forego the possibility of 
opposing the fictions diffused by this establishment is in the least irresponsible. 
That is why I believe in a cinema which addresses itself to the masses and not a 















Boundaries: New Regionalisms and the Limits of the Cinematic Nation 
 
The student revolts of 1968 and the subsequent factory-worker strikes of 1969 initiated a 
period of prolonged instability in Italy.1 Dissatisfaction related to the slowness of social and 
political reforms (compared to the rapidity of postwar industrial development) signaled an 
underlying crisis in values, in which “everything that was certain in the past made it difficult to 
define the present and impossible to locate the future.”2 After twenty years of extraordinary 
economic growth, modernization, and centralization, Republican Italy had apparently reached an 
impasse. Idealist visions of a progression from wartime ruin to a position of international 
prominence were challenged by public exposure of the nefarious and disintegrative means 
utilized to achieve such ends. As Paul Ginsborg has summarized, the holes opened in the 
ideological fabric of both the right and left resulted in nothing short of chaos: 
There were major inquiries into police infiltration of political parties, and into 
corrupt use of public funds or “clientelism.” Terrorism was becoming fashionable. 
Socialist parties could not make up their minds whether, or on what terms, to go 
into alliance with Christian Democrats: the Italian road to socialism seemed to be 
leading nowhere. Meanwhile, neo-Fascist and far-left groups were constantly in 
the news. Industrial and student unrest drew attention to the fact that the 
“economic miracle” had not led to much needed social reforms, which were often 
blocked by the representatives of big business. The Vatican opposed any 
liberalization of the divorce laws. For seven months in 1969, there was no 
credible government in power. Disillusionment with the parliamentary process 
was growing.3 
Out of this backdrop, a strategia della tensione (strategy of tension) arose in the 1970s 
characterized by widespread violence and revolt. New,  issue-based voting blocs, including 
feminists, environmentalists, labor unions, neofascists, reactionary Catholics, and Maoist 
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revolutionaries, sought to obtain political representation and legislative reforms, often without 
aligning themselves with the traditional parties.  
 In the first half of the 1970s, the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Communist 
Party (PCI) maintained their political dominance by cleaving votes away from the new 
movements, primarily through clientelism, exchange voting, and guarantees of public financial 
support.  The nationalizing regime in postwar politics that had begun in 1963 reached its apex in 
1976, when the DC and PCI accounted for a record seventy-three percent of the national vote.4 
However, as soon as this phase peaked, it abruptly ended. By 1980, the inability of the DC and 
PCI to represent the interests of far left and far right reformist groups culminated in major losses 
in national elections. Support shifted rapidly to the smaller Republican Party (PRI), Socialist 
Party (PSI), Radical Party (PR), Proletarian Democracy (DP), Social Movement (MSI), and 
others.  
 Although influenced by an inability of the major parties to follow through with promised 
reforms, the localization of political patronage was also a response to social and economic 
alterations that emerged in the 1970s. The international recession of 1973-1974 inspired a 
transition from neocapitalism to neoliberalism, symbolized by a push to reduce federal debt and 
expenditures by privatizing public services and industry and decentralizing government. The 
emergence of globalized financial, transportation, and communications networks fostered 
reterritorializations of place that brought into question the primacy of the nation-state.5  
 Related to the changes in political party power and economic policy of the 1970s, three 
specific occurrences would greatly reduce both the role of cinema in cultural struggles to define 
the nation and the relevance of the South as the primary hindrance to Italian nationalism. The 
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first of these was the displacement of cinema by television as the most popular medium. Second 
was the devolution of power to the twenty administrative regions and the subsequent rise of the 
“Third Italy.” Finally, came a proposed “Historic Compromise” between the DC and the PCI. I 
will discuss each of these in turn. 
 
The End of an Era: Crises in Cinema, Regionalism, and Ideology 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, cinema consumption superseded that of all other mass 
media (e.g. radio, print, and television) combined. In the 1960s, Italians “went to the cinema 
more often—per week, per adult—than any other audiences in the world.”6 In 1965, forty-nine 
percent of families owned a television set and only two channels were in operation, both run by 
the State company, RAI. Television was initially considered il cinema dei poveri (the cinema of 
the poor) in reference both to its “free” cost and to a viewership pattern involving groups 
gathered around a solitary set in a local bar, church, or community center.7 By 1975, however, 
television-set ownership had reached ninety-two percent of households. This growth included an 
extraordinary increase in the South. Whereas in 1965, less than twenty-seven percent of southern 
families owned their own set, by 1975 this number had reached eight-five percent.8   
From its inception in 1954 until 1976, television existed mostly as the central mass-media 
platform for the DC and the Catholic Church. The DC maintained control of government during 
this period, and even though RAI sold airtime to advertisers, the DC managed to discriminate 
against potential buyers. A potent example involved the refusal of airtime for automobile 
companies other than FIAT, since the largest Italian manufacture did not want competitors’ cars 




In 1975, however, the regulatory structure of RAI was changed and the main control of 
programming and advertising boards moved from the government to parliament. Other major 
developments quickly followed. In 1972, the Constitutional Court allowed private-sector radio 
and television programs at the local level. Three years later, RAI began broadcasting a third 
channel devoted to local and regional news programs. By 1980, hundreds of local radio and 
television stations had developed throughout the country. Importantly though, cable television 
was still forbidden, so RAI was able to preserve its monopoly over national broadcasts.  
In the 1980s, Silvio Berlusconi and his company Fininvest created a private network of 
three regional channels (e.g. Canale 5, Italia 1, and Rete 4) that successfully competed with RAI 
for audience shares. This success, which eventually fostered the evolution of the channels from 
local to national, was indebted to the restrictive advertising policies of RAI. The rise of private 
television finally allowed the large number of consumer-product-based companies that had 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s the means to reach all corners of the domestic market with their 
advertising.9 In less than a decade after deregulation, television had become in Italy what it is 
today: the most profitable, pervasive, and popular visual medium.  
The ability of the cinema industry to compete with television was doomed for numerous 
reasons, all essentially financial. The exponential costs of producing films compared to television 
shows led many directors to make projects directly for the small screen. Television also reduced 
pressures to make profitable films since, in contrast to big-screen productions that derived their 
entire returns from ticket sales and distribution fees, responsibility for a television network’s 
bottom-line was split among dozens of programs and their overall capacity to generate 
competition among advertisers. The economic crisis initiated by the 1973-1974 recession 
crippled the cinema industry, given its dependence on large sums of credit, consumers with 
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disposable income, and the largest possible number of theater screens. The dire financial 
situation of the 1970s forced over three thousand theaters (predominantly of the terza visione 
variety) to close. Plummeting attendance and reduction in international investment limited both 
the number and scope of films being made. After a twenty-year period in which Italian films 
maintained most of domestic box-office revenue, American movies had regained their position 
of dominance by the early 1980s, accounting for approximately eighty percent of the Italian 
market share.10  
As the last cohesive and popular genre of the postwar period to tackle issues of social and 
political representation imbricated in struggles to define the modern nation, spaghetti westerns 
appropriately reflected the irreversible transition from cinema to television. The success of the 
spaghetti western in the early 1970s, when television viewership was rapidly supplanting theater 
attendance, can be explained in part by the genre’s similarities to small-screen productions. The 
serial tendencies—exemplified by the repetition of protagonists and their personalized problem-
solving techniques in ever-changing situations and locations—mirrored the narrative formula of 
popular television programs. Dispelling audience expectations from film to film overrode 
concerns for production value, authenticity, and directorial artistry that distinguished cinema, at 
least superficially, from television. Based on subject matter and marketing strategies, spaghetti 
westerns also masqueraded as American products akin to the imported television programs from 
the United States that were beginning to be broadcast by RAI in the late 1960s.    
The internal transition of the genre from the politically charged Zapata variant to the 
comic western can be viewed as symptomatic of television’s “victory” over cinema. The 
replacement of pistols with open fists and of revolutionary ideology with slapstick humor 
harbored a symbolic equivalence to the end of cinema “as the most powerful weapon.”11 The 
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abrupt decline in the medium’s force and influence also had a very real effect on theorizations of 
nationalism, for “just at the moment when we are able to detect a nationwide acculturation taking 
place as a result of Italian cinema reaching all classes and areas,” the public’s gaze shifted from 
the communal seats of local theaters to the private realm of the living room.     
The extent of television’s neutralization of cinema in the 1970s was matched by 
diminished importance of the Southern Question brought about by new administrative and 
conceptual regional alignments. Although the Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948) had 
included provisions for the granting of a degree of autonomy to the twenty regions, devolution 
did not occur until 1970, when the fifteen statuto ordinario (ordinary statute) regions were given 
political, legislative, and financial powers similar to those of the five previously established 
statuto speciale (special statute) regions.12 The most common reason offered by the DC for their 
slowness in implementing the regional-autonomy mandates contained within the Constitution 
was a claim that decentralization was only viable after the nation had transformed the centralized 
framework of Fascism into a national system based on republican principles. Opponents issued a 
different explanation, however, suggesting that the DC prevented extension of regional powers 
out of fear that the PCI, which had been excluded from national government since 1948, would 
gain control of local and regional policy-making.  
Pressured by the PSI—whose support was needed to maintain governmental majority in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s—the DC slowly agreed to a series of reforms that gave ever-
expanding authority to the twenty regions.13 These were the first steps in Italy’s march toward 
twenty-first century federalism.14 Notably, the devolution of political power allowed for a 
deferment of fiscal responsibility from the national to the regional level. Changes to the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno were indicative of this transfer, as substantially less money was allocated for 
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the organization from 1976 until 1993, when it was finally dissolved. Originally devised to carry 
out “extraordinary” interventions that local and regional institutions could not afford themselves, 
the Cassa’s focus in the mid-1970s turned from creation of a unitary industrial and agricultural 
framework for the South to funding for “ordinary” interventions requested by local authorities, 
such as road- and school-building projects.   
The political rationale behind decentralization had a symbolic counterpart. Whereas 
devolution was viewed as a means to temper pressures from regional autonomy movements and 
to hold underachieving regions accountable for their own competitive economic development, it 
essentially amounted to an admission that national unity was culturally unviable.15 This, of 
course, was a principle argument underlying the historic dualism between the North and South. 
Ironically, decentralization of fiscal and administrative power in the 1970s emboldened new 
forms of entrepreneurship in the central and northeast regions that challenged the hegemony of 
the North and greatly disrupted longstanding macroregional divisions.  
The emergence of a conceptual “Third Italy” in the late 1970s brought into question the 
relevance of regional dualism to postwar development. Third Italy delineated a group of regions 
in the northeast and center portions of the country that produced relatively high economic growth 
rates during a period of national stagnation [Fig. 7.1]. Their success was indebted to expansion of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in a number of craft sectors—e.g. textiles, leather, 
ceramics, furniture, and artisanal foods—that were spatially clustered, cooperative, and capable 
of establishing niches in export markets.16 This model contrasted with the traditional large-firm, 
heavy-industry complex of the Northwest industrial triangle—an area undergoing a severe crisis 
in the mid-1970s owing to labor strikes, skyrocketing fuel and raw material costs, and increased 




Figure 7.1. The Three Italies.   
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historically imagined North into two economically divergent halves, Third Italy diminished the 
impact of framing the South as antithetical to the modern nation. It shifted focus to the out-dated 
and inefficient trappings of the postwar industrial base in the Northwest. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, many southern regions imitated the SME-cluster model of Third Italy, with firms in 
sectors such as wine, olive oil, orchard fruits, and food processing, joining established 
cooperatives in the central regions.17  
Interestingly, the SME model that defined Third Italy succeeded in both Catholic and 
Communist political strongholds. The greatest majority in national support for the DC 
throughout the postwar period (as a percentage of regional votes) came from la zona bianca in 
the northeast, while the PCI was firmly entrenched in the central regions that comprised la zona 
rossa.18  On the surface, this occurrence was a testament to the capacity of Third Italy’s 
development model to accomplish what had the North and South had failed to—namely, the 
conciliation of the interests of capital and labor. Ideologically, this served more as a symbol of 
the final acquiescence of political values to the superiority of economics, which, for leftist 
critics, echoed a similar submission by their political leaders, embedded in the proposed 
compromesso storico (Historic Compromise) between the DC and PCI. 
Based in part on the coalition agreement struck by the DC and PSI in the 1960s, the 
compromesso storico gained traction in the mid-1970s after the PCI severed its ties to the Soviet 
Union and embraced Eurocommunism under the leadership of Enrico Berliguer. Fearing the loss 
of regional influence as a function of decentralization and recognizing its inability to contain the 
disruptive effects of social movements, the DC viewed an alignment with the PCI as a way to 
maintain its governmental majority. Following their parliamentary gains in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the PCI saw its chance to transform from a “party of struggle” to a “party of 
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struggle and government” and thereby to move from a position of exclusion within the 
bipartitismo imperfetto (imperfect two-party system) to one of equitable power in a 
coassociativismo imperfetto (imperfect coassociationism).19 Thinking in this way, the party 
distanced itself from several radical movements in order to negotiate a coalition with the DC. As 
Antonio Negri has stated: 
The four years from 1974 to 1978 saw a progressive tightening of the alliance 
between the DC and the PCI: this alliance extended outwards from government 
and parliament to the whole system of power, from the central administration out 
to the periphery, to the trade unions, to the running of communications and the 
media and even, remarkably, to the police. However, at the same time, Italy's 
broadly-based social struggles were becoming more intense and the social 
movements broke definitively with all forms of institutional representation.20 
 
 
Resentment by working-class movements and Marxist revolutionaries towards what they 
saw as a betrayal of traditional Communist-party principles by the official leaders of the left 
came to a boiling point in 1978. The Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades)—a militant extremist 
group—kidnapped the former DC Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, who was one of the main figures 
brokering the compromise. After two months of government refusal to meet their demands, the 
Brigate Rosse killed Moro. This act officially ended attempts to create a compromesso storico. 
The PCI never recovered either. Electoral support declined amidst its failure to reestablish 
connections to the social movements that had been marginalized, and the party returned to its 
subservient position under the DC. The PCI also had become “something which in its original 
glorious history it had never previously been: a bureaucratic grouping, cut off from society and 






Pasolini’s Eulogy to Postwar Possibilities: Uccellaci e uccellini  
Perhaps it is no surprise that Pier Paolo Pasolini, one of the most vocal and incendiary 
critics of Italian postwar development, presaged the 1970s crises of cinema, ideology, and 
national unity in his allegorical tale Uccellacci e uccellini (Hawks and Sparrows, 1966). This 
film unfolds as a Catholic parable within a Marxist parable. Pasolini’s juxtaposition of the two 
main ideological currents at odds in the modern nation is played out through a series of comic 
encounters that ultimately highlight the pervasiveness of class antagonisms, secular progress, and 
political abstraction. The “outer” story centers on a father and son, Innocenti Totò and Innocenti 
Ninetto (Nino), who wander the outskirts of Rome. They are eventually joined by a talking 
crow—a Marxist intellectual who serves as Pasolini’s alter ego.  
 When Nino asks the crow where he is from, the bird replies: “I am from far away. My 
country is called Ideology. My parents are Mr. Doubt and Mrs. Conscience. I live in the capital, 
the city of the future, on Karl Marx Street.” The crow then explains his reason for conversing 
with the men, expounding a personal belief of Pasolini in the process: the subproletarians are 
“blessed” by their “innocence, simplicity, and grace.” The crow wishes to follow them “along a 
road that no one knows,” but eventually leads to “that place where all roads meet.” The physical 
road the men traverse happens to be a loop that surrounds Rome—a real and symbolic divide 
between city and country. The fact that the road never enters either realm and ends where it 
begins clearly alludes to Dante’s Purgatorio. As they start their walk along a freeway overpass 
under construction, the crow opines that “the road begins, and the journey is already over.” The 
statement is indicative of the director’s suggestion that the structural mechanisms of 
modernization effectively reduce the possible avenues of development to a singular, 
homogenizing, and capitalist path.  
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 Pasolini cleverly comments on the disorienting effects of modernity’s transformation of 
place by constructing a heterotopic and imagined geography. Father, son, and crow wander 
through streets with names derived from the realities they contain, moving from “Via Benito La 
Lacrima, Disoccupato,” a road named after a man crying over his unemployment, to “Via 
Antonio Mangiapasta, Scopino,” a street that “puts the food consumer on the same level as the 
garbage collector.”22 They pass signs in the desolate outskirts that point to Istanbul and Cuba, 
thousands of kilometers away [Fig. 7.2]. Although these markers hint at the interconnections 
being created by globalization, their randomness calls into question the relevance of such 
associations (in terms of noneconomic factors), while the vast distances displayed extol an 
isolation of place symptomatic of deterritorialization.  
 The “inner” story is a parable told by the crow to the father and son that focuses on two 
Fransciscan friars, Brother Ciccillo and Brother Ninetto (played by the same actors, Totò and 
Ninetto Davoli), who are asked by St. Francis to convert the “arrogant hawks and humble 
sparrows” to Catholicism [Fig. 7.3]. After a year of living amongst the hawks, Brother Ciccillo is 
able to learn their language and successfully convince the birds to love one another and to 
worship the Lord. Converting the sparrows proves to be more difficult for, as Brother Ciccillo 
learns, these birds communicate through gestures rather than auditory “language.” The friars 
eventually teach the sparrows to love as well. However, on their way back to the monastery, they 
witness a hawk killing a sparrow.  Dismayed, the friars admit to St. Francis that they were able to 
show the birds how to love themselves and the Lord but not each other. St. Francis implores the 

































The world must be changed. We know that as society gradually progresses, the 
awareness of its imperfect composition arises, and its strident, imploring 
inequalities emerge, those that afflict mankind. Isn’t this awareness of the 
inequality between classes and between nations, the most serious threat to peace?  
 
Although the quotation imparts a Marxist slant, in actuality the words that St. Francis cites are 
those of Pope John XXIII. The applicability of the statement to both ideologies evinces a primary 
claim of Pasolini’s: that Catholicism and Communism, as viable world views, are rendered 
equally in crisis by the socioeconomic changes wrought by modernization. In Pasolini’s 
allegorical dialectic, the predatory hawks are an obvious symbol of the bourgeoisie and the 
sparrows, as their prey, signify the subproletariat. 
 As the action returns to the present, an intertitle reiterates the role of the crow as the 
Marxist counterpart to the father and son. It reads: “For anyone in doubt or not paying attention, 
we would like to point out that the raven is a “left-wing intellectual” of the era preceding Palmiro 
Togliatti’s death.”23 The men continue their walk, and along the way get into a fight with a group 
of farmers over private property rights before stumbling into the house of a peasant woman. In 
this sequence, Innocenti Totò plays the part of an unsympathetic landlord demanding rent from 
the woman, even though it is clear she has nothing to offer, not even food. Her appearance and 
mannerisms, together with the soundtrack, portray the woman as Chinese. The scene is meant to 
invoke “the spectacle of the Third World and its exploitation by the West,” but also suggests that 
the subproletariat has lost all sense of unity, as sparrows now prey upon other sparrows.24 Totò, 
however, is put is his proper place in the social hierarchy when he is treated similarly by an 
engineer to whom he owes money.  
 Further down the road, the wanderers happen upon the funeral procession of Togliatti. Of 
course, they are nowhere near the city center where this historic event actually occurred. Pasolini 
inserts newsreel footage of the funeral between shots of Totò and Nino looking into the distance, 
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as if they were witnessing the event. In the spatial, temporal, and visual detachment from its 
object, their gaze constitutes a lament more than a first-hand observation. Pasolini focuses 
attention on Communist Party members simultaneously giving clenched-fist salutes and crossing 
themselves. As Peter Bondanella has proposed, “no more striking and incongruous picture could 
be presented of contemporary Italy’s ideological confusion than this strange mixture of Marxism 
and Christianity.”25    
 At the end of the film, the crow has lectured the father and son to the point of boredom. 
Exasperated by their companion, the duo kills the crow and devours him along the roadside. The 
scene is a comic inversion of the traditional Eucharist, with the suggestion being that the “body 
of Marx, like that of Christ, will provide mystic nourishment for the subproletariat” on their 
journey to an unforeseeable place in the future.26 
 Aesthetically, Pasolini repeatedly references cinematic works of his predecessors and 
contemporaries. The casting of Totò sets the tone for the entire film, for the legendary actor 
exudes a comic mastery akin to Charlie Chaplin. Totò’s expressions, along with numerous shots 
of the father and son walking along desolate roads and hopping around like birds, are direct 
allusions to Chaplin’s film, Modern Times (1936), a similarly parodic critique of industrial 
society. Another sequence, in which Totò and Nino happen upon an odd group of travelling 
carnival performers, respectfully lampoons the picaresque style of Federico Fellini’s early works. 
Most of all, Pasolini cites the rhythm and visual clichés of the neorealist tradition. However, the 
influences of neorealism are contaminated by comic gags, sped-up motion, and existential 
monologues by the crow (an aberration in itself). The circular road that ends where it begins 
symbolizes the director’s claim that neorealism has run its course and “the ideologies it reflected 
are now dead and part of history.”27 This verdict is reiterated by the crow’s proclamation near the 
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end of the film that “it is the sunset of great hopes. . . . The age of Brecht and Rossellini is 
finished. Ideology is no longer in fashion.” Pasolini’s point is simple: For cinema to continue to 
comment, inform, and inspire, new modes of artistic construction and visual communication are 
required—forms that reflect the specific cultural and political landscape of postboom society in 
ways that mirror, rather than copy, the historical efficacy of neorealism to the immediate postwar 
reconstruction period. 
 For many directors of the late 1960s and early 1970s, this crisis led them to seek 
inspiration in the developing world, abandoning the self-reflexive tendencies of the pre- and 
postwar eras in favor of a borderless cinema that investigated the effects of globalization. Franco 
Solinas, screenwriter of several Zapata westerns, summarized the logic behind this movement: 
First, the working class was thought of as completely integrated; it seemed 
nonexistent in relation to the revolutionary cause. Second, a deep analysis of the 
political situation had completely ruled out the possibility of a revolution on our 
continent. You can understand how explosions of colonial contradictions, the 
revolutions, the armed struggles that then were erupting in the entire geography of 
the Third World stirred up hope as well as interest. You had come to believe that 
capitalism, seemingly undefeatable at home, could have been defeated once and 
for all in its supplying bases.28       
 
For Italy, the postboom transition marked the end of discussions of a national cinema, as concern 
for italianità gave way to a burgeoning internationalism in both popular and auteur filmmaking. 
 
Visual Media, Identity, and Contestation: Lessons from and for Developing Nations  
 Just as attention of many leftist Italian directors turned to the conditions of the Third 
World proletariat, their counterparts in the Global South looked to postwar Italian cinema for 
tactics suited to their own oppositions to dominant constructions of nationalism and neoliberal 
development. One hope was postulated by Argentine filmmakers, Fernando Solanas and Octavio 
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Getino in their 1969 manifesto, "Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the 
Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World,"—one that contrasted with the 
“First Cinema” of Hollywood and the “Second Cinema” of European auteur films.29 Whereas 
First Cinema was the hegemonic boogeyman representative of U. S. imperialism, the problem 
with Second Cinema was that its original “attempt at cultural decolonization . . . had reached the 
outer limits of what the System permits.”30 Reminiscent of Pasolini’s claim, Solanas and Getino 
proffered: 
While, during the early history (or the prehistory) of the cinema, it was possible to 
speak of a German, an Italian, or a Swedish cinema clearly differentiated and 
corresponding to specific national characteristics, today such differences have 
disappeared. The borders were wiped out along with the expansion of U. S.  
imperialism and the film model that is imposed: Hollywood movies.31 
 
The Third Cinema was imagined as a new form of filmic creation that utilized the most 
affective subversive methods of auteur cinema yet remained outside the Hollywood-industrial 
system via emphasis on collective authorship, guerilla-filmmaking techniques, and clandestine or 
free public viewing. In this quest, the contestatory cinema of the Italian postwar period provided 
the greatest inspiration and relevance. Proponents of Third Cinema saw unparalleled political 
and economic similarities between their nations in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, 
and Italy (as opposed to other European countries). These commonalities included the relative 
youth of the modern Republic, rapidity of industrial development and its associated 
transformation of agrarianism, concurrence of growth in mass media consumption and the 
secularization of national culture, extraordinary migration flows and urbanization, and the 
profuse influence of the U. S. on development strategies and political leadership. Considering 
that a primary tenet of Third Cinema was to present “areas of national life often neglected by 
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official discourse and industrial cinema and thrust them into the international limelight,” the 
legacy of Italian postwar cinema provided profound examples.32 
Dissections of the various Italian genres pinpoint the specific formal modes considered to 
have the greatest oppositional vigor and cultural resonance. neorealism adequately conveyed the 
revolutionary spirit of proletarian movements and posited an alternative, nonauthoritarian and 
noneconomic path to national unity. Realistic presentations of the conditions of the downtrodden 
and oppressed imparted the underlying ideological messages with an appearance of credibility 
and objectivity. A downside to neorealism, however, was the prevalence of melodrama that 
stained the narrative structure. Melodrama sanitized the radical tropes of the genre—the use of 
nonprofessional actors and location shooting, and presentation of the everyday lives of the 
poor—by infusing theatricality and sentimentality into depictions of reality. This allowed for the 
genre’s defining visual codes to be translated to more programmatic and fictional “character 
studies,” in which the examination of social relations centered on the comic or quixotic 
experiences of the everyday, devoid of broader political engagement and ideological impress. 
Another drawback of neorealism was its inability to offer practical solutions to the realities it 
conveyed. As the Italian case indicated, audiences were likely to grow weary of seeing their own 
plight exhibited on film without any offering of resolution or optimism. 
Although the sardonic and self-reflexive commedia all’italiana genre illustrated the 
unrivaled ability of comedy to captivate the widest geographic and demographic audience, its 
emphasis on humor distracted from the seriousness of pressing cultural and political issues. 
Regardless of the social preconceptions these films intended to subvert, they ran the risk of 
reiterating, rather than deconstructing, stereotypes. Despite being more popular than comedy 
among the working classes, the peplum genre suffered the escapist trappings of First Cinema—a 
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simplistic rendering of good and evil and fantasy-laden storylines bound to ancient history. The 
spaghetti western genre maintained the disadvantages of the pepla. Yet, the specific intent to 
subvert the genre most emblematic of First Cinema (as conducted by the Zapata westerns, in 
particular) was a radical move forward. Even though spaghetti westerns developed within the 
industrial framework established by Hollywood, they demonstrated the possibility of 
contaminating dominant systems of representation from within “the fortress.”  
Third Cinema found its greatest inspiration in certain elements of auteur cinema—
specifically, the interrogative “film inquests” that utilized the documentary techniques of 
neorealism to project unwavering ideological and acerbic critiques of the status quo. Of course, 
such overtly political films were not without their weaknesses. They often failed to generate 
mass viewership and their message was frequently bound to the personal philosophy of 
individual authors. However, the ability of films such as Pasolini’s Accattone, Mamma Roma, 
and Comizi d’amore, Luchino Visconti’s Rocco e i suoi fratelli, and Francesco Rosi’s Salvatore 
Giuliano and Le mani sulla città to produce official reactions from the State attested to their 
influence. The power in this mode of production derived from its resistance to co-optation and 
adaptation. Refutation of the claims put forth in these films required either public 
acknowledgment of the subversive messages, (which effectively provided free publicity to 
contestatory arguments), or production of responsive works by the State (which would be 
lambasted as propaganda and likely inspire more “inquests”). 
Given the omnipresence of First Cinema and its essentially complete assimilation of 
Second Cinema in Western nations, it seems logical to project that “film as a subversive art” is 
nearing its end.33 However, Third Cinema is alive and well, evidenced by a profusion of critical 
films being made in West Africa, Brazil, Cuba, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Oceania, and by 
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immigrants from such nations now living in Europe and North America.34 Compared to new 
media, cinema still struggles to overcome the elitism ascribed to the relatively high cost of 
production. Yet, the primary advantage it retains over television, print, radio, and the internet is 
its lack of saturation. Annual global production of films totals in the thousands—a minuscule 
number compared to the millions of articles, television programs, albums, weblogs, and 
webvideos produced yearly. Whereas filmmakers are able to use television and the Internet to 
disseminate their works beyond the silver screen, the reverse is rare.  
For twenty-first century artists determined to express alternative views of the effects of 
sociopolitical and economic transformation, the proclamation by Solanas and Getino still 
resonates: “The capacity for synthesis and the penetration of the film image, the possibilities 
offered by the living document, and naked reality, and the power of enlightenment of audiovisual 
means make film far more effective than any other tool of communication.”35 Even though 
cinema’s reign as the most popular visual medium lasted for only a few decades, the role that this 
“seventh art” played in postwar Italian struggles to define the nation greatly contributed to 
contemporary understandings of the power of film. In a world where “the image of reality is 
more important than reality itself,” there is no better medium to challenge the hegemony of 
neoliberalism and imperialism—which depends so much on the veiling of socioeconomic 
relations behind a “screen of images and appearances.” As Pasolini declared, cinema is “the 
semiology of reality,” and films represent reality “with reality itself.”36        
   For the Mezzogiorno, cinema during the postwar period enabled the inclusion of the 
masses in regional and national discourse for the first time since unification. Contextual analysis 
of genre development between 1945 and 1975 illustrates how the strategies of social and political 
engagement of the Southern Question concocted during the eighty years of the Liberal period 
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were refashioned and contested during the first thirty years of the modern State. Although 
postwar cinema empowered refutations of the longstanding stereotypes of southern 
backwardness, parochialism, and criminality in a representational form open to all strata of the 
population, it also reiterated the Achilles’ heel of southern identity. The South has always been 
defined from the outside, as a comparative Other of the North, as well as of modernity and 
progress. More films have been made for or about the South than by southerners themselves. 
Whether one can posit southern culture as a collection of identifiable commonalities is somewhat 
irrelevant, just as attempts to define working-class culture are mired in futility and abstraction. 
This is because the South, as an imagined space, has been, and still is of greater rhetorical 
(political) value than any reality (sociocultural).  
In recent years, scholars and artists have begun to produce portraits of the South 
responsive to Franco Cassano’s call for pensiero meridiano (southern thinking).37 The Istituto 
Meridiana (IMES), founded in the 1980s with the aim of investigating the South according to “its 
constitutive parts and to its internal differences” rather than its opposition “as a homogeneous 
bloc to the Center-North,” remains at the forefront of producing endogenous scholarly works that 
contest the “Mezzogiorno’s mainstream history, founded upon a deformed image of uniform 
backwardness and poverty.”38 The last decade has seen the growth of Neapolitan, Sicilian, and 
Apulian schools of cinema in reference to a number of films made by southern filmmakers that 
focus on documenting contemporary regional life.39 New southernist literature and cinema, in a 
Gramscian sense, seek to empower the South by obtaining hegemony over the representation of 
identity—something that has alluded to region since its ideological conception.      
In relation to the national question, the South has proven to be a necessary site of 
displacement. Since unification, the region has been invoked both as the primary hindrance to 
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economic development and national unity and as creator of the corrupt, inefficient, and 
polarizing aspects of State centralization. In the last two decades, southerners have been replaced 
as the barbarous, contaminating Others of the North by an unprecedented influx of migrants from 
the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans. Italy’s transformation from its historic position of 
massive emigration to one of net immigration has produced a xenophobic backlash, most 
fervently voiced by political parties of the right. One might think that such growing disdain for 
foreigners would entail an end to prejudice towards southerners, as Italians are called to rally 
around an imagined ethnic nationalism. This, however, has not been the case. As recently as 
2008, the Lega Nord’s Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, iterated familiar lines when he 
declared that the “southern culture of organized crime” was the greatest problem facing the 
nation, and that “the government [was] facing a civil war” between a “progressive North and a 
South that knows nothing but corruption and violence.”40  
As unified Italy nears its sesquicentennial, the persistence of regional antagonisms 
suggests that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Or, perhaps Giuseppe di 
Lampedusa, in his novel, Il Gattopardo, set in Sicily on the eve of Garibaldi’s invasion, said it 
best: “If things are to stay as they are, things will have to change.”41                           
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Notes on Selecting and Reading Films 
  
To produce this dissertation, I conducted a critical analysis or “reading” of ninety-seven 
films, newsreels, and documentaries, the majority of which are listed in the Filmography that 
follows. The selection process was straightforward. My focus on the postwar years through 1975 
determined the primary delineation, with the exception of Fascist-era films from the 1930s. My 
interest in five specific genres—neorealism, commedia all’italiana, interrogative auteur cinema, 
peplum, and spaghetti westerns—further reduced the pool. The genres themselves were chosen 
based on two elementary characteristics: By definition, their subject matter addresses differences 
between the Italian North and South, and/or they constitute the most popular genres (i.e. those 
with the greatest number of viewers and box-office returns) of their specific time periods.  
Working from several filmographies produced by film historians and theorists (in English 
and Italian), I created a master list of films from the aforementioned genres that also met 
temporal boundaries based on each genre’s period of greatest popularity. I defined such periods 
via the years of highest film production, audience viewership/box-office revenue, and 
national/international awards and acclaim. This list totaled just over five hundred works. I 
reduced it based on which works met at least one of three criteria: they were one of the top-ten 
domestic grossing films of their respective years; they were productions by the State (e.g. the 
INCOM and LUCE newsreels); or they or their directors inspired official responses (usually of a 




I obtained the majority of films for viewing from commonplace outlets such as libraries 
and rental companies. Other films were purchased from retail establishments, and a few 
(especially newsreels) were viewed online via the RAI and LUCE electronic archives.  
My analysis of the ninety-seven films included multiple steps and methodologies. I first 
watched them as any casual observer would—as a continuous act from start to finish, done 
without taking notes or stopping the performance. As a nonnative Italian speaker, this first 
viewing included watching the film with subtitles (when available). Afterwards, I would record 
my general impressions and write a brief synopsis of the plot. I then determined the relevance of 
the film’s content and subject matter to my overall inquiry into Italian regionalism, nationalism, 
and place representation. This decision largely was based on the degree to which central issues of 
postwar development and nation-building were engaged in each work. Films set in the South 
and/or those that presented discussions of southern society, mores, and migration were identified 
for further examination. So were those dealing with changes in morality, urban versus rural 
landscapes, contestations of hegemonic structures (e.g. Christian-Democratic envisionments of 
the modern nation), and the effects of modernization. This process reduced the sample to fifty-
three films, newsreels, and documentaries.  
My second viewing of the smaller sample involved a semiotic analysis centered on the 
identification and description of visual iconography. In this instance, I focused on ways that 
environmental settings were presented in the film. I developed a set of questions concerning the 
depiction of landscape that could be repeated from sequence to sequence and film to film. These 
included: Does the scene take place inside or outside? Is the setting urban or rural? Is there any 
clear indication of place location (i.e. North or South, Milan or Turin)? Is landscape active or 
passive?—meaning, does the environment have an active effect on the actions of the characters 
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or is it merely a backdrop? Is the space populated or empty? What are the dominant iconic 
symbols of the landscape? For example, if the location is urban, are buildings, vehicles, 
billboards, and roads emphasized over other visual signs?  
When possible, I extended semiotic analysis during the second viewing to document the 
portrayal of characters. Sometimes this required a separate third viewing. I devised a similar set 
of questions for this: Are characters distinguished by their appearances? If so, what clothing, 
facial hair, or accoutrements differentiate people from different social and economic classes? 
What aspects of physical appearance are meant to differentiate northerners from southerners, 
peasants from urbanites? Are the particularities of appearance intended to convey the social 
standing or place of origin of a character? 
Subsequent viewings (sometimes to a total of eight) centered on contextual, or qualitative 
content analysis of the films. One aspect of this followed traditional film theory and criticism 
methodology, the documentation of technical aspects of production such as shot construction and 
focal length, mise-en-scene, editing, diegetic and nondiegetic sound, and pacing. Concerning plot 
construction, narrative function, and authorial intent of each film, I then supplemented my 
insights with interpretations offered by previous film reviews and criticism both 
contemporaneous to a film’s release and retrospective.  
Conclusions pertaining to the intended messages of the films were greatly enhanced both 
by the utilization of existing literature produced by film critics and historians and by explications 
of the directors themselves. Visconti, Rosi, Pasolini, Leone, Antonioni, De Sica, and De Seta all 
are the subjects of autobiographies and/or biographies plus documentaries in which these artists 
discussed the themes, motivations, ideological messages, and social, economic, and political 
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criticism within their films. My comments on recurrent allusions to Dante’s Purgatorio in 
Pasolini’s films, for example, are rendered more credible by the director’s documented 
admission of such intended references in his films.   
Given my overarching interest in contextualizing film as a product of specific cultural 
and political undercurrents during postwar development, I relied on standard accounts of modern 
Italian history to enframe my analysis of the social conditions in which films and genres were 
produced. For example, Paul Ginsborg’s discussion in A History of Contemporary Italy of the 
realistic and valorizing treatment of the Roman peripheral landscape in Pasolini’s Accattone 
added credence to my examination of the urban periphery as a targeted “site of exclusion” in 
Italy’s modernization. Ginsborg has documented how the visual imagery of the Roman borgata 
in the film was reprinted and used in protests against the perceived misappropriation of tenement 
construction funds in the capital city. Similarly, John Foot, in Milan Since the Miracle has 
documented how Rocco e i suoi fratelli created such an uproar in Milan over the impoverished 
and disintegrated conditions of migrant neighborhoods that the city council subsequently set 
aside special funds for increased services to these areas. 
Ultimately, rather than relying on any singular methodology, I did as Gillian Rose 
suggests in Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials and 
“mixed methods.” What has worked for me has been described as a “close reading” of film, 
“close” being synonymous with humanistic. Jeffrey Bardzell has defined this approach nicely: 
A close reading doesn’t involve a set methodology and as such it is very hard to 
describe. . . . But the gist of this sort of approach is that an expert (which I will 
leave undefined here) engages with a text with great care. This engagement 
typically entails a number of activities: multiple readings/viewings of the text; 
situating the text in its social and historical contexts; deconstructing the text using 
a variety of critical strategies (e.g., from Marxism, feminism, poststructuralism, 
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postmodernism, structuralism, reception theory, psychoanalysis); bringing to bear 
what, if anything, everyone else has said about that text, including interviews with 
the author/creator, its critical tradition, similar texts (e.g., by the same 
author/creator); and so forth. Note that this sort of approach is holistic and relies 
for its success on the expertise of the expert doing it; it is unique, individual, and 
subjective; it does not follow any disembodied abstract methodology but rather 
the logic of the scholar-expert in whose hands it is being executed.1
My aim has been to balance my subjective and personal reading of the films with a 
(fairly) objective historical narrative that incorporates statistical data and analysis in an attempt 
to explain regional specificity. In a way, my approach exhibits a “betweenness” similar to that of 
chorology, which has been described “as being located on an intellectual continuum between 
science and art, or as offering a form of understanding that is between description and 
explanation.”
 
2 My contextualist analysis deviates from traditional chorology, of course, in its 
“emphasis on the study of space and society rather than on nature and society,” and its emphasis 
on “theory and an explicit concern with meaning.”3
 In analyses of place representation, separating science and art is a foolhardy endeavor. 
Art cannot evolve and continue to comment on and construct historical moments without 
utilizing or deconstructing technology and scientific innovation. Yet, science cannot enable 
itself, and its conclusions require mass communication to expand human knowledge. Generating 
desirable actions and fostering change requires more than the bare transmission of facts and 
numbers. Cultural translation is needed. In the world today, this intersection of scientific 
explication and artistic expression occurs predominantly through visual media.  
 
                                                          
     1 Jeffrey, Bardzell, “Discourse Analysis vs. Close Reading,” Interaction Culture: Musings on Interaction Design 
and Culture.  http://interactionculture.wordpress.com/2009/03/24/discourse-analysis-vs-close-reading/    
 
     2 J. Nicholas Entrikin, “The Betweenness of Place,” in Reading Human Geography: The Poetics and Politics of 
Inquiry, eds. Trevor Barnes and Derek Gregory (London: Arnold, 1997), 303. 
  






Note: Films are listed according to their Italian title. Titles in parentheses indicate 
American/English/International release titles (in italics), or translations (in roman type). 
Each citation also includes director(s), original production company or companies, and 
year of Italian release.  
 
 
Accattone. Pier Paolo Pasolini. Cino del Duca /Arco Film, 1961. 
 
Aurora sul mare (Dawn on the Sea). Giorgio Simonelli. Manenti Film, 1934. 
 
L’avventura (The Adventure). Michelangelo Antonioni. Cino del Duca /PCE /Lyre,  
     1960. 
 
I bambini ci guardano (The Children Are Watching Us). Vittorio De Sica. Scalera 
     /Invicta, 1944. 
 
Banditi a Orgosolo (Bandits of Orgosolo). Vittorio De Seta. Titanus, 1960.  
 
La battaglia di Algeri (The Battle of Algiers). Gillo Pontecorvo. Igor Film /Casbah Film, 
     1966. 
 
Blazing Saddles. Mel Brooks. Crossbow Productions /Warner Brothers Pictures, 1974. 
 
Il buono, il bruto, il cattivo (The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly). Sergio Leone. 
     PEA /Constantin, 1966. 
 
Cabiria. Giovanni Pastrone. Itala Film, 1914. 
 
Caccia tragica (The Tragic Hunt). Giuseppe De Santis. ANPI /Dante Film, 1947. 
 
Camicia nera (Black Shirt). Giovacchino Forzano. LUCE, 1933. 
 
C’era una volta il West (Once Upon a Time in the West). Sergio Leone. Rafran /Finanzia 
     San Marco /Paramount Pictures, 1968. 
 
Lo chiamavano Trinità (They Call Me Trinity). Enzo Barboni. West Film, 1970. 
 
Comizi d’amore (Love Meetings). Pier Paolo Pasolini. Arco Film, 1965. 
 
Condottieri (Giovanni de Medici: The Leader). Luis Trenker and Werner Klingler. ENIC,  
     1937.  
 
. . . continuavano a chiamarlo Trinità (Trinity is STILL My Name!). Enzo Barboni. West  
     Film, 1971.  
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Cristo si è fermato a Eboli (Christ Stopped at Eboli). Francesco Rosi. Vides /RAI 
      /Action, 1979. 
 
Darò un milione (I’ll Give a Million). Mario Camerini. Novella Film, 1935. 
 
1860 (Gesuzza the Garibaldian Wife). Alessandro Blasetti. Cinès /Steffano Pittaluga 
     Films, 1934. 
 
Divorzio all’italiana (Divorce, Italian-Style). Pietro Germi. Lux /Galatea /Vides, 1961. 
 
Django. Sergio Corbucci. BRC /Tecisa, 1966. 
 
La dolce vita (The Sweet Life). Federico Fellini. Riama /Pathé Consortium /Gray-Film, 
     1960. 
 
Il dottor Antonio (Doctor Antonio). Enrico Guazzoni. Manderfilm, 1938. 
 
Ecce bomba (Behold the Bomb). Nanni Moretti. Filmalpha, 1978.  
 
Le fatiche di Ercole (The Labors of Hercules). Pietro Francisci. Galatea Film /O.S.C.A.R. 
     /Urania Film, 1957. 
 
A futura memoria: Pier Paolo Pasolini. Ivo Barnabò Micheli. 23 Giugno, 1986. 
 
Giù la testa (A Fistful of Dynamite; Duck, You Sucker!). Sergio Leone. EIA /Rafran /San 
     Miura, 1971. 
 
Gli uomini che mascalzoni! (What Scoundrels Men Are!). Mario Camerini. Cinès, 1932.  
 
I grandi magazzini (Department Store). Mario Camerini. Amato /Era Film, 1939.  
 
Il grido (The Cry). Michelangelo Antonioni. SpA Cinematografica /Robert Alexander 
     Productions, 1957. 
 
High Noon. Fred Zinnemann. Stanley Kramer Productions, 1952. 
 
Ladri di biciclette (The Bicycle Thief, a.k.a. Bicycle Thieves). Vittorio De Sica.  
      PDS-ENIC, 1948. 
 
Lorenzino de’ Medici (The Magnificent Rogue). Guido Brignone. Manenti Film, 1935. 
 
Luciano Serra pilota (Luciano Serra, Pilot). Goffredo Alessandrini. Aquila 
     Cinematografica, 1938.  
 
Maciste nella valle dei re (Maciste in the Valley of the Kings). Carlo Campogalliani.  
     Donati e Carpentieri /Films Borderie /Gallus Films /Jolly Films, 1960.  
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Mafioso (Mafioso). Alberto Lattuada. CCC /Dino de Laurentiis, 1962.  
 
The Magnificent Seven. John Sturges. Mirish Corporation /Alpha Productions, 1960. 
 
Un maledetto imbroglio (The Facts of Murder). Pietro Germi. Riama Film, 1959.  
 
Mamma Roma. Pier Paolo Pasolini. Arco Film /Cineriz, 1962. 
 
Le mani sulla città (Hands Over the City). Francesco Rosi. Galatea Film /Lyre, 1963.  
 
Modern Times. Charles Chaplin. Charles Chaplin Productions, 1936.  
 
Il Moralista (The Moralist). Giorgio Bianchi. Cinematografica Internazionale /Napolean 
     Film, 1959.  
 
Il Mulino del Po (The Mill on the Po). Alberto Lattuada. Lux, 1948. 
 
My Darling Clementine. John Ford. Twentieth-Century Fox, 1946. 
 
Non c’è pace tra gli ulivi (No Peace Under the Olive Tree). Giuseppe De Santis. Lux, 
     1950. 
 
Le notti di Cabiria. Federico Fellini. Dino de Laurentiis /Les Films Marceau, 1957. 
 
Paisà (Paisan). Roberto Rossellini. Foreign Films Productions /OFI, 1946. 
 
Palio. Alessandro Blasetti. Cinès, 1932. 
 
Per qualche dollaro in più (For a Few Dollars More). Sergio Leone. PEA /Gonzales 
     /Constantin, 1965. 
 
Per un pugno di dollari (A Fistful of Dollars). Sergio Leone. Jolly Film /Ocean Films 
     /Constantin, 1964. 
 
Piccolo mondo antico (Old-Fashioned World). Mario Soldati. ATA /ICI, 1941. 
 
Quién sabe? (A Bullet for the General). Damiano Damiani. M. C. M., 1966. 
 
La resa dei conti (The Big Gundown). Sergio Sollima. PEA /Tulio Demicheli P. C., 1966. 
 
Resurrectio (Resurrection). Alessandro Blasetti. Cinès, 1931. 
 
Riso amaro (Bitter Rice). Giuseppe De Santis. Lux, 1949. 
 
Rocco e i suoi fratelli (Rocco and His Brothers). Luchino Visconti. Titanus /Les Films 
     Marceau, 1960. 
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Roma, città aperta (Rome: Open City, a.k.a. Open City). Roberto Rossellini. Minerva  
     /Excelsa, 1945. 
 
Rotaie (Rails). Mario Camerini. SICIA, 1929.  
 
Salvatore Giuliano. Francesco Rosi. Galatea Film /Lux /Vides Cinematografica, 1962.  
 
Scipione l’africano (Scipio Africano: The Defeat of Hannibal). Carmine Gallone. ENIC,  
     1937.  
 
Sciuscià (Shoeshine). Vittorio De Sica. Societa Cooperativa Alfa Cinematografia, 1946. 
 
Sedotta e abbandonata (Seduced and Abandoned). Pietro Germi. CCF /Ultra Film /Vides, 
     1964. 
 
Senza pietà (Without Pity). Alberto Lattuada. Lux, 1948.  
 
Shane. George Stevens. Paramount, 1953. 
 
Il signor Max (Mister Max). Mario Camerini. Astra Film, 1937.  
 
Sole (Sun). Alessandro Blasetti. Augustus Film, 1929.  
 
I soliti ignoti (Big Deal on Madonna Street). Mario Monicelli. Lux /Vides /Cinecittà, 
     1958. 
 
Il sorpasso (The Easy Life). Dino Risi. Incei /Fair /Sancro Film, 1962. 
 
La spiaggia (Riviera, a.k.a. The Beach). Alberto Lattuada. CCC /Titanus /Gamma Film, 
     1954. 
 
Lo squadrone bianco (The White Squadron). Augusto Genina. Roma Film, 1936.  
 
Stromboli, terra di dio (Stromboli, Land of God). Roberto Rossellini. Berit Films /RKO, 
     1949. 
 
La tavola dei poveri (The Table of the Poor). Alessandro Blasetti. Cinès, 1932. 
 
Terra madre (Mother Earth). Alessandro Blasetti. Cinès, 1931. 
 
La terra trema: Episodio del mare (The Earth Trembles: Episode of the Sea). Luchino 
     Visconti. Universalia, 1948. 
 
Uccellacci e uccellini (Hawks and Sparrows). Pier Paolo Pasolini. Arco Film, 1966. 
 
Umberto D. Vittorio De Sica. Amato /Astoria /De Sica /Rizzoli Film, 1952. 
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Vamos a matar, compañeros (Compañeros). Sergio Corbucci. Atlántida Films /Terra  
     Filmkunst /Tritone Cinematografica, 1970. 
 
Vecchia guardia (Old Guard). Alessandro Blasetti. Fauno, 1934. 
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